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their time very unequally between that enviable scientific life and the joyless service in the cave, that even these men attain to the pure contemplation of the idea of the good, and to government; to which last, however, they have only to devote intermittingly the smaller part of their time, dedicating the greater to contemplation, until at length in due time, and extolled by all, they close their mortal career. And with this, Socrates, after having first given a cursory hint as to the manner in which, provided only first of all that true philosophers but once had the power in their hands, such a state might actually exist, has fully acquitted himself of the whole task which Adimantus had set him, and returns back at the beginning of the eighth book to the point at which this great digression was imposed upon him, and we now take our leave of this singular Republic. And if I may be allowed to say a few words upon the same, I would first call attention to the point, how little Plato deserves the accusation not unfrequently brought against him, of contempt for his own nation; how highly, on the contrary, he thought of the Hellenic nature, as he not only ascribes to it a pre-eminent development of the knowledge-seeking element in the human mind, but even in so contracted a population as we have to conceive his Republic capable of containing, he calculates upon finding that rare union of qualities, and these in sufficient strength, to engage successfully in all these exercises and trials, in so many individuals, including even the female sex, that he will never want rulers, although no one attains to the highest power before his fiftieth year, and then several are to relieve one another by turns. Perhaps even in our own populous states we would not undertake to effect this, though with the total difference in our method of education it can never be possible that the attempt should be made. Meanwhile, however, we have gone so far as to require from all those who would exercise great influence upon society, a combination of scientific accomplishments with those requisite for war, and vice versă. And if we cannot desire that they who have to exercise the highest power should possess the most dialectic genius, with us the supreme power does not comprehend so much as in Plato; and we count moreover much upon the fact that they who live most in the kingdom of ideas, by exercising a manifold influence upon education, will also have a predominant influence in the formation of public opinion, which always, though unconsciously, regulates the exercise of the supreme power. Nay, even though temporary mischief might not always be avoidable in so doing, we might pretty confidently leave it to the emulous principle in our nature, in the development of which we are so far in advance of the ancients, to decide where self-seeking and counterfeit sophistry is endeavouring to play the part of the philosopher, and falsify the description of the good. Now this perfect Republic being only constructed for the particular purpose of exhibiting justice in the gross, after those general outlines also have been sketched which do not stand in immediate connection with this object, a nearer approximation is now made to what was to have been done at the end of the fourth book, we mean, to answering the question as to what mode of life is the most desirable. And here the same method of proceeding is adopted as that by which we were conducted to a definition of the idea of justice. For

imperfect characters also must exhibit themselves under more express and better developed forms in the imperfect constitutions, that deviate from that archetypal model, and it is desirable with this view to describe these, and to consider them in a continually retrograde process, until at last the most perfect injustice is brought to light in the most corrupted state. This Fifth grand division of the whole work, which now brings the original question to a decision, comprises the eighth and ninth books. The whole process appears to stand in a sort of contradiction with what Plato frequently and distinctly enough gives us to understand, I mean, that his Republic never has in reality existed, and that there is not even any necessity that it ever should exist. For if this is the case, how can he, notwithstanding, represent the forms of government which have actually and historically existed among the Hellenes, for scarcely any mention of others is made, as a graduated series of revolutions, which he developes, historically, from that ideal conception ? What, therefore, is here historical is, undoubtedly, mere form, but which lay very ready at hand, because, in fact, the different constitutions have, not rarely, succeeded one another in the same series, and by this method only the various degrees of distance from perfection are to be made manifest, and that only with a view to a better understanding of this gradual degradation of moral worth in individual minds; and this retrograde career which the individual mind runs appears always as the principal subject. Starting, therefore, from the perfect Republic, which exhibits the union of all virtues in the gross, Plato's next problem is to show how imperfection arises from perfection; for it appears less difficult to see how what is imperfect continually deteriorates after the initial change has once taken place. Now, since his perfect state can only exist for any length of time by means of the intermixture of the sexes being conducted by the philosophers upon correct principles, it is evident that the commencement of the deterioration must be grounded upon a flaw in this process; and Plato, therefore, has recourse to an unavoidable fatality by means of which, at some time or other, the same wisdom in this department is not observed. If an important deviation is ever made from this there immediately ensues a deficiency of properly tempered natures: and then the consequence of that must be a diminution of public spirit, and an excitement of selfinterest. This then tends to a dissolution of the mutual relation hitherto kept by the men and youths destined for the government, as also of their general relation to the people, and in this is at once contained the germ of the utter ruin of the constitution, and consequently of all in which virtue can be seen in its enlarged and general form. In the same manner, upon the principle that the constitution of a state is at all times in accordance with the prevalent morality, it is shown further below, how individual minds, under certain conditions of descent from one state, become such as to carry within themselves the type of the next worse, and how they then by degrees summon into existence the constitution which is in conformity with them. Now, it must be allowed that the images here given of different moral characters are not only drawn with striking truth, considered in and for themselves, but also with reference to the main principles of the Platonic philosophy, constitute definite gradations. The first point is that at which after the small part has been once suppressed by virtue of which the mind is wise, the spirited principle (to 6vuoetëés) then gets the upper hand, and is attended only by the principle of desire, whether appearing under the form of love of money or love of enjoyment. Or, secondly, if the former principle sinks to the bottom, then the various passions exist upon friendly terms with one another in the mind, or some single one usurps universal monarchy. But, on the other hand, the manner in which one of these characters arises out of the other, is not quite intelligible by and for itself, but only as it is effected by the presence of those different civil constitutions; and the transitions of those into one another are indeed described with great truth, and in a manner immediately intelligible, but properly they should, according to the principle stated above, have only been intelligible from the predominance of the analogous disposition in the great majority of individuals. So that it looks as if the political representation, which, if aecurately considered is only here as an apparatus, obtains a prominent independence, and unconditional importance, contrary as it were to the inclination of the writer. This is particularly shown in the instance of the tyrannical constitution of mind, in which Eros indeed and Dionysus are intelligible as sole monarchs in the mind and without any political relation, while the melancholic temper on the contrary, although it is self-evident that this might in like manner assume a despotic character, is left without the psychological foundation in this connection, as indeed it did not usually appear in the case of private individuals in the same way and to the same degree with the Erotic and Bacchic excess; only

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