so recently as the twenty-third day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and two. It took place after the most able and ample discussion by counsel. It was not suddenly cast forth in the hurry of a nisi prius trial, and by a single judge, but the record is stamped with the unanimous sanction of seven men claiming to be in the full possession of intellectual faculties of no common order, and acting upon mature consideration. Such are the deplorable effects of long familiarity with injustice and oppression.

General principles of political government, militating against the existence of slavery, are asserted in the constitutions of most of the slave-holding states; yet care has been taken to qualify their bearing by some express declaration, importing that the rights of freemen only were designed to be protected. The constitution of the state of Delaware, though a slave-holding state, seems to have been framed with somewhat less caution on this subject. It sets forth, that, Through Divine goodness, all men have, by nature, the rights of worshipping and serving their Creator according to the dictates of their consciences; of ENJOYING AND DEFENDING LIFE AND LIBERTY; of acquiring and protecting reputation and property; and, in general, of attaining objects suitable to their condition wITHOUT INJURY BY ONE TO ANOTHER." Here we have a charter of liberty of sufficient amplitude. How far it may be considered as annihi

on the suggestion and by the consent of counsel, and at March term, 1798, judgment was entered for the defendant, "for the purpose," as is stated in the record," of an appeal to the High Court of Errors and Appeals, and that the justices of this court may there assist in hearing and determining it." On the 20th January, 1802, the hearing took place before the High Court of Errors and· Appeals. Jared Ingersoll, William Rawle, and William Lewis, Esquires, were of counsel with the plaintiff, and from the known character of these gentlemen, it is to be inferred, that during the four days which were occupied in the hearing, no argument which ingenuity and learning could supply was wanting. The judges with a reserve more convenient to themselves than convincing to their hearers, were content with the brief declaration, announced through their President, "that it was their unanimous opinion, slavery was not inconsistent with any clause of the constitution of Pennsylvania;" in conformity with which, judgment was entered on the record, "court unanimously of opinion, that negro Flora is a slave, and that she is the property of the defendants in error, and the judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed."

lated by what follows in connexion,-" and as these rights are essential to their welfare, for the due exercise thereof, power is inherent in them, and therefore, all just authority in the institutions of a political society, is derived from the people, and established with their consent to advance their happiness, and they may, for this end, as circumstances require, from time to time, alter their constitution of government,"-will depend very much on the moral sentiments of those who pass judgment upon the question.

Section II. ON THE LAWS REGULATING THE EMANCIPATION

OF SLAVES.

Slavery being hereditary, may, of consequence, be rendered perpetual, if such be the will of the master of the slave. From a just consideration of the rights of property, it would seem equally plain, that the master might, at his pleasure, relinquish ⚫ his dominion over the slave. But society, in our slave-holding states, has decreed otherwise. Having degraded a rational and immortal being into a chattel-a thing of bargain and saleit has been discovered that certain incidents result from this degradation, which it concerns the welfare of the community vigorously to exact and preserve. One of these is, that the master's benevolence to his unhappy bondman, is not to be exercised, by emancipation, without the consent of his creditor. This is a principle of law which pervades nearly every code in the slave-holding states. In some of these codes, express enactment cannot be cited for it; yet I think it probable, unless with the single exception of North Carolina,* that practically it is made so to operate.

* In North Carolina, a slave, as will be shown hereafter, cannot be emancipated except for meritorious services, to be adjudged of and allowed by the court. Haywood's Manual, 537 (act of 1796.) The act is silent as to the rights of creditors, and I infer, therefore, that the claims for meritorious services, are deemed paramount to the rights of third persons, whether creditors or other+ wise interested. In South Carolina, in Georgia, and in Alabama, the legisla ture only, by special acts, have authority to emancipate slaves. Of course, the clause may be, and no doubt always is, inserted to preserve these suppose rights.

In Virginia and Mississippi, an emancipated slave may be taken in execution to satisfy any debt contracted by the person emancipating him, previous to such emancipation. 1 Rev. (Vir.) Code, 434; Mississippi Rev. Code, 386. In Kentucky, the act which authorizes emancipation, and directs the mode by which it may be effected, contains a saving of the rights of creditors, &c. 2 Litt. & Swi. 1155, sect. 27, act of 1798.

By the new civil code of Louisiana, it is declared, “Any enfranchisement made in fraud of creditors, or of the portion reserved by law to forced heirs, is null and void; and such fraud shall be considered as PROVED, when it shall appear that at the moment of executing the enfranchisement, THE PERSON

GRANTING IT HAD NOT SUFFICIENT PROPERTY TO PAY HIS DEBTS. Art. 190.

