Sivut kuvina
PDF
ePub

and limited form, obtains in this, like what was said in the Phædrus upon the nature of love generally, an extended application, beyond mere personality, to the more important civil relations as well, inasmuch as with almost verbal reference to the Lysis, love for the people and love for the boy are laid down as coordinate. And thus too it is now for the first time clearly proved, that in the Phædrus a peculiar value was justly attributed to the doctrine, not, it must be allowed, brought forward with sufficient clearness for every one, which inculcates the necessity of a similarity in the ideal, or character, for the production of love between two minds. With this, moreover, we are to put in connection that view of Plato which supports itself against all unmeaning disputation and persuasion, that those, who pursue principles morally opposed, can entertain no deliberation with one another in common; a view which had been already enunciated verbally in the Crito, but is here palpably exemplified in the first discussion of Socrates with Callicles, and contains likewise from this point of view the defence of the indirect dialectic method for the second part of the Platonic works. Moreover, in our present dialogue, Plato makes Socrates expressly acknowledge that the principle brought forward in the Laches, that courage cannot be conceived apart from knowledge, is certainly his opinion; and, in like manner, what has been declared in the introduction to the Charmides to be the result of that dialogue with reference to discretion. I mean that Socrates agrees in the explanation, that discretion is virtue, in so far as it is to be regarded as health of the mind; this principle also here receives corroboration. So also piety appears here, exactly as it was defined in

the Euthyphro, as justice towards the gods All these are retrospective references, if not quite literal, still quite certain and decisive; and we are sure that whoever considers them comparatively, will never entertain the notion of inverting the arrangement, and take these dialogues for further enlargements upon points here as it were preliminarily noticed. And even as to the lesser Hippias, any one who would undertake to find a confirmation of it in the Gorgias, might do so by affirming that the supposition started at the end of the first section, that the just man always wills to act justly, appears to refer less to the general position already advanced elsewhere, that every one always wills the good, than to the principle that willing belongs quite necessarily as knowing to the nature of justice in particular, and that this is exactly the natural result of the sceptical treatment of the idea of justice in the Hippias. But any one must see that this reference is far from being either as important or as certain as the others. For the principle itself, that the exercise of justice eminently implies the presence of volition, is a thing so generally recognised, that it may be assumed without any reference to a previous proof.

Again, the traces of a promise or preparation for the majority of the subsequent dialogues, appear quite as clearly as the references to earlier works which we have instanced above; partly in the design of the whole, partly in particular passages. The manner, for instance, in which, after the establishment of the essential distinction between the good and pleasant, the notion of a combination of the two is notwithstanding again entertained, points to a problem not yet solved, and which is interwoven with the subject of the Philetus, the last dia

logue of this series.

The manner in which the nature of the art of counterfeit is taken up, and its province divided according to the rules of dialectics, is the first breathing of what we meet with in the Sophist and Statesman so artificially and comprehensively worked out. The stress laid upon separating and divesting mind of personality, and the mode of exhibiting it mythically, is, as it were, a prophetic anticipation of the Phædo. So that we may even decide from hence, how much in this second period proceeded from the point which we have specified as the centre point of the Gorgias, and what on the contrary belongs, so to speak, to a second formation, or must be referred to the point already indicated, as contradistinguished from it. And I speak not so much of the dialogues, as of the principal factors of the dialogues; for it is precisely in this reconciliation of the two points of view, the theoretical and practical, brought about as it is, without uniting them so completely as to cancel all opposition between the two, that the still more artificial form of the subsequent dialogues consists.

Hence, even the Gorgias, strictly taken, can only be viewed as a moiety of the beginning of this second part, and it is not until we have combined it with the Theætetus that we can look upon it as constituting a complete commencement, inasmuch as the latter treats of the opposition between existence in the abstract and conception, exactly as the Gorgias does that between the good and perceptive feeling. Hence, considering the total absence of any decisive testimony whatever as to the period of composition, and moreover, that the idea of the two works must arise almost simultaneously, and they are both of considerable extent, the appearance

of the Gorgias prior to that of the Theætetus cannot be immediately and at once established. On the con

trary, it is only as an inference mediately drawn from a variety of particulars, and these are nothing more than manifold references to what has preceded and to what follows, the character of a general prelude, if I may be allowed so to express myself, and that analogy, according to which every new layer in the philosophy of Plato commences originally with the ethical-these are the only grounds which can justify the precedence of the Gorgias, against several particular objections which might possibly be alleged against assigning it such a position.

Whoever takes up those traces and references, and is acquainted with the manner in which it is Plato's custom to mark such notices, will undoubtedly discover of himself more of the same kind copiously interwoven with the details of this dialogue. For other persons we may be allowed to draw attention to some of them only. For instance, with what in reference to the Phædrus and Protagoras appeared to us before in an apologetic light, still more matter connects itself in this dialogue which we can only understand as a review of particular declarations of opinion against such Platonic writings as had hitherto appeared. However, what might be said upon this point must always remain within the limits of supposition, and the best method therefore will be, only to give slight indications in the particular places and passages where such matter occurs. And, besides this, there is much that stands in such close connection with the Apology of Socrates, that it might be said that all the essential matter in that piece is here repeated, only so given as to be exalted above the imme

diate personal relation. And it looks almost as if the Apology of Socrates, changed as it thus is into a defence of the Socratic modes of thought and action, has rather changed than lost its personal relation, and become a defence of Plato. Least of all can this repetition lead us to agree so far with another writer as to believe that the Gorgias must have been written soon after the death. of Socrates, because assuredly Plato would not have reproached the Athenians a second time with so detailed a history of that act of which they had long since repented. For when we recollect that this also applies naturally to the Phædo, we have these repetitions compressed within so short a period as to excite a feeling of satiety relative to the subject of which they treat; a process quite in contradiction with that richness and abundance which characterizes the Platonic composition, and which, in the present case, would have no conceivable object; nor is there any sign whatever of ridicule suffered or anger felt, for no trace appears anywhere of either, that might have driven Plato to such reproaches of his fellow citizens. On the contrary, the purpose I have indicated, of justifying himself by a retrospective view of what had lately happened, for his continual political inactivity, and at the same time of showing how fearlessly he intended to continue his philosophical course-this is a purpose which he may well be conceived to have entertained at a somewhat later period. Though indeed, as Plato, after having lived some time at Megara with the other Socraticians, does not appear to have returned to Athens, for any long time at least, what I have suggested can hardly have been the case at an earlier period than after his return from his first travels. Soon afterwards, however, he might have had

A A

« EdellinenJatka »