wise only an extremely loose connection would be perceptible, by the prevalent purpose, I mean, observable, of drawing attention to the different significations of existence, and their relation to one another and to ideas. And in this process it cannot indeed be denied, that the idea of unity is considered also according to its own separate potentialities: but this is, first, not an educt from the idea of unity; and, secondly, Plato indicates so clearly when this is the case, that neither can the attentive reader go wrong, nor can any one suppose in the writer the intention of deluding by this course. If however, and this cannot be denied, the idea is worked out by such predicates as do not appear applicable at all to an idea, still let it be remembered, that nothing definite had been previously established to determine in what manner an abstraction with no objective existence can be classed among ideas, or what abstraction can be so classed, and that every point is to be essayed, in order, by this dialectic process, to bring the question nearer to a decision. And this indeed would suffice for an explanation as regards the great bulk of the difficulties; the following consideration however may be further added. The most intricate developements, and those most considered as intentionally sophistical, are distinguished by the circumstance, that the train of consequences resulting from them and strictly belonging to the general series might have been discovered by a far easier method, also that nothing peculiar to unity is discovered by probing deeper in the investigation; a fact to which Parmenides himself frequently calls attention. The object therefore for which these particular parts are here, is not the immediate result, but the actual mode of proof, by

means of which, as it recurs in the different parts of the investigation, Plato intends, in his own peculiar manner, to draw attention to the nature of certain ideas of relation. It is very profitable to follow this collateral object through all the turnings of the dialogue, and to see how Plato makes way towards it, and how one elucidation always refers to another. That these ideas constituted an important subject of consideration in his mind, and that he held it by all means necessary to put them in a clear point of view, may be seen from a passage in the Charmides, where he speaks of it as an important and difficult matter to investigate, whether any, and what, Ideas exist in reference to themselves alone, or only in relation to others.

Now as regards the particular train of consequences in which we have a comprehensive view of the peculiar properties of unity, it must not be forgotten, that unity is the general form of all ideas alike, which Plato himself sometimes calls unities; and that, accordingly, it is from this dialectic point that the opposition of unity to all not comprised under that term, which would otherwise have no proper keeping, is to be considered, as well as the opposing results in particular. But the different views and hypotheses which co-operate towards establishing this connection, will not be easily followed out by any one to his own satisfaction who does not first compare, with much pains and accuracy, the mutally opposing sections of the investigation with one another, as well as the modes of treating homogeneous points in particular in all the several sections. And the attentive reader will find something eminently remarkable in the attempt made at the end of the first

section, certainly the most ancient in philosophy, to construct knowledge by the reconciliation of antitheses. But few persons have divined the antiquity of this method, and will perhaps be disposed to recognize the mighty dialectical and speculative mind in this slight attempt, so similar to much that has appeared among ourselves, sooner than in many theories of Plato properly of more importance. Still more remarkable are two notions developed in the course of the investigation, the one in the attempt just noticed, the other where unity is supposed non-existent I speak of the idea of the infinitesimally small in time, or of someting objective existing in it, and of the idea of magnitudes or spacial repletion without unity. They are, as regards this dialogue, the result of that peculiar manner in which, in Plato, from the fundamental character of his philosophy, which some have most unjustly considered to be a confusion of thought with knowledge, speculation of the more lofty kind is combined with the dialectic process. The manner in which this notion of magnitude, if we may so call it, is discovered, and the way in which, notwithstanding its obstinate resistance to all management, it is nevertheless grasped and described, appears so deserving of admiration, that it is difficult to conceive how a philosophical critic, who deserves in other respects some merit in his exposition of this dialogue, gives up, not long before this section, on receiving notice of the subject, as if he were weary of pursuing further this loose web of sophisms. One should have thought that a commentator who, even in the middle, had met with much that had less claim upon his attention, would at least, on notice given, have been glad to work to the end through these difficulties,

were it only to reach this remarkable discovery. Above all, the sincerely earnest reader must be on the watch beforehand every way, for all conclusions drawn from the hypothesis of a non-existent unity, to which, as constituting an indispensable supplementary part, even Parmenides himself so significantly points. It is not difficult to adduce still more, though of less importance but the temptation must be withstood; perhaps for the reason that many readers, from their own selfsearch into and explanation of this investigation, in which almost every point radiates with the germs of whole lines of fresh investigations, and each succeeding one, by reason of the gradually increasing and manifold significancy, admits of a more extended and comprehensive survey of all connected with it, may be induced, sooner than they would be by deficient information, to share the notion, that this strange piece of logical art, as far as a similarity can obtain between philosophical and poetical creations, corresponds to those imaginative and pregnant compositions, which, under the modest name of tales, represent the inward form of things, and the true history of the world, with a richness and a depth which no one can ever be fully conscious of having fathomed to the bottom; even though perhaps many readers who go along with their author in thought and composition, may sometimes discover particular relations which have lain concealed from the composer himself.

And further, the reason why, in the present work at all events, as well as in those poetical compositions, we are not in a condition to come to a perfect understanding of every particular, is grounded upon our ignorance of many probably existing relations. Who,

for instance, can tell whether many of those points at which we take most offence, do not refer to passages in the books of Zeno? We may divine that something like this is the case to a considerable extent, if we compare the propositions of Zeno still preserved to us with several of the passages in the Parmenides, which seem to us here superfluous and sophistical. It would be a serviceable undertaking, though one that does not belong to this place, to follow out this track further. That Plato respected Zeno very highly as a dialectician, and has here adopted his method, he himself says clearly enough; but it also seems quite as certain that he put no great value upon his genius as a philosopher as exhibited in the work here brought forward. Similarly also, in another place, where he has to deal with the Eleatic philosophers, Zeno is mentioned not independently, but only as connected with Parmenides. How far, then, the notices drawn from the higher province of speculation relate to the philosophy of Parmenides in particular, and whether, for instance, the world as deprived of unity in opposition to that grounded upon and resolving itself into it, is intended to be a fresh illustration and corroboration of the opposition which Parmenides institutes between the world of reason and the world of sense; to decide this accurately we possess, and ever shall possess, too scanty remains of the compositions of the wise Eleatic. For it might be a fallacious process to listen to testimony, since Parmenides is one of those who were earliest misunderstood, and even the means to which we must resort are still in an extremely unproven and imperfect state. Even in Plato himself there is much that will not unite with what is generally assumed from