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translation of ours of the Greek sophrosyne by the word besonnenheit, may have obtained in consequence of our former application of it in the Protagoras, Plato's idea could be expressed more appropriately in our language than by this term. That of moderation (Mâssigung), as it was translated by Cicero, in which he seems to have had Aristotle in his mind more than Plato, is certainly not to be used at all.

Socrates' transition from the one explanation, that discretion is self-knowledge, to the other that it is knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, might perhaps at first sight appear forced and sophistical. But if self-knowledge is knowledge of perfection and imperfection, of virtue or its opposite, and if virtue itself is a knowledge, which, rightly understood, must certainly be pre-supposed, and which Plato only ceased to repeat when the further repetition of it would have been tedious; then, certainly, self-knowledge is a knowledge conversant about knowledge or ignorance. And it is simply by means of this transition, and of the way in which this investigation prefaces the separation of the dialectic from the ethical, that the investigation of the particular notion of discretion is connected with the more general one of the nature of morals, which pervades all these dialogues, and the progress of which, moreover, is the reason why the Charmides has its place rightly assigned after the Laches. For the difference between the good and pleasure is here at once pre-supposed as recognised and granted, the required unity of knowledge and action in the province of ethics is brought nearer by the inquiry into the operation of virtue as separate and distinct from virtue itself, and above all the distinction between that higher species of

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knowledge, and that which is particular and empirical, is further carried out. And at the conclusion not only is the instance of the prophet repeated connectedly with the Laches, but is further outbidden by an instance of one who knows all from all times, and judges of all who know, so that the distinction between practical and technical knowledge can escape no one. the distinction taken between the knowledge that one knows, and the knowledge of what one knows, the complete difference of knowledge from perception with reference to its power of making itself its own object, and the hints given as to the relative and absolute, are very remarkable as leading notices in the work.

The fact, that all these general elucidations are disguised under apparent attempts to discover yet new explanations of the idea of discretion, is a peculiarity which to a certain degree already assimilates the Charmides in point of execution to the artificiality of the works of the second period; while by the more enlarged and more perfectly conceived problem relative to the definition of knowledge, it prepares the way more than anything that has preceded, not only for the Parmenides, but also for the Theætetus, and again starts from the apparent separation of the theoretical from the practical, which strikes us in the Protagoras and Parmenides. Any one not satisfied with the evident allusions to the Protagoras, must at all events be convinced by this connection that the Laches and Charmides do certainly belong to this place. For otherwise it would be natural enough, to consider these smaller expositions as exercises and introductions preparatory to those larger ones of justice in the Books of the Republic. But even supposing this to be the case, still,

in the first place, a corresponding exposition of wisdom would be wanting; and in the next, we may add, that that larger work evidently stands upon a different basis from these smaller ones with reference to the ethical ideas. Moreover the reader who has but rightly understood the nature of morality, as it is given in the present series, will not look in vain for proper expositions of justice and wisdom, but both may be constructed after Plato's own mind out of what is brought forward in the Laches and Charmides.

Some quite peculiar circumstance there certainly is attaching to that one explanation of discretion here advanced, which makes it consist in every one doing his own business. And even supposing that some of the sophists perhaps explained it thus, in order to give to this virtue quite a different meaning as applied to the governing and the governed: still this is not sufficient, nor is it indicated in such a manner as to justify the conclusion that it was Plato's object to refute this view. On the contrary, whoever observes the facility with which this explanation is again given up, and to the peculiarly satirical emphasis with which Socrates announces that it comes from Critias, will see that some particular allusion must be here concealed, and will hardly be able to refrain from thinking of personal relations of Critias, whether it be that in his challenges to Plato relative to the undertaking of public affairs he appealed to such arguments, or that in his notorious attempt to dissuade Socrates from teaching, he may have availed himself of a similar principle, which Plato here covers with ridicule as in itself perfectly indefinite. This would coincide very well with the probable period of the composition of the dialogue, which may be conveniently

placed in the anarchy, for after the death of Critias such an allusion would be no longer in the spirit of Plato, so we should have to look already for an apologetic purpose in it. The character of Charmides is strikingly the same as Xenophon represents it, so that this comparison is no slight voucher for the imitative truth of our Author.

VI. EUTHYPHRO.

As an investigation into the idea of piety, which is likewise brought forward in the Protagoras as one of the parts of virtue, the Euthyphro connects itself with that dialogue. But when compared with the Laches and Charmides, it appears, however, in the light of a very subordinate piece, because not only does its imperfect dress stand in very disadvantageous contrast with the richness and ornament which characterize these dialogues, but even its internal substance, when compared with what we find in them, does not acquit itself much better. For in the Euthyphro we can neither point to a progressive connection of the most general ethical ideas, nor, if we go no further than the particular notion which constitutes the immediate object of the investigation, are those indirect indications to be found which make the attentive reader sufficiently well acquainted with the views of the composer; but it is clear at once, and upon the face of the work, that the object in view is as limited as the mode of treating the argument is sceptical. Now the fact that so essential an element in the formation peculiar to the Platonic dialogues is here wanting, might fairly excite a suspicion that the present dialogue is one

of those which are to be denied a place among the works of Plato; and this suspicion is strengthened by many peculiarities in the execution which, instead of the already approved and finished master, betray a not unsuccessful, and therefore complacently consequentializing imitator, eager to push to extremes the moderate acquisition of a little dialectics and a somewhat superficial irony. Meanwhile, the rejection of this suspicion depends upon the validity of the following grounds. Firstly, the dialectic exercise contained in the Euthyphro, though not so comprehensive as that in the Charmides, is no less a natural offset from the Protagoras than, in itself, an approximation to, and preparation for, the Parmenides. This holds especially with regard to the development of the distinction between what indicates the nature of an idea, or only one of its relations, as well as with regard to the origin of that usage of language which Plato observes throughout in the sequel to mark this distinction. Moreover, in the remaining works of Plato, the notion of piety is cancelled out of the list of the four cardinal virtues, with which, in the Protagoras, it is still associated, and in such a manner that a particular notice on the subject is altogether necessary, and, if it were not to be found, must have been supposed lost. Later dialogues do indeed contain some positive expressions as to the nature of piety, and the relation in which it stands to those virtues; but in our author what is covert always precedes what is open and undisguised; and even these expressions are immediately connected with the merely negativing result of the Euthyphro. Lastly, it must be taken into consideration that this dialogue was unquestionably written between the accusation and condemnation of Socrates, and that, under these circumstances, Plato could hardly avoid

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