were from God; that in their essential import they were the product, not of a mere human mind, contracted, subject to error, but of the Divine Mind, which is absolutely true, which is the perfect Reason. But in whatever way we may seek to determine the precise manner in which truth was revealed to Jesus, it seems to me by no means necessary to suppose, that the individual activity of his soul was in any manner superseded by the fact of his being inspired, and that he was reduced to a mere passive instrument. On the other hand I am fully convinced, that the idea of receiving supernatural revelations from God, perfectly agrees with the supposition of the freest, liveliest, and most exalted mental activity in the recipient. Every communication to the intellect is designed and adapted to excite and invigorate it; and provided the communication be of a proper kind, it advances the soul to a purer knowledge and an elevated life. It can be no otherwise with that form of communication to the intellect, which we call revelation; and plainly, if we suppose the receiver of such revelation to be merely passive, we introduce into the idea something entirely impertinent. If we cannot conceive of the primitive act of revelation, as performed otherwise than by means of the inspired man's own activity, and this activity purified, exalted, ennobled by being thus employed; so neither can we suppose, that the truths thus revealed, can be propagated without the individual activity of the minds to which they are addressed. Never are the truths of revelation properly received by us, without the free exercise of our own mental powers. Such a reception of them always tends to exalt, purify, and invigorate the whole intellectual life, and the rational thought not less than the pure sentiment and will. Faith, therefore, in Jesus and his instructions, when it is of the right character, is not a blind, limping, spiritless deference to mere authority; it is a new germ of life, which is planted in our spirits, so that, in its free unfolding, it may bring forth the richest blossoms and fruits. We may indeed be justified in yielding to the bare word of him, who, unlike every other man, is perfectly innocent and holy, and therefore, in the knowledge of divine things, unerring. This is a kind of faith, however, which is not blind, and does not sacrifice the reason of man. It is founded directly on our rational, our moral constitution; and on the sound principle, that a soul which is perfectly sinless and good, which dwells in the purest union with Deity, will be capable of a clearness and a perfection of religious know ledge, such as no other intellect can attain. And if, penetrated with this persuasion, we receive certain instructions as true, which Jesus gave, receive them at first barely for the sake of the person who gave them; yet by no means are we precluded, by this faith, from subsequently retaining the same truths on the ground of their inherent excellence, for their own sake as well as their author's: nor are we precluded from searching after the inward principles which support them. Far from it. There is, on the one hand, in the spiritual truths themselves, which the Bible exhibits, something that allures to still further development; something that has a quickening influence on the mind; and, so far forth, revelation is incessantly effecting an improvement in the intellectual character of the race. There is, on the other hand, in the mind itself, a necessity of working over, in its own thoughts, the truth that is presented to it, and of making continual advances from what is obscure to what is obvious. In no way, however, can that which we believe on the bare authority of Jesus, contravene the laws of our own intellect. On the contrary, we ever feel ourselves bound to receive his doctrines, under the previous supposition, that they are the outflowings of the highest, the absolute, the divine Reason, from which have proceeded not only these truths, but also the nature, the laws, and the necessities of our own narrow, but yet divinely-related intellect. We feel assured that there is a preëstablished harmony between revelation and the human soul; and we are convinced that there will be discovered, at the last, a most exact agreement between the truths revealed by the divine reason, and the laws which regulate the human. It must be understood, however, as a condition of this agreement, that the human reason is to be in the right train of investigation; of pure-minded investigation, originating from the noblest cravings of the soul, excited by God-like impulses of truth, and therefore equally profound and modest. NOTES BY THE TRANSLATOR. NOTE A, Page 392. The argument drawn from the moral character of the writers and the doctrines of the Bible, appears to increase in its relative importance, as the sensibilities of men become more refined. There are multitudes, whose attention must be aroused by the exhibition of wonders, and whose heart must be assaulted violently, or it will not be benefited at all. But there are others, who are more effectually subdued by the still small voice. The argument from miracles, meeting as it does a demand of the human soul, is by no means to be undervalued; and yet this is not the kind of proof, to which the majority of cordial believers in the Bible are, at the present day, most attached. They have neither the time nor the ability to form an estimate of the historical evidence, that fåvors or opposes the actual occurrence of miracles. They know the Bible to be true, because they feel it to be so. The excellence of its morality, like a magnet, attracts their souls; and sophistry, which they cannot refute, will not weaken their faith, resulting as it does from the accordance of their higher nature with the spirit of the Bible. The internal argument in favor of Christianity is also recommended by its moral influence. The full exhibition of it is a melting appeal to the heart; and as the heart becomes the more susceptible, the argument becomes the more convincing. With the unlettered Christian, then, the moral evidence for the Bible is the more effectual, because the more simple; with the educated Christian it is so, because the more dignified. It may be questioned, indeed, whether the argument from miracles is not logically dependent, for its complete force, on its connection with the argument from the moral nature of Christianity. Was not the former argument designed to operate in conjunction with the latter; and does it not, when severed from that union, fail to afford full conviction? We have read of wonders performed ostensibly for a bad object, and also of wonders performed in mere frivolity. Can any evidence whatever, in favor of these anomalies, fully convince the mind of their real occurrence, as