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the statesman is described as a combining one, upon whom it is incumbent as his chiefest and almost only duty to connect together different, and therefore reciprocally repugnant, natures. If now we look only to what forms the chief thread of the whole, and to the last result, these may certainly appear scanty enough. And that indeed, not only to the great mass of modern politicians, whose highest problem is ever only how they may increase the public wealth;-for how little Plato has to do with this, must at once be clear enough to these men from the beginning of that process of separation, when agriculture, as well as trade, is treated very contemptuously with reference to the state. But they also who bring with them more exalted moral and scientific views might look upon the result arrived at as barren, and this last, and only object of the statesman, although to a certain degree an important one, might still not satisfy their expectations, and the less, as it does not appear even once to be immediately mentioned to what particular end this combination of nature and that dominion over the business and affairs of the state is to refer; or under what form, whether always the same, or varying according to circumstances, the two are to be exercised. And the persons in question might next suspect, that as in the former dialogue the description of the sophist is manifestly drawn up with an eye to the then state of science, so also here, that of the statesman may be given with reference to the political relations at that time existing among the Hellenes; inasmuch as in this, the most profound as well as the noblest views are taken of the confusion and madness of parties, and certainly to relieve the state from these, or preserve it free from them, must be represented as the highest exercise of the statesman's art. Chiefly however, they might observe that in the present dialogue, exactly the same complication and composition obtain as in the one preceding, and that . therefore it may not be in vain to look for the most important conclusions on points which they miss in that immediately connected main-thread, in matter which is given merely as digressive and incidental. For instance, as regards the form of the state, first of all, Plato gives us clearly enough to understand, that from the rarity of political wisdom the real state can scarcely admit of any other than the monarchical form ; but if we, as he also does, leave the real state completely out of the question, and only regard the Statesman as prescribing his laws to another state which is to be an imitation, Plato then allows all three forms named to obtain as such ; but from the statesman's business of combining natures or regulating duties alone, it cannot appear under what circumstances he will give to any one state any one of those forms; or when he would prefer to charge one individual, or the few, or the many, with the imitation of it. And we have therefore that digression upon the merits of the different forms, which clearly enough gives us to understand that in proportion as courage and discretion are combined in one, or in a few, power also must be concentrated in him or them; while, in proportion as the two are separated, the power also must be loose and disunited, and the state consequently weak in the same proportion as that main object of the statesman is still imperfectly accomplished in it. Again, the whole view of the statesman's art is greatly illustrated by that

other digression upon the idea of measure, though introduced not in reference to the subject, but only to defend the method pursued. For it is not without reference to his principal subject that Plato so definitely explains that the statesman's art, like every other, aims in its operations at this natural proportion, founded upon, and contained in its mature, and which consequently, the true statesman as the scientific philosopher, must bear within himself, and also, together with right notions of the good and the just—for by what except by this proportion are these two to be defined? implant it in others, that he may be enabled in conformity with this, and in common with them, to mark off the outward and limiting circumference of the state, and also to assign its own to every part of it. With regard, lastly, to the highest object of the state in that great myth already mentioned, the character of the golden age is criticized according to the rule, that no wealth in natural things or facility of obtaining sustenance, can have any value unless the conversation and dealing of men with one another and with nature conducts them to knowledge ; so that at last, nothing either in themselves or in nature can remain concealed from them, which must therefore clearly be the aim of that political art which in the end, when combined with all others, may correspond to those exertions of the gods, and of the daemonic protector. Meanwhile, part of the similarity between the present dialogue and the Sophist consists in the fact, that the references adduced as bearing upon the immediate subject of the dialogue, do yet not exhaust the purport of these interwoven pieces, and we must, therefore, follow up that purport still further, as well as the traces admit of being indicated in a few steps. For instance the myth, which appears to have been suggested by an Egyptian tradition mentioned by Herodotus—for if any thing resembling it occurs elsewhere, as Plato does certainly suppose the single point which he forms into a great and important image to be well known by tradition, such resemblance has escaped the translator, this myth has manifestly a far more comprehensive tendency. To explain the description there given of the relation of the Deity to the world, or to judge how far it might be available to search in it for the doctrine ascribed to Plato, that the principle of evil exists and originates in matter, would not be appropriate to this place, because the subject lies quite without the limits of the present dialogue. It may, however, be indeed remarked, that Plato here intended to lay down a comprehensive view of the historical periods of the world, and of the mighty revolutions of human affairs, and especially also, of their remarkable retrogression at particular times, in which he found even his own country involved, especially in a political point of view; and it is certainly part of the harmony of the whole, that this degeneracy also is explained from the absence of living knowledge, and from the presence in the state of that mere imitation in which the resemblance to truth vanishes, more in proportion as the imitation continues longer. But whoever considers this description, and follows it out more according to our method, would discover in it, not erroneously, the first finished expression of these views, which have already appeared at a much earlier period, and which contemplate the life of the world as alternating in opposite motions, and

again reproducing itself. It is moreover remarkable,

and a task very much to the purpose here, to compare this myth with that in the Protagoras. For it is hoped that every reader who pays attention on perusing this myth, to the manner in which the Protagorean one is here taken up again, will consider what was said about the latter to receive additional corroboration. In like manner the idea of measure here, has a particular, though but slightly indicated reference to the two parts or forms of virtue as they are called, in order to prevent every possible misunderstanding, by which it might be conceived that they are only great or small in comparison with one another, so that the same action when considered with reference to one of two others would be considered courageous, and with reference to the other, of a contrary character; or indeed in comparison with the one courageous, and with the other mad and precipitous, and that it may be established that they are only virtuous, for the very reason that they have their measure in themselves. And hence the view of virtue here started connects itself immediately with that given in the Sophist, as the two species of vicious states, disproportionality and disease, are thus shown in their connection, and the simile here constantly employed with reference to the statesman obtains its proper signification, because the statesman now becomes the physician for the disease of the soul in general, inasmuch as he gradually corrects its temper, and together with true notions of the good and just, implants at the same time in all its natural abilities, which, as long as they want this essential unity must stand up in rebellion against one another, their true and proper proportion. So that now, by means of a complete adoption of true and correct conception into the idea of knowledge, from

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