luxuries and arts, which are in the sequel for the most part rejected, as what may be according to his theory admitted, yet still there are wanting in that description of the original simple society, not without full consideration, I am tempted to suspect, all the spiritual elements without which it is impossible to live. The proper bearing of this too is therefore, probably, upon the reference to the mind, in which not before it is susceptible of a great multiplicity of sensual attractions, and manifold activity in itself, can virtue appear in a definite form, or the opposition between good and evil develope itself. Only the theoretical representation of the state itself does indeed seem to be too much sacrificed to that relation, when it is intimated that, because in the mind the separation of the functions is the ground upon which the whole doctrine of virtue that follows rests, that, therefore, also the operations of war and defence, because they correspond to a peculiar function in the mind, do, notwithstanding the fact that war occurs in the state only at intervals, form a particular profession distinct from all others; so that Plato here appears as a sworn advocate, the oldest philosophical one probably, of standing armies. And not even, upon his own theory, with perfect fairness; since it can only be said of the leaders of the army that their work is an art, the performances of the common fighting men, on the contrary, whether we look at what they do or what they suffer, comprehending in them nothing, an aptitude for which might not be acquired by means of a gymnastic education, combined with the practice of any other trade, while every citizen must be able to give that security which a firm disposition to preserve the existing order of things supplies, so

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that the Platonic army, however sufficient the men may be, must ever continue a disproportionate burden upon the productive classes. But, notwithstanding the ease with which he might have avoided this vicious state of things, if he had taken the common soldiers from the working classes, and only made the leaders a separate order, he did not do so, because then the spirited principle in the mind would have had no proper and perfect representation in the state. And thus we see how subordinate an object the representation of the state is in and for itself, and how every thing is only calculated for and regulated by the idea, that it is only to be a magnified form of the mind, in order thus to recognise justice more easily in it.

This subordination is still more confirmed by what immediately follows. For after it has been determined what kind of disposition they must have, and what natural advantages they must enjoy, who are to defend the state, under the easily admitted pretext that this also will be useful for the investigation of justice, the mode of their education is discussed. And thus, what is here set up as the standard according to which all myths used in education are to be judged, that they do not inculcate a belief that the gods are the authors of evil, is manifestly of great importance for the individual mind. For the spirited principle, if it is to fight with effect against destructive inclinations, will be debilitated by the belief, that the same exist in the gods; and as little will it be able to press powerfully forward to abstract truth, if it can be met by the fact that the gods metamorphose themselves and practice deceit to indulge their passions. But upon the constitution and * τὸ θυμοειδές.

arrangement of the commonwealth such a fancy has no immediate influence, but only in so far as it corrupts individual minds. The same may be argued of every thing in this part of the work connected with education, that it refers most to the individual, and that in a purely ethical relation, in order to effect in the mind a harmony of government and obedience, and that every essential part in it may perform its own office, and not encroach beyond it. Only, that generally regard is paid from the first to the principle, that the state cannot be better than the bulk of individuals composing it, whence its tranquillity depends upon their constancy of character, and its excellence upon the competency of each individual for his own business. As also in the maxim, that those only of the defenders of the state are to take part in the government of it, who are not in a condition to do anything except what may advance the good of the whole, we have that principle already shadowed forth which is not brought out distinctly until towards the end of the work, namely, that reason alone can judge of what is wholesome for the other parts of the mind, and that the reasonable man alone can estimate the value of other modes of life besides his own. To this purely ethical bearing upon the individual, we have indeed an exception in the discipline appointed for the champions, which belongs exclusively to the peculiar character of the Platonic Republic. But for this very reason it is here only superficially described, as not properly belonging to this place; and this description is only to be understood from what is said at full length upon the subject sometime afterwards. On the contrary, the law, which at the end of this part is made good in

opposition to Adimantus, that happiness must exist in the whole of the state and not in a particular division of it, as well as the maxim that riches and poverty must in an equal degree be withheld from the commonwealth, these are perfectly appropriate to this place, and are intended not less for the individual mind than the Republic. But what answer is to be made when a well-meaning though somewhat austere friend of truth asks, what, in a work constructed upon a basis so purely ethical, is to be made of the fact, that Plato thinks to bring about that wholesome stability of character by a false pretence, or, as they say, by a pious fraud, falsifying as far as may be the truth of childish recollection, and jesting with divine commands and prophetic sentences, so that even Socrates himself appears timorous enough with this part of his argument. This timidity, however, is to be taken more in jest; as if Socrates was apprehensive that persons might be inclined to reject with a strong hand, totally and entirely, every thing mythical. For when Socrates previously explained mythical tradition generally upon the principle, that most that is in it is falsehood, but some part truth, he means now to convey the notion that the good is chiefly distinguished from the bad in this kind of tradition according as it is the seat of truth or fiction. Now, in the present instance, the form of representation only is fiction, while the essence of the subject-matter is true, and almost every single point is otherwise brought forward in strict connection with the fundamental views. For the variety of natures does indeed result, under divine Providence, from the most secret operations of planetary life, and an education which is to do nothing else, so long as the pupils

are still unable to guide themselves, beyond developing further what has thus come into existence, is fairly referred in the end to the same principle. And it results accordingly on all sides as matter of divine ordinance, that a commonwealth must go to ruin in which unsuitable men, and with no inward call, attain to the government; so that on this account our author may not indeed be without his justification. Neither, again, can it be fairly explained as simply the result of a cautious fear in Plato of the fate which befel his master and others, that he refuses himself to legislate upon the worship of the gods, and consigns that task to the native Apollo. We at least, knowing as we do, how little at any time modern philosophers have ever done, who thought to found a new worship of the Supreme God capriciously and extemporaneously, without historical foundation, should the less expect any thing of the kind from Plato, as he belongs to a period at which no one could have any conception of a godworship which was not national, and since he is here by no means fabulously compiling actual earthborn matter upon a soil perfectly new and devoid of history, but every thing, however different from all hitherto known, does still proceed in a spirit entirely Hellenic. And, although Plato in the books up to this point, declares with sufficient spirit against all fabling, that has a tendency to degrade the idea of the Supreme Being, he was at the same time too profound to assimilate himself to certain sophists in their rationalizing annihilation of the gods, and not, on the contrary, to hold in honour the strange tissue of natural feeling, and historical legend in the Hellenic theology, and to attempt to turn it to good use for his citizens.