volved in their fate.1 Ships have also been condemned for having on board articles contraband under a treaty to which their country was a party; and for the fraudulent circumstances of false papers. and false destination.2 in the same vessel. The principle which, according to the English on innopractice, governs the treatment of innocent merchan- cent goods dise found on board a ship engaged in the transport of contraband, is identical with that which affects the vessel itself. The law of nations,' said Lord Stowell, 'in my opinion is, that to escape the contagion of contraband, the innocent articles must be the property of a different owner.' 3 Within It is universally admitted that the offence of transporting contraband goods is complete, and that what time the penalty the penalty of confiscation attaches, from the moment attaches. of quitting port on a belligerent destination. On the other hand, as a consequence of the doctrine that the goods are seized because of their noxious qualities, and not because of the act of the person carrying 1 Wheaton, Phillimore, and Heffter, loc. cit.; Bluntschli, § 810. Ortolan (ii. 199) argues that it is immaterial whether the vessel and the cargo belong to the same person or not. In the usual theory, 'le fond de la pensée serait toujours de traiter le commerçant en ennemi, de dire: Nous tenons tes biens, quels qu'ils soient, nous les gardons. Mais nous le répétons, il n'est pas ennemi, il est commerçant; il ne s'agit pas d'actes d'un gouvernement qui romprait la neutralité, mais d'actes de particuliers qui exercent leur traffic.' It seems to me that M. Ortolan's reasoning is sound; but it may be doubted if the current practice is likely at present to be disturbed. them, it is held that so soon as the forbidden merchandise is deposited, the liability which is its outgrowth is deposited also, and that neither the proceeds of its sales can be touched on the return voyage, nor can the vessel, although previously affected by her contents, be brought in for adjudication.1 Some cases have, however, been decided in the English courts in which, a contraband cargo having been taken to the East Indies, with fraudulent papers and a fraudulent destination, the return cargo was condemned on the ground that 'in distant voyages the different parts are not to be considered as two voyages, but as one entire transaction, formed upon one original plan, conducted by the same persons, and under one set of instructions, ab ovo usque ad mala.' And it was even held that 'it is by no means necessary that the cargo should have been purchased by the proceeds of the contraband' carried in the outward voyage.2 The doctrine of these cases is not approved of by Wheaton or by foreign publicists; and, while undoubtedly severe, it does not appear to be a necessary deduction from the general principles governing the forfeiture of contraband cargoes. 1 The Imina, iii Rob. 168; Wheaton, pt. iv. chap. iii. § 26; Calvo, § 1116; Heffter, § 161. CHAPTER III. ANALOGUES OF CONTRABAND. § 48. WITH the transport of contraband merchandise is usually classed analogically that of despatches bearing upon the conduct of the war, and of persons in the service of the belligerents. The analogy is how ever remote, so far as the nature of the act is concerned; and it is more correct and not less convenient to place adventures of this kind under a distinct head. They are, or may be, undertaken for profit alone, but they are not in the way of mere trade. The neutral individual is not only selling or hiring out his goods in the best market, but he is personally entering the service of the belligerent, and contracting as a servant to perform acts intended to affect the issue of the war. He makes himself the enemy of the other belligerent. In doing so he does not compromise the neutrality of his own sovereign, because the nonneutral acts are either as a matter of fact done beyond the jurisdiction of the latter, or if initiated within it, as sometimes is the case in carrying despatches, they are of too secret a nature to be known or prevented. Hence the belligerent has acquired the right of protecting himself by means analogous to those which he uses in the suppression of contraband trade. He seizes the peccant property, and confiscates it by adjudication in his courts. But there is this difference between the two cases; that in the one, the neutral Carriage of de carrier lies under no presumption of enmity towards the belligerent, and his loss of freight, &c. is a sensible deterrent from the forbidden traffic; in the other, seizure of the transported objects is not likely to affect his earnings, while at the same time he has so acted as fully to justify treatment of greater severity. The neutral ship therefore does not, as in cases of true contraband, simply lose its freight and expenses, but is itself confiscated, whenever the owner or his agents have either placed it in the service of the belligerent, or have negligently permitted it to be used by him for his belligerent purposes.1 § 49. The noxiousness or the innocence of desspatches. patches, as affecting the neutral carrier, is determined in the main by the broad external fact of their destination; and as the bearer of letters is not necessarily acquainted with their contents, no other test of character is so convenient, when its application is possible. Two classes of despatches are in this manner distinctly marked. Those which are sent from accredited diplomatic or consular agents residing in a neutral country to their government at home, or inversely, are not presumably written with a belligerent object, the proper function of such agents being to keep up relations between their own and the neutral state. The despatches are themselves exempt from seizure, on the ground that their transmission is as important in the interests of the neutral as of the belligerent country; and to carry them is therefore an innocent act.2 Those on the other hand which are addressed to persons in the military service of the belligerent, or to his unaccredited agents in a neutral state, may be 1 Ortolan, ii. 284; Wheaton, pt. iv. chap. iii. § 25; Heffter, 161; Phillimore, iii. § 272. 2 The Caroline, vi Rob. 461; The Madison, Edwards, . ii. 226; Ortolan, ii. 240. Comp. Letter of Marque of the Confederate States, ap. Ortolan, vol. ii. Append. xxi. presumed to have reference to the war; and the neutral is bound to act on the presumption. If therefore they are found, when discovered in his custody, to be written with a belligerent purpose, it is not open to him to plead ignorance of their precise contents; he is exonerated by nothing less than ignorance of the fact that they are in his possession. Letters not addressed to persons falling within either of the abové categories are primâ facie innocent; if they contain noxious matter they can only affect the vessel when other facts in the case show the knowledge of the owner or master. Thus, where official despatches of importance were sent from Batavia to New York, and were there given by a private person, enclosed in an ordinary envelope, to the master of an American ship, for transmission to another private person in France, the ship was released, on the oath of the captain that he was ignorant of the contents of the letters entrusted to him.1 1 The Rapid, Edwards, 228. The English Courts have unfortunately sometimes given decisions inconsistent with the principle of this case, and have held that a vessel is not exempted from confiscation by having been violently pressed into the belligerent's service. If an act of force exercised by one belligerent on a neutral ship or person is to be considered as sufficient justification for any act done by him contrary to the known duties of the neutral character, there would be an end of any prohibition under the law of nations to carry contraband, or to engage in any other hostile act. If a loss is sustained in such a service, the neutral yielding to such demands must seek redress from the government which has imposed the restraint upon him.' K The Carolina, iv Rob. 259. Nor is it necessary that the master shall be cognisant of the service on which he is engaged. 'It will be sufficient if there is an injury arising to the belligerent from the employment in which the vessel is found. If imposition has been practised, it operates as force; and if redress in the way of indemnification is sought against any person, it must be against those who have, by means either of compulsion or deceit, exposed the property to danger; otherwise such opportunities of conveyance would be constantly used, as it would be almost impossible, in the greater number of cases, to prove the knowledge and privity of the immediate offender.' The Orozembo, vi Rob. 436. Sir R. Phillimore maintains the authority of |