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then, if it is actually the case, the place which we have assigned to this dialogue, is sufficiently assured to it.

And of this every reader may convince himself if he considers the course of this conversation, the main points of which we will here note down in a few words. In this it is at once assumed almost at the beginning, as had been proved in the Gorgias, that pleasure is not identical with the good, and therefore that happiness which is sought as a common object, is defined, only for the purpose of keeping to the ordinary translation of the word eudaimonia, to be "right doing" (or, "well doing"). At the same time the conversation connects itself with the Menonic position, that every thing which is ordinarily called a good is not so in and for itself by virtue of the mere possession of it, but becomes so first by coming under the power of wisdom so as to be governed and managed by it. Accordingly the proper object of desire is defined to be knowledge, to which Plato here deliberately gives the more exalted name of wisdom, and without even mentioning that lower grade which is there called correct conception. But this is by no means a sign which can imply that this distinction had not yet been made, or that Plato contradicts himself in any way consciously or unconsciously: but the ground of it is as follows: just at the beginning, where Socrates states the problem, the two, the search, that is, after wisdom and the diligent endeavour to attain virtue, are laid down as identical or as connected in the most intimate manner. He intends therefore by this, expressly to show what he meant by what is only thrown out at last in the Menon, that it is certainly necessary to seek that virtue and statesmanship which proceed from wisdom,

notwithstanding the fact that they have not yet existed, because without them those more common kinds which are satisfied with right conception, can have no permanent existence. After the proper result of the Menon has been thus enunciated and elucidated, it is now enquired further what that knowledge must be, and after it has been established, in part with reference to the Gorgias, that it must be an art which is capable at the same time both of producing and using its object, and thus several particular arts have been brought forward by way of example which satisfy these conditions, the conversation comes at last, less by the strictly scientific method of analysis and investigation, than by the unmethodical process of promiscuous adaptation, to the real political or kingly art to which all others surrender their products for its use. But now the progressive advance of the dialogue is at an end, and the conversation changes again into a hesitative kind of speculation which only starts riddles and hands them over with a few hints to the reflection of the hearer for their solution. It is in this sense then that the product of that art is investigated, and nothing is discoverable except that if in the good we are always to inquire after the end we must always come round in a circle; in this sense Socrates quite at the beginning started the question whether to teach wisdom and to create a passion for it belongs to the same art; and it is precisely in this sense that the relation between the true and the good, wisdom and art, is so multifariously repeated and brought to light. And thus, as was before maintained, this conversation contains, on the one hand, corroborative illustration of the preceding dialogues; on the other hand, the reader is to be

excited not to rest content with the assumptions there made, as that virtue and wisdom are the useful, and thus this conversation becomes a preparatory indication pointing to the subsequent dialogues, in particular the Statesman and Philebus; and hence on their account, the Euthydemus appears to be a transitional member by no means superfluous, and here certainly, quite in its proper place.

After we have thus properly estimated the essential part of the dialogue, it then becomes easy to take up another view of the remainder also. For the question arises of itself, was Plato, whom in the dialogues immediately preceding the Euthydemus we have already found occasionally engaged in controversy with the founders of contemporary Socratic schools; was he, I say, likely now again to commence a battle, for which the time had quite gone by, against earlier sophists whose influence and exertions were suppressed without it, as soon as ever the Socratic schools had become regularly formed? and was he likely to support this superfluous contest by such an expence of demonstrative art, and to be so well pleased with himself in the execution of his task as is here manifestly the case? Who then were these men, Diony sodorus and Euthydemus, to deserve such notice and meet with such treatment? History is silent respecting them more than any other of the sophists mentioned by Plato, so that we may certainly maintain that they never formed anywhere any kind of school, nay, it would even seem that they were not generally men in very great repute. Xenophon mentions Dionysodorus and speaks of the time when he taught the art of war, whence we must conclude that it is a real fact which Socrates mentions

that they did this first, though probably more as tacticians than trainers in the art of fighting, and only applied late to philosophizing sophisticism. Plato himself in the Cratylus brings forward Euthydemus, but with a sentiment flowing immediately from the principles of the Ionic philosophy, and from which moreover no such sophistical misapplication immediately ensues, so that we do not at once recognize this Euthydemus in him. Aristotle also mentions him, and that with a few positions of the same kind as we find here, though their formulæ will from their nature admit only of an ironical application, and could never be directed against philosophy; and hence Euthydemus would not have deserved so cruel a treatment for their sake. On the other hand Aristotle brings forward almost all the formula which here occur, several of them even verbally, without mentioning Euthydemus or his brother, but ascribing them entirely to the Eristic philosophers. Moreover, there is an important passage in our dialogue in which the catch-questions brought forward are mostly referred to the principle of Antisthenes, that there is no such thing as contradiction. Now if we compare with this several particular allusions in the dialogue, and another passage of Aristotle, where he says that Gorgias, the first instructor of Antisthenes, taught how to practise these matters, but not upon first principles, and consequently only communicated a few particular maxims and not the whole art itself, more and more light falls upon the whole, and it becomes very probable that under the name of those two sophists Plato intended rather to assail the Megarian schools and Antisthenes. He might be inclined to spare the former for old friendship's sake, which connected him with the

founder of them; and he might prefer not mentioning Antisthenes by name in order to avoid personality as much as possible and to expose himself less to his rough treatment. And in considering this point indeed we must remember, in order to come to the right conclusion, that much was very intelligible to contemporaries, and would spontaneously obtrude itself upon their notice, which we can only discover by laborious means, and a variety of combinations and comparisons. From the extravagant ridicule moreover the attentive reader is made aware throughout of a profound and bitter satire upon the then prevailing degeneracy among those even who professed themselves disciples of Socrates.

Still however there remains yet something to illustrate and explain. For if we consider accurately what it in reality is that is here criticised, and controverted only in a spirit of ridicule, it must indeed be generally allowed that the particular examples as they here occur deserve nothing else; it is however not to be overlooked, that the whole tissue of these lies and cheats was in its nature nothing but that scepticism, which always accompanies the doctrine of flux and progressive incomplete existence, generally or partially taken up, in its particular application to language. If Plato therefore wished to treat this sophistical art independently and for itself, it was necessary for him either to show shortly how closely it was connected with the principles already refuted by him, or he was obliged to penetrate deeper into its proper object,-language; and in this also to point out together with the changeable, the unchangeable and constant. The first he certainly does, but in such a manner that the greater part of the examples discussed have no business there. To the latter

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