6 *lish, in a state of blockade; and it is impossible that it should not have come to the knowledge of this Bremen man. It is not to be said by any person, although I know a blockade exists, yet because it has not been notified to my Court I will take out a cargo.' If it was known to every Dane and Swede, it is impossible that it should not be known to this man. It is not more likely to have been unknown to this vessel, from the circumstance of its being a Bremen ship, when we consider the particular relation which Bremen bears to the sovereign of this country." 4. With respect to blockade of the port of destination, it has been decided by the Supreme Court of New York, that it operated a complete dissolution of the contract (r). That decision proceeded on the broad ground, that what has become unlawful by the general law of nations, cannot be lawfully done by the subjects of any particular state. The question does not appear to have directly arisen in our courts of common law, but the general principle has been acted upon by Lord Stowell (y), and was assumed by the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas in the cases which will be presently cited. But to produce this effect it must be a real and effective — not a nominal or relaxed blockade (z). "A blockade," said Lord Stowell, " may be more or less rigorous, either for the single purpose of watching [602] military †operations of the enemy and preventing the egress of their fleet, as at Cadiz, or on a more extended scale, to cut off all access of neutral vessels to that interdicted place, which is strictly and properly a blockade, for the other is in truth no blockade at all, as far as neutrals are concerned. It is an undoubted right of belligerents to impose such a blockade, though a severe right, and as such not to be extended by construction. It may operate as a grievance upon neutrals, but it is one to which by the law of nations they are bound to submit. Being, however, a right of a severe nature, it is not to be aggravated by mere construction. If the ships stationed on the spot to keep up the blockade will not use their force for the purpose, it is impossible for a court of justice to say there was a blockade actually existing at the time so as to bind the vessel " (a). There must also, to render the voyage illegal, be a premed*itated intention to break the blockade. If it be part of the (z) Scott v. Libby, 2 Johns. Rep. 336. 110 (a) The Juffrow Maria, Schroeder, 3 Rob. Ad. Rep. 147. *original intention to inquire as to the continuation of the blockade at some port of the blockading country, a vessel may lawfully clear out for a blockaded port (b). And unless there were such a premeditated intention to violate the blockade, it is no defence to an action on a charter-party for not sailing on the voyage towards the port agreed on, that the port was in a state of blockade, if the defendant knew the fact at the time of entering into the charter-party. In the recent case of Medeiros v. Hill (c), which was an action of assumpsit against a ship-owner for not proceeding to Terceira pursuant to charter-party, the defence was, first, that at the time the charter-party was entered into, Terceira was in a state of blockade by the government of Portugal, which blockade had been notified to the English government, and consequently that the voyage was an illegal voyage; and, secondly, that although the voyage might not be, strictly speaking, illegal, the circumstances of the blockade operated as an excuse for the non-performance of the contract. Upon these points, Chief Justice Tindal, delivering the judgment of the Court of Court of Common Pleas, observed, "The case of the Neptunus (d), which was cited in support of the first objection, establishes that it is illegal to attempt to enter a blockaded port in violation of the blockade, and that after notification of the blockade, †the [† 603] act of sailing to a blockaded port with the intention of violating the blockade, is in itself illegal. But neither that case nor any other that can be cited has laid it down that the mere act of sailing to a port which is blockaded at the time the voyage is commenced, is any offence against the law of nations, where there is no premeditated intention of breaking the blockade, if it shall be found to continue in force when the ship arrives at the port. Any such determination would be destructive, in many instances, of the fair commercial speculations of neutral merchants, to whom it might be of the first importance to possess the opportunity of introducing their goods into the port which had been blockaded, at the very earliest moment after such blockade had been relaxed. In the present case there was no evidence of any understanding between the contracting parties that the defendant was to break the blockade of Terceira, in order to deliver his outward cargo. Indeed, the fact of the block*ade did not appear to enter into the contemplation of either (b) The Shepherdess, 5 Rob. Ad. Rep. 262; The Neptunus, 2 Rob. Ad. Rep. 110; Naylor v. Taylor, 9 B. & C. 719. (c) 8 Bing. Rep. 231. party, until after the defendant's