miracles? Can we be fully satisfied, that miracles have occurred, while we view them as mere naked phenomena, abstracted from their connection with a divine government, from any and every moral object to be attained by them? As the proof of the inspiration of the Bible is, in the logical order, subsequent to the proof of the existence and government of God, we certainly have a right to decline a controversy on the former subject, until our opponent has conceded the fundamental truths relating to the latter. When he has conceded these, we may connect with them the external argument for inspiration. The controversy between Campbell and Hume shows the disadvantage, under which any one must labor, who attempts to prove the occurrence of miracles as insulated facts, or to dispute on their credibility with one who denies the first principles of natural religion. And when Campbell intermingles with the abstract discussion, as he often does, references to the actual or possible design of a moral Governor in producing the disputed phenomena, he may be censured perhaps for diverging from the line of argument, which he at first intended to pursue; but may be approved for practically acknowledging, that wonders, so great as those recorded in the Bible, must be viewed in some connection with a worthy moral end to be answered by them, or they will not command the full assent of the intellect. Consult, however, on the general subject, Hume's Ess. on Mir., and Campbell's Reply. Erskine on Int. Ev. pp. 110 -129. Brown on Cause and Effect, Notes E. and F. Paley's Ev. (Prep. Consid). Price's Diss. pp. 384-464. Butler's Anal. II. 7. Starkie on Evidence, I. pp. 471-475. Whateley's Rhet. P. I. Ch. 2. § 4, and 3. § 4. Abercrombie on Int. Powers, P. 2. S. 3, particularly pp. 77–86. NOTE B, p. 394. The following explanation of terms, which is taken from Bretschneider's Entwickelung, § 90. pp. 520-524, may throw light upon the phraseology of Ullmann, in this, and in subsequent parts of his treatise. "Sin, peccatum, denotes, in the theological usage, sometimes a property (or attribute) of the free being himself, sometimes a property of his feelings and acts. The former is sin in the abstract; the latter, sin in the concrete. (Cicero, paradox. III. says, "to sin is, as it were, to pass over the lines; the doing of which is cause of blame. Peccare therefore is the same as Tapaßaivew. Salmasius derives peccatum and peccare from pecus: "more pecudum, sine ratione agere." Gellius, however, and Isidorus derive it from pellicatus, because adultery was first called sin by the ancients, and the name was afterward extended to all kinds of iniquity.) Sin, in the abstract, is the want of coincidence between the state of free beings and the commands of God, or, which is the same thing, the object for which those beings were created. It is "illegality, or want of conformity with the law," Calov. V. p. 14, or " the want of agreement with the law," Reinhard, Dogm p. 267. [He is said to sin,' says Henke, who deviates from the divine law either in feeling or in action, The rule of right is the divine law, or the pleasure of God made known to men, concerning that which is to be done or avoided. Bret. Dogm. II. pp. 5,6-TR.] Perhaps, however, the term vitiosity rather than the term sin should be applied to the abstract idea; the term sin being most frequently used in the concrete. [See Note G, following-TR.] This simple and popular idea is expressed by John, 1st Epist. 3: 4, "sin is the transgression of the law;" and all the terms employed in the Scriptures respecting sin, include the distinctive mark of opposition to the law, over-stepping the rule, or disobedience to the rule. Thus the most usual word, duapráve means "to miss one's aim," and Suidas explains the word duapria by the phrase, 1 Illegalitas, aut difformitas a lege. 1 failure from moral good, aberration from the right path, from one's aim.' The same is also expressed by the Hebrew . Other expressions are i, that which is perverted, crooked, deviating from rule;, error, wandering from the right aim and way;, nania, novηpia, that which is wrong in itself, bringing perdition; y, making confusion, worthy of punishment. Particularly deserving of notice are the figurative terms denoting a falling away from the law, or a stepping over it, as 2,17,, -τη, παράπτωμα, παράβασις, ἀποστασία, παρακοὴ, and such like. But sin is not only predicated of acts which are contrary to the law, but also of feelings, as in Matt. 9: 4. Mark 7: 21, and of the whole state of the man, so far as it does not agree with the commands of God; Rom. 7: 17. 5: 12. 6:1 seq. John 1: 8. John 8: 34. Sin, in the concrete, is every feeling or act of a free being, which is contrary to the known law; "the free motions and actions that are not in agreement with the divine law."3 Doederlein, Inst. Vol. II. p. 99. In a more exact development of the idea of sin, we must distinguish between the material of it, and the formal. The material implies a law given or promulged, (Rom. 4: 15. 5: 3), and a feeling or deed at variance with it. This has also been called objective sin (Doederlein, Inst. II. p. 100); and to it belong all those feelings and acts, which we exercise or perform while we are not in a state of moral freedom. Perhaps this might be called metaphysical sin. The formal consists in the knowledge of the law, and such a deviation from the law, as is made in the exercise of free will, i. e. in a rational state. The formal is subjective sin, which the man must also acknowledge to be sin; or it is moral, such as may be imputed. From the formal originates guilt; reatus, that is "the state of being obnoxious to punishment, or to the suffering which proceeds from fault." (Mosheim, Elem. Theolog. Dogmat. 1. p. 589.) This guilt (exposedness to punishment) follows from the imputation of the sin; i. e. " from the judgment, in which we affirm that any one is the author of anything, which was done deliberately," Reinhard, Dogm. p. 291, or the "judgment by which any one is held chargeable with a fault." [For an explanation of this distinction between the material and the formal, see also Bretschneider, Dogm. Vol. II. p. 5. See Rom. 4: 15. 5: 13.-TR.] The opposite of sin is virtue, or the harmonious relation of our feelings and acts to the divine law. It is piety, the fear of God (pietas, evolßeα, góßos Tou Dεov), if reverence for God, and desire to please him, which is “H toυ áɣaðoù άлоτνzia, aberratio a recto, a scopo. 2 Abnorme. 3 Motus et actus liberi legi divinae haud consentanei. 4 Deren wir uns in einem unfreien Zustande schuldig machen. 5 Obligatio ad poenam, aut, obligatio ad malum sustinendum, quod ex culpa nascitur. Judicium, quo affirmamus, aliquem esse rei cujusdam, in quam deliberatio cadit auctorem. 7 Judicium quo quis culpae reus habetur. |