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may indeed be explained upon the ground that there would otherwise have been less occasion to reduce the others also to a satisfactory explanation; but this is not the only one; on the contrary, the discovery of justice last, and the discovery of it by such a method, are closely connected together, and the following may be given as the account of the matter. Virtue in general had been already explained above, cursorily and in the more extended sense, to be that quality of a thing by means of which it is in a condition to perform its own proper function. Now the four virtues are supposed to have been discovered in this state, and in the same state we have had shewn to us the three classes or orders of citizens, of which two do indeed respectively perform their own appropriate functions in the state, while the third, that of those who work for hire, comprises a multiplicity of functions, which are not properly functions in the state, each individual seeking only his own advantage by the performance of his own. In this manner, then, the four virtues separate into two classes, for these two orders have each of them, by reason of its own peculiar function, a virtue also peculiar to itself. For be a state ever so wise, it is so only by the wisdom of its guardians, and be it ever so brave, it still is so only by the courage of the youth of that class, namely, its champions, while to the third class neither wisdom nor courage are ever even in any degree attributed. Now it is indeed true, that the state is only wise by virtue of the wisdom of the wise, when this wisdom can operate in legislation and guidance, that is, when obedience is rendered to it; and in like manner only brave by the courage of its champions, when these, like the governing parties, have the necessary services done for them; and thus with these two virtues of the more honourable division in the state, since those who love wisdom must ever be but a small selection from the courageous, two other virtues of the inferior order seem to be connected, obedience, namely, and industry. And thus four virtues would be proportionately and homogeneously distributed among the four main divisions in the state; and certainly, as regards the Platonic Republic, nothing could very easily be objected to such a construction. But obedience and industry are not discretion and justice, and the particular virtue to which all that is said refers, would thus not be found at all, neither in the state, nor, by this method, in the mind, the application to which, however, manifests itself as well here as elsewhere to be the main problem. Going back, therefore, to the four virtues first assumed, and considering that discretion and justice are differently circumstanced from wisdom and bravery, at least in so far as that these two latter can only be attributed to some, while the two former can be neglected by none, it follows that discretion and justice are indeed to perform what obedience and industry answer for, but that they must be not exclusive virtues confined to one division, but universal and extending to all. But even thus, inasmuch as they exist in the more honourable division, they can only refer in operation to the particular incapacity and deficiency of the less honourable, and as they exist in the latter, only to the appropriate virtues of the former : hence, therefore, these latter virtues must necessarily precede the others in the exposition. But in what manner discretion and justice are themselves distinct from each other, and why, without regarding the circumstance that justice most properly forms the conclusion, discretion must precede it in and for itself—the absence of any explanation upon these points makes this the weakest part of the exposition, and that not only in so far as these virtues are exhibited in the state, but also in the mind. For the agreement of all divisions as to which is to command, and the conformable activity of each in reference to government and obedience, each of these positions is far more difficult to explain than it is to distinguish these two virtues, discretion and justice, from the other two, or even these from one another, and it therefore appears not inappropriate that after the three first virtues have been discovered, so many particular and laborious preparations are made, in order further to find justice as one separate from the others. For it may be said on the one hand, that that to which justice first gives its appropriate power, is not so much a compound of all three virtues, as discretion alone; inasmuch as the agreement assumed to exist in this passes into action by means of justice, and consequently becomes operative; and then, again, on the other side, that in these two together the whole perfection of the state is exhausted, for that wisdom is only that part of justice which belongs to the first, and courage, that which belongs to the second division; inasmuch as it would be clearly unjust, if the lovers of wisdom were not to develop ideas and appoint laws, and if the courageous would not stimulate others, and repulse dangers themselves. And further on, in like manner, where the explanations given are applied to the individual mind, and, in order to test that of

justice, the familiar common topics are brought forward *, it might be said that even the discreet man would avoid all these merely by a freedom from extravagant and unnatural passions. Meanwhile, let no one take this to be a critical censure upon the matter itself, which lies so near the centre point of the whole work. This censure falls at the most upon the description of these four connected virtues, which Plato, manifestly enough, only took up in a true practical sense from regard for an existing theory, as they had already passed in a similar manner from common usage into the philosophy of Socrates. But instead of these four virtues Plato was perfectly at liberty, on the one hand, to set up wisdom as the only virtue, if he only saw in the reasoning part the power of putting the whole mind in a state of activity by means of courage, or, on the other hand, justice, as the only one. He might either say, that the state and the mind are virtuous by means of the efficiency and power of that single part, or that they are so from a right and proper state of activity in all the parts. That Plato, as is sufficiently clear from the position which he assigns to justice in this work, preferred the last, is, with reference to the state, an agreeable extenuation of an otherwise almost intolerable aristocratism. For, if wisdom is regarded as the only virtue, then the partakers in the government, who also supply their vacancies from the collective mass of the people, have alone a share in the civil virtue, and even the next more distant circle, the champions, no less than the great hireling multitude, are excluded from all participation in it, and reduced to a state of obedience so strict that they can display no activity otherwise than the governing party has ordained, and if one of the two rebels from ambition or self interest, the parties do not bear the guilt themselves, but only the weakness of the governors. But since Plato defines justice as that virtue which does in fact include all others within itself, all the essential elements of the state bear a proportionate part in the morality of it. In this point of view, therefore, the choice made must appear meritorious. But with reference to the individual mind, we should, according to our mode of thinking, unhesitatingly prefer the opposite course, and, defining wisdom to be the only virtue, however immoderate a height the sensuous desires might reach, we should rather look for the cause of guilt in the weakness of the reasoning principle, than attribute to that subordinate faculty any peculiar share in the morality of the whole. And upon the same ground we should at once take an exception to the premised explanation of discretion, inasmuch as the expression of a free agreement among all the parts of the mind with reference to the government of it, is more in accordance with an aesthetic than a strictly scientific treatment of the moral element. And yet this Pythagorising view, which conceives virtue as a harmony, which first appears in full perfection when discretion, considered as a free agreement of the inferior powers with the superior, is placed upon a higher ground than temperance, which consists only in a commanding position being usurped by reason above all presumptive claims of the inferior powers, this view, which we cannot avoid designating as heathenish in an especial sense, is yet but too much the key of the whole work, and is most closely connected with every thing in it which most shocks us, nay, which appears

* Book I v. c. 16.

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