son, the captain of the vessel, had signed the charter-party for his father; and, upon the evidence, the blockade had ceased to be a real and effective blockade long before the charter-party was entered into. “We see, therefore, no reason for holding the contract to be void on the ground of illegality. "As to the second point, it is sufficient to say, that as the blockade had been publicly notified to the government of England, the contracting parties must be taken to have entered into the charter-party with an equal knowledge of its existence; no difficulty, therefore, attending the performance of the contract can be set up as an excuse for its non-performance. In that case, the rule of law laid down in Paradine v. Jane (e) applies, viz.: That where a party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by the contract.'" This judgment is in conformity with the opinion delivered by Lord Stowell, in the case of an American ship (f) condemned by him for an attempted breach of the blockade of Havre. Adverting to that opinion, Lord Tenterden, in the case of Naylor v. Taylor, an action on a policy of insurance, expressed himself as follows: "We think there is no [† 604] ground for saying that this voyage as finsured was illegal in its commencement; indeed, according to the opinion of Lord Stowell, in the case of the Shepherdess, the vessel might have sailed to Buenos Ayres, without contravening the laws of nations, provided it was a part of the original intention to inquire as to the continuance of the blockade at some port of the blockading country; and in this case, inquiry might have been made at Monte Video, or of any of the Brazilian ships met in the river Plate, and the policy is framed upon a doubt whether the blockade would continue at the time of the ship's arrival at the Plate, and does not indicate any intention to break the blockade " (g). On this question of intention (h), a distinction has been taken between vessels sailing from a great distance to a blockaded port, and vessels sailing to it from ports in its vicinity. An American ship, taken by the French, on a voyage from *America to Amsterdam, was retaken by the English, and (e) Alleyn's Rep. 27. (f) The Shepherdess, 5 Rob. Ad. Rep. (g) Naylor v. Taylor, 9 B. & C. 719. *proceeded against in the Admiralty for an intentional breach of the blockade of Amsterdam. "I certainly," said Lord Stowell, "cannot admit that Americans are to be exempted from the common effect of a notification of a blockade existing in Europe. But it is not unfair to say, that, lying at such a distance, it is not unnatural that they should send their ships conjecturally upon the expectation of finding the blockade broken up, after it had existed for a considerable time. A very great disadvantage, indeed, would be imposed upon them, if they were bound rigidly by the rule, which justly obtains in Europe, that the blockade must be conceived to exist, till the revocation of it is actually notified. If this rule were rigidly applied, the effect of the blockade would last two months longer upon them than upon the trading nations of Europe. That American merchants should therefore send their ships upon a fair conjecture that the blockade had, after a long continuance, terminated, and for the purpose of making fair inquiry whether it had so determined or not, is, I think, not exceptionable, though I certainly agree that this inquiry should be made, not in the very mouth of the river or æstuary, from the blockading vessels, but in the ports that lie in the way, and which can furnish information without furnishing opportunities of fraud." The principle of this distinction has been expressly recognized (i) in treaties between several continental states, and *the states of North and South America. (i) Manning's Law of Nations, p. 327. 60* [† 605] PART V. OF THE WAGES OF MERCHANT SEAMEN. THIS last part of the present Treatise will be employed in the consideration of contracts made for the employment of seamen by the month or for the voyage; of the earning and payment of wages in pursuance of such contracts; of the loss and forfeiture of wages; and of the modes of enforcing payment by the aid of Courts of Justice. Each of these topics will form the subject of a distinct chapter. CHAPTER I. OF THE HIRING OF SEAMEN; AND HEREIN, (Ss.)1. Of the Hiring of Seamen generally. 2. Of Ships' Articles- Regulations respecting them of 2 2 Geo. 3, c. 31-31 Geo. 3, c. 39 Geo. 2, c. 36 - and 37 Geo. 3, c. 73. 3. Regulations of 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 19, respecting them. 4. Provisions for the protection of Seamen and the preservation of their health. 5. Verbal agreement for Wages not absolutely void. 6. Seamen not entitled to increased Remuneration for extraor dinary Service. 1. SEAMEN employed in merchant ships are usually hired at a certain sum, either by the month or for the voyage. [606] In the former † case the amount of the payment that may be earned by them, depends upon the length of the voyage; in the latter it is fixed invariably without any regard to the duration of the voyage. In the fishing trade, particu |