But in addition to the obstacles to emancipation which is created by the saving in favour of creditors, a very extraordinary one is opposed on behalf of the widows of deceased slave-holders. For where a widow is entitled by law to one-third of her deceased husband's personal estate, unless he shall have left sufficient other personal estate, after payment of his debts, to satisfy her claim of one-third, his slaves, though declared to be free by his last will, shall nevertheless not be free, but shall be held liable for the third to which the widow is entitled. 1 Vir. Rev. Code, 435; Mississippi Rev. Code, 386; 2 Litt. & Swi. (Kentucky) 1246.

But it is in the mode by which emancipation is to be effected, that the most formidable difficulties arise. In South Carolina,*

* In South Carolina, before the passing of the act of 1820, here referred to, the law stood thus: "No emancipation of any slave shall be valid, except it be by deed, and according to the regulations above described, (which regulations made it necessary for the person intending to emancipate a slave, to obtain the approbation of a justice of the quorum and five freeholders,) and accompanied by the above certificate," (i. e. the certificate of the justice and freeholders.) 2 Brevard's Digest, 256. With such strictness was this law construed, that where a testator made a bequest of slaves to a trustee, with direc tions to liberate them, it was held by the court of chancery to be a void bequest, and that therefore the slaves might be retained in perpetual servitude. See the case of Byrnum vs. Bostwick, 4 Dessaussure's Chancery Reports, 266.

₹

Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, it is only by authority of the legislature specially granted, that a valid emancipation can be made. It is not enough that a penalty is imposed upon the benevolence of a master who may permit his slave to work for himself; a slave-owner must continue a slave-owner, (unless he dispose of his chattels by sale,) until he can induce the legislature to indulge him in the wish to set the captives free. Prince's Digest, 456 (act of Dec. 5, 1801); James' Digest, 398 (act of 1820); Toulmin's Digest, 632; Mississippi Rev. Code, 386.

In Georgia, the attempt to set free a slave, by any other mode than by an application to the legislature, is visited with severe penalties, as will appear from the following act: “If any person or persons shall, after the passing of this act, 1801,) set free any slave or slaves, in any other manner and form than the one prescribed herein, (i. e. by special legislative act,) he shall forfeit for every such offence two hundred dollars, to be recovered by action of debt, or indictment, the one half to be applied to the use of the county in which the offence may have been committed, the other half to the use of the informer, and the said slave or slaves so manumitted and set free, shall be still to all intents and purposes as much in a state of slavery as before they were manumitted and set free by the party or parties so offending." Prince's Digest, 457. Notwithstanding the punishment thus imposed for this new crime which the Christian people of the republic of Georgia have seen fit to create, in the nineteenth century, some refractory heretic, it is presumed, must have been found within her borders, for in the year 1818, the following act was added to her code: "All and every will and testament, deed, whether by way of trust or otherwise, contract or agreement or stipulation, or other instrument in writing, or by parole, made and executed for the purpose of effecting or endeavouring to effect the manumission of any slave or slaves, either directly by conferring or attempting to confer freedom on such slave or slaves, or indirectly or virtually, by allowing and securing or attempting to allow and secure to such slave or slaves the right or privilege of working for his, her or themselves, free from the 'control of the master or owner of such slave or slaves, or of enjoying the profits of his, her or their labour or skill, shall be and

the same are hereby declared to be utterly null and void: and the person or persons so making, &c. any such deed, &c. &c. and all and every person or persons concerned in giving or atattempting to give effect thereto, whether by accepting the trust thereby created or attempted to be created, or in any other way or manner whatsoever, shall be severally liable to a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars, to be recovered, &c. &c. and each and every slave or slaves in whose behalf such will or testament, &c. &c. shall have been made, shall be liable to be arrested by warrant under the hand and seal of any magistrate of this state, and being thereof convicted, &c. shall be liable to be sold as a slave or slaves, by public outcry, and the proceeds of such sales shall be appropriated, &c. &c." Prince's Digest,

466.

By an act of the General Assembly of North Carolina, in 1777, it is enacted, "That no negro or mulatto slave shall hereafter be set free, except for meritorious services to be adjudged of and allowed by the County Court, and license first had and obtained thereupon: and when any slave is or shall be set free by his or her master or owner, otherwise than is herein before directed, it shall and may be lawful for any freeholder in this state to apprehend and take up such slave and deliver him or her to the sheriff of the county, who, upon receiving such slave, shall give such freeholder a receipt for the same, and the sheriff shall commit all such slaves to the jail of the county, there to remain until the next court to be held for that county; and the court of the county shall order all such confined slaves to be sold, during the term, to the highest bidder." Haywood's Manual,525. The sheriff is directed five days before the time appointed for the sale of the emancipated negro, to give notice in writing to the per-, son by whom the emancipation was made, to the end that such per. son may, if he thinks proper, renew his claim to the negro so emancipated by him, on failure to do which, the sale is to be made by the sheriff, and one fifth part of the nett proceeds is to become the property of the freeholder by whom the apprehension was made, and the remaining four fifths are to be paid into the public treasury. Ibid, 525-6, and see act of 1788, ibid, 529, also act of 1796, ibid, 537.