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of their first human life, banished as they are to such an organism, can attain to no recollection whatever. They are accordingly those souls which appear deprived for the most part of their original nature. But against this it may be again objected, that as every species of brutes developes but few and simple desires, they are less burdened with those foreign encumbrances than the human souls, in which the whole army of desires displays itself, furnishing indeed one ground for placing the two in comparison with one another. This theory also agrees, therefore, with that, which in the right conduct of the plastic powers of nature contained in the human race, discovers the only true principle upon which all efforts to form mankind to wisdom and justice are to be founded. And in like manner it may be said that the paedagogic regulations of the Platonic state receive a new light from what is here said about the influence of the present life upon the future. For in that passage above which places the choice of a new life between unavoidable destiny and free-will ingeniously combined, every thing depends upon the soul being in a proper condition to choose, and not too strongly possessed by the impressions of what it may have encountered in its former earthly existence, to be able to seize that which is in conformity with its inward essence, and calculated to promote its improvement. Only it does indeed seem as if that art of superintending the connection of the sexes might come into some difficulty, if, notwithstanding, upon this method a soul quite foreign and unsuitable, in no way connected with this state, can insinuate itself into it; and it is not very easy to see, under what particular divine protection this circumstance must be placed, that such a misfortune may not occur before it is significantly felt in the exercise of the art itself; unless it is to be said that this is a far more worthy and important object, than all those trifling concerns of an individual life, for that beautiful feeling of confidence which suggests that for him who is dear to the Godhead every thing must work for the best. In this description, finally, that interchange between the happy wandering through heavenly space and the return to the region of imperfect existence bears a manifest similarity to the interchange to which the lives of the guardians of the state are to be subject, between the longer period which they are to devote to philosophical contemplation, thus surrendering its right to the wish of the philosopher for death, or rather for being dead, and the return for one day only to the burdensome employment of government in the cave. So that even in this point of view Plato will not be denied the merit of having regarded the eternal arrangement of the universe in the regulation of his Republic. But he has left almost all this for the reader only to discover, and the whole section, indeed, most manifestly bears the impress of having been intended to awaken and stimulate the mind of the hearer in every way to bestow the most diligent pains upon the subject of justice, and never to consider anything as more profitable. Such is the tenor of its commencement, such of its conclusion; hence what does not contribute to that object might be only alluded to, and what is further enlarged upon is only to be regarded as digressive. But we have also here in close connection with that grand object the aversion expressed to the art of imitative poetry, and especially towards Homer, whose heroes quite pointedly furnish most examples of souls that make a bad choice; Odysseus only, the passionless, was made wise by the experiences of his travel, and Plato honours him by setting him up as a model for the choice of a life withdrawn from public affairs. And now that we have arrived with our analysis at the end of the work, a question very naturally arises, if the case is as our results have represented to us while we pursued the dissection in the most accurate manner, that the question originally raised regarding the advantage of a just and moral life does in fact predominate throughout, so that every thing not relating to this is only to be regarded as digression—the question, I say, arises, whence the work comes to bear the title of the Republic, in comparison with which the other, of the Just, has in no way been able to make good its claim How happens it that the work, we may indeed say since it has been in existence, has always been quoted under this name, and under no other, so that it at least goes back to the immediate disciples of Plato P Nay, can we not say that Plato himself was, mediately at least, the author of it, since in the opening of the Timaeus Socrates himself manifestly appears to be speaking of these dialogues when he says that they have discussed the main question of the constitution of the state f And so far is this from being an incidental or subordinate notice, that on the contrary, the whole idea of the Timaeus and Critias, as well as of that which Hermocrates was to adduce, is immediately developed from this. Must not, therefore, most confidence be placed in this Platonic Socrates himself? and would he not smile at the analysis of the whole here given, the upshot of which is that, justice is the grand subject Is not an argument in favour

of the supposition that he did by no means here coilstruct his Republic as a mere scaffolding, afforded by the elaborate execution with which matters in it are discussed, which will bear no immediate application to justice P And if there is some ground for the supposition that this ideal state, even before Plato described it in the books we have, had been a subject of satirical allusion as sketched in his oral instruction, are we to believe that those oral sketches were in all respects so similar to the written works, that Plato in them also introduced the ideal of a Republic only as a scaffolding for his theory of virtue? These are, indeed, important and weighty grounds; but our view also of the work in its whole connection rests upon no authority but the same Platonic Socrates, whose own advices we have most accurately followed. Are we, therefore, to believe that in the work itself he has only played with its proper subject, and that he begins all at once in the Timaeus, and not before, to take a serious view of the question ? But to attend to this latter dialogue exclusively would be at least quite as partial as not to pay any regard to it whatever. But if we are to start upon the supposition that the representation of the state is the proper grand object, it would be hardly possible to conceive why the appearance of the contrary is pointedly produced. And even if it could be explained why Plato combined the investigation concerning justice with this grand object, still the form and the manner in which this is done would then be perfectly unmeaning and absurd. It would have been much more natural to introduce the main subject at once, and then, after the internal existence of the state had been described, to say in what the justice and discretion of such a whole consist; and then the application to the individual mind, and the ethical problems, still unresolved in this point of view, would have resulted most naturally ; consequently, a perfectly converse relation between these two grand objects and the essential parts of the work referring to them must then have obtained. And if, indeed, upon this supposition it would be more easily conceivable that the regulations about the commerce of the sexes should be treated of with the copiousness which now appears, then too, on the other hand, all that is in connection with the rewards of virtue would have to fall much farther back as mere subordinate matter; and it is impossible that this subject could be so prominent as it is here made, partly by the style and method of the execution, partly by the fact that the exposition, constituting as it does a return of the end to the beginning, very properly concludes the whole. Other discussions, such as that upon the nature of dialectics, upon the conditions of this intellectual activity and its relation to the others, and in like manner those upon the art of imitative poetry bear, indeed, a similar relation to both suppositions, and the question how they are necessarily connected with the grand Thema is in both cases equally difficult to answer. Accordingly it does not appear that by the method actually pursued even the slightest step is gained for affording a clear insight into the connection, if the whole work is only to be regarded as a representation of a normal constitution; although, on the other hand, if it is to be merely a defence of justice, a disproportionality remains, and an excess of unnecessary and subordinate matter, which the preceding attempt to explain the connection has in no way endeavoured to

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