Hence be it not interpreted amiss in him that he most prefers committing the ordination of sacred matters to the native god, whose sentences rise up from the most mysterious depths of the central point of the earth.

And here, when the fundamental outlines of the Republic have been sketched thus far, the third part of the work begins. And the commencement of it is marked distinctly enough by Socrates calling upon Adimantus to summon now not only his brother, but also Polemarchus and the rest together. This part, though comprehended within the remainder of the fourth book, not only projects the idea of justice, but gives explanations as well of all other virtues, and first of the manner in which they exhibit themselves in the state. And then, after it has been shewn that this process is to be applied to the individual mind, and how it is to be so applied, the same virtues are also exhibited as existing in that subject.

Now it is here, first of all, remarkable, that the four otherwise well-known cardinal virtues are represented as exhausting the idea of the good, and that without any proof whatever being given, or any such having been communicated in any other piece. And yet it is upon this hypothesis that the correctness of the whole proceeding rests; for it is only by assuming that these four constitute the whole province of virtue, that it can be said that when three of these constituent parts have been demonstrated, the still remaining part must necessarily be justice. And moreover we cannot even suppose that proof to have been known from oral discussions, or to have been communicated in any lost work. For such a proof could not have been given without at the same time the four virtues being

thoroughly explained, and accordingly the whole of the work before us would in the last case be superfluous, and in the first, there would be no reason why the proof as well as the explanations should not have been repeated in writing. Plato, therefore, can only be justified upon this point, if the structure, as it is here erected, contains itself in itself, and the whole process by which the explanations of all these virtues are obtained does by immediate palpability claim the conviction of the reader in such a manner that he desiderates nothing further for his satisfaction. Since then the virtues are first investigated in the Republic, the completeness of this investigation rests entirely upon the proper relation of the three classes into which Socrates divided the inhabitants; and if the four virtues cause by their means each one of these classes to fall into proper relation to the rest and to the whole, then indeed no one can refuse to allow that the state, through their agency, must be good. And strange indeed to every one must the brevity and conciseness appear with which this is shewn; nay, this brevity in the execution does itself appear to be at the same time the fairest justification of the whole ethical preparatory process, as well in the earlier books of this work as in the preceding dialogues. However accurately then in this section also every thing is referred to the Republic, still the individual mind is constantly and prospectively kept in view in a manner not to be mistaken. Thus, in the case of wisdom, the general law that it is not by any particular knowledge of anything in the state, but by that of the state itself, and its manner of existence, that the state is wise, is set up especially on account of its application to the mind. In like manner

the observation, somewhat too easily conceded, and which, if its truth were disputed, would perhaps be found untenable as regards the state, that this knowledge can only exist in a very small number of the citizens, seems to have been produced more with reference to the mind. For however strange it may sound that the reason is the smallest component part of the mind, it is, notwithstanding, certain that the principle of desire, spreading as it does into such manifold ramifications, is the largest, and therefore the simple principle, which ever continues consistent with itself, and is never other than the most internal, naturally appears to be the smallest. Also in the case of courage, the remark, that the explanation given is immediately that of civil courage, is to be referred to the fact that the courage of individual minds not only comprises in itself what is developed from civil relations, but that to it every thing belongs which the reason can offer to set in opposition to pleasure and pain. By such indications then the application accordingly of the explanations given to the virtues of the individual mind, is still more abridged. Next, again, it must appear to the reader a somewhat precipitate method, and obscure from beginning to end, that all the other virtues are honoured with an investigation, while justice alone, notwithstanding that it is the precise object of the investigation, not only remains left to the last, but is not even immediately and directly found and described, which would certainly be the clearest method of proceeding, but only comes to light indirectly, as that of the four which remains after the discovery of the other three. The first point then, that this virtue is left untouched to the last,

may indeed be explained upon the ground that there would otherwise have been less occasion to reduce the others also to a satisfactory explanation; but this is not the only one; on the contrary, the discovery of justice last, and the discovery of it by such a method, are closely connected together, and the following may be given as the account of the matter. Virtue in general had been already explained above, cursorily and in the more extended sense, to be that quality of a thing by means of which it is in a condition to perform its own proper function. Now the four virtues are supposed to have been discovered in this state, and in the same state we have had shewn to us the three classes or orders of citizens, of which two do indeed respectively perform their own appropriate functions in the state, while the third, that of those who work for hire, comprises a multiplicity of functions, which are not properly functions in the state, each individual seeking only his own advantage by the performance of his own. In this manner, then, the four virtues separate into two classes, for these two orders have each of them, by reason of its own peculiar function, a virtue also peculiar to itself. For be a state ever so wise, it is so only by the wisdom of its guardians, and be it ever so brave, it still is so only by the courage of the youth of that class, namely, its champions, while to the third class neither wisdom nor courage are ever even in any degree attributed. Now it is indeed true, that the state is only wise by virtue of the wisdom of the wise, when this wisdom can operate in legislation and guidance, that is, when obedience is rendered to it; and in like manner only brave by the courage of its champions, when these, like the governing parties, have

the necessary services done for them; and thus with these two virtues of the more honourable division in the state, since those who love wisdom must ever be but a small selection from the courageous, two other virtues of the inferior order seem to be connected, obedience, namely, and industry. And thus four virtues would be proportionately and homogeneously distributed among the four main divisions in the state; and certainly, as regards the Platonic Republic, nothing could very easily be objected to such a construction. But obedience and industry are not discretion and justice, and the particular virtue to which all that is said refers, would thus not be found at all, neither in the state, nor, by this method, in the mind, the application to which, however, manifests itself as well here as elsewhere to be the main problem. Going back, therefore, to the four virtues first assumed, and considering that discretion and justice are differently circumstanced from wisdom and bravery, at least in so far as that these two latter can only be attributed to some, while the two former can be neglected by none, it follows that discretion and justice are indeed to perform what obedience and industry answer for, but that they must be not exclusive virtues confined to one division, but universal and extending to all. But even thus, inasmuch as they exist in the more honourable division, they can only refer in operation to the particular incapacity and deficiency of the less honourable, and as they exist in the latter, only to the appropriate virtues of the former: hence, therefore, these latter virtues must necessarily precede the others in the exposition. But in what manner discretion and justice are themselves distinct from each other, and why, without