this will betray itself in its principal features even in those studies in which we miss the important matter of these works of a higher class. Moreover, and it is this which must contribute to give us a correct idea of this genuine Platonic form, we need not first abstract it, like those other two tests, out of the larger works as an analogy, the limits of the applicability of which can still not be drawn with certainty; but it is, in every essential point, a natural consequence of Plato's notions with regard to philosophical communication, and must therefore be found, generally, to the same extent in which this latter exists. For it is nothing but the immediate putting into practice of those methodical ideas which we developed from Plato's first principle as to the mode in which writing operates. So that the same idiosyncracy of the philosopher which justifies us in looking for a pervading connection throughout his works, does also reveal to us that which yields the surest canon for judging of their genuineness, and thus the solution of both problems grows from a common root. Now the dialogistic dress has already been represented above as the external condition of this dialogistic form, and its almost indispensable scheme, but only where, vividly conceiving the purpose of imitating oral instruction, which always has to deal with a definite subject, it further adds thereto an especial characteristic, the admixture of which forms the Platonic dialogue. I speak of that mimic and dramatic quality by means of which persons and circumstances become individualized, and which, by general confession, spreads so much beauty and charm over the dialogues of Plato. His great and undisputed works plainly show us that he does not neglect this admixture even when he is most deeply

absorbed in the subject, as on the other hand they shew us almost universally that he admits it most copiously when the subject-matter does not lead so far into the dark solemnity of speculation. Whence we may certainly conclude that this peculiar form can never be totally wanting, and that even in the most insignificant trifle which he undertook, whether as a study or an occasional piece, Plato will have applied something of this art. Moreover, the want of this is indisputably the first thing which, to the feeling of every reader, must distinguish as unplatonic the dialogues rejected from antiquity downwards; as it is also the correct basis upon which that old critical judgement rests, that all dialogues without Introductions are to be disavowed, except that this formula expresses the fact but very partially and imperfectly. And to the inward and essential condition of the Platonic form belongs every thing in the composition resulting from the purpose of compelling the mind of the reader to spontaneous production of ideas; that frequent recommencement of the investigation from another point of view, provided nevertheless that all these threads do actually unite in the common center-point; that progression, often in appearance capricious, and only excusable from the loose tenor which a dialogue might have, but which nevertheless is always full of meaning and of art; the concealment, further, of the more important object under one more trifling; the indirect commencement with some individual instance; the dialectic play with ideas, under which, however, the relation to the whole and to the original ideas is continually progressing: these are the conditions some of which must necessarily be found in all really Platonic works that have any philosophical

bearing. Meanwhile it must be evident that this character can show itself in its full light only in proportion to the importance of the subject-matter, and we here see first how, when we are employed upon Plato, the task of proving the genuineness of any dialogue, and the investigation of its right place, mutually support and verify each other. For in any dialogue which at once recommends itself by its language, and which manifestly treats of Platonic subjects, the more perfectly this form is stamped upon it, we may not only pronounce it genuine with so much the more certainty, but since all those arts point back to what has gone before and forward to what is to come, it will necessarily be so much the easier to determine to what main dialogue it belongs or between which it lies, and in what region of the development of the Platonic philosophy it can furnish an illuminating point. And in like manner, conversely, the easier it is to assign to any dialogue its place in the list of the others, these relations must become more marked by means of those expedients, and the dialogue appropriates itself, with the greater certainty, to Plato. These dialogues, therefore, in which Platonic matter is united in proper proportion with Platonic form, and both appear sufficiently manifest, constitute a second class of Platonic works, which, even without looking to the pretty valid evidence which likewise appears in support of some of them, sufficiently authenticates itself by its relation to, and connection with, the first. But the more deficient a dialogue is in reference to the form, and when the subject-matter presents itself but slightly enough proportioned to it, the more suspicious, certainly, the genuineness of that dialogue becomes, especially as the other elements of the Platonic character must be

less distinctly perceptible. For even the thoughts themselves will then betray less of the spirit of Plato, and the language also will have less opportunity to develope itself in all its power and beauty, as so much of both is connected with those peculiarities in the composition. Thus, as the distinctness of the form diminishes, the conviction of genuineness does so likewise in all respects, until, as more suspicions and doubts come into its place, it gradually becomes less credible that Plato, to whom it was so easy and natural to refer from all particular ideas and separate opinions to his great original principles, should have brought forward in a different manner any subject whatever in the province of philosophy, where every one may be so treated, because he must thus, without attaining any of his well known points and for no purpose, have transposed himself into a forced position. With respect to such dialogues it is therefore imperative to bring especial proof of the possibility of their being Platonic, and a preponderant probability at least must be shown in favour of them to prevent their rejection, and that with the most perfect justice. But even supposing the balance to waver, and that the matter could not be at all decided, even this continuing uncertainty will not throw the arranger of the Platonic works into any embarrassment. For dialogues of this kind do in no way belong to the list which it is his object to make out, for, even supposing their genuineness proved, this would only be the case when a particular object or an especial occasion for the existence of such heterogeneous productions was pointed out, so that in any case they can only be occasional pieces, which from their very nature are indifferent as regards this investigation. It is therefore easier also to decide upon the genuineness

of all which can belong to the connected system which the arranger seeks, and all in which the investigation of their genuineness can either be not made out at all, or only upon other grounds, falls at once and of itself into a third, and for him an indifferent class. I speak not only of those pieces that are dubious from a certain misunderstanding of them, but also of those in the Platonic collection which do not fall in any degree within the province of philosophy, and whose genuineness, therefore, cannot be judged of according to the same rules with the others.

Thus, then, the privilege is reserved of investigating quite from the beginning upwards the connection of the Platonic writings, and placing them in such an order as shall possess the probability of deviating as little as may be from that in which Plato wrote them; and this undertaking is not endangered even supposing that a decided judgement upon the genuineness of many dialogues must continue in abeyance for future times, or for a sharper eyed and better furnished criticism. All therefore that now remains, since the marks of genuineness and the thence resulting different circumstances of the Platonic writings have been briefly sketched, is in like manner to lay before the reader the first principles of their connection and the arrangement resting thereupon, in the way of a preliminary survey of the whole in general. For to show in detail how every dialogue strikes into the rest, must remain in reserve for the particular introductions; while here we can only give an account of the principles which are the basis of the general plan.

If then, to continue, we keep to the somewhat contracted selection of the more important Platonic works in which alone the main thread of this connection, as has