It

policy towards the Powers, it prefers reserving them in the expectation of a spontaneous return of Russia to a line of action more conformable to its declarations. It is with a view to remove every obstacle to that return that it restricts itself at present to protest against the aggression of which it has just right to complain. thinks thereby to offer to the whole world an additional proof of the moderation of the system it has adopted since the commencement of this affair. It abstains from any hostile act; but it declares that it in no manner consents to the entrance, from time to time, of troops into the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, which are integral parts of the Ottoman empire, regarding them as a house without a master."

Porte from such acts have been fruitless, and even the solemn word which the Sultan had given to us on the occasion has been violated.

"Having exhausted all the means of persuasion, and all the means of obtaining in a friendly

manner the satisfaction due to our

just reclamations, we have deemed it indispensable to order our troops to enter the Danubian Principalities, to show the Porte to how far its obstinacy may lead it. Nevertheless, even now, it is not our intention to commence war: by the occupation of the Principalities we wish to have in our heart a pledge which will guarantee to us in every respect the re-establishment of our rights.

66

We do not seek conquests: Russia does not need them. We demand satisfaction for a legitimate right openly infringed. We are ready even now to stop the movement of our troops, if the Ottoman Porte engages to observe religiously the integrity of the privileges of the Orthodox Church. But if obstruction and blindness obstinately desire the contrary, then, invoking God to our aid, we will leave to his care to decide our difference; and, placing our full hope in his all-powerful hand, we will march to the defence of the Orthodox faith.*

The feeling with which the war is regarded by the Russians as a "holy enterprise against infidels guilty of oppression towards the members of the Greek Church, is exhibited in the following translation of some stanzas of a popular song which appeared in St. Petersburg about this time, called "The Song of a Russian Warrior:"

"From the summit of the Balkan our brethren stretch out their hands to us with hope and prayer. Their sufferings are not unfelt by us. Russia has compassion on them, and goes forth to combat for them. VOL. XCV.

The Russian Government after

wards declared that the occupation of the Principalities was in consequence of the act of England and France in sending their combined fleets to Besika Bay, near the

entrance to the Dardanelles. But a very slight attention to dates disproves this assertion. On the 31st of May, the day on which Count Nesselrode wrote to Reschid Pasha, announcing that in a few weeks the Russian troops would cross the Pruth, the English fleet was at Malta, and the French fleet at Salamis; and it was not until the 2nd of June that instructions were sent to Admiral Dundas to proceed to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. Šimilar orders were about the same time issued by the French Government to

their fleet. Now information of these instructions did not arrive at St. Petersburg before the 17th of June, so that the intention of Russia to take temporary possession of the Principalities was avowed by her Chancellor more than a fortnight before the act

"It is there that our ancestors received the holy baptism which rescued them from the darkness of idolatry. There is the sanctuary of our faith. It is there that the chalice of salvation restored them to life.

"The mother of orthodox Russia, Kiew, holy and sublime city is she not the goddaughter of Constantinople? Those traditions are sacred to us. They contain the promise and the pledge of destinies which are gathering strength in silence.

"We go forth to chastise the proud, to avenge our altar, insulted by the impious. Burst forth, then, holy war ! let our cry, the precursor of victory, be raised! That cry is All for the God of Russia-for the Czar of the Russians.""

[T]

"I shall now proceed to place on record at what time and for what reasons the British fleet was sent to the Turkish waters.

"Prince Menschikoff, acting, it must be assumed, on the orders of his Government, stated in his note of the 5th of May, of which a copy was received in London on the 18th of May, that any further delay in answering his proposals respecting the Greek Church could only be considered by him as 'un manque de procédés envers son Gouvernement, ce qui lui imposerait les plus pénibles obligations.'

"Again, in his note of the 11th of May, a copy of which was received in London on the 30th of May, Prince Menschikoff says, that in case of an unsatisfactory decision on the part of the Porte si les principes qui en forment la base [of the articles he was negotiating] sont rejetés, si par une opposition systématique la Sublime Porte persiste à lui fermer jusqu'aux voies d'une entente intime et directe, il devra considérer sa mission comme terminée, interrompre les relations avec le Cabinet de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et rejeter sur la responsabilité de ses Ministres toutes les couséquences qui pourraient en résulter.'

And lastly, in his note of the 15th of May, received in London June 1, Prince Menschikoff concludes Il appartient à la sagacité de votre Altesse de péser les suites incalculables et les grandes calamités qui pourraient en résulter, et qui retomberaient de tout leur poids sur la responsabilité des Ministres de Sa Majesté le Sultan.'

"This succession of menaces, addressed to a power whose independence Russia had declared her determination to uphold, and in support of claims so much at variance with the assurances given to Her Majesty's Government, together with the vast military and naval armaments which for months had been preparing on the very confines of Turkey, left no doubt on the minds of Her Majesty's Government of the imminent danger in which the Sultan was about to be placed. They deeply lamented that this danger should arise from acts of the Russian Government, which was a party to the treaty of 1841; but, as Her Majesty's Government adhere now, as firmly as in 1841, to the principles which that treaty records, and believes that the maintenance of European peace is involved in the maintenance of the Ottoman empire, they felt that the time had arrived when, in the interests of peace, they must be prepared to protect the Sultan; and, upon learning the abrupt departure of Prince Menschikoff, it was determined that the British fleet, which up to that time had not not quitted Malta, should be placed at the disposal of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

"On the 1st of June a despatch was forwarded to Lord Stratford

de Redcliffe, authorising him in certain specified contingencies to send for the fleet, which would then repair to such place as he might point out. On the 2nd of June instructions were sent to Admiral Dundas to proceed at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and there to place himself in communication with Her Majesty's Ambassador.

"On the previous day we received a copy of Prince Menschikoff's note of May 18, announcing the termination of his mission, and that the refusal of the guarantee demanded 'devra désormais imposer au Gouvernement Imperial la necessité de la chercher dans sa propre puissance.'

"On the 2nd of June I communicated to Baron Brunow the measure taken by Her Majesty's Government; it could not have been made known by him at St. Petersburg before the 7th or 8th, and consequently it could in no way influence the decision taken by the Russian Government; for Count Nesselrode's note to Reschid Pasha, announcing that 'dans quelques semaines ses troupes recevront l'ordre de passer les frontières de l'empire,' was dated the 31st of May; and his despatch to Baron Brunow, in which he said that if the Porte did not sign Prince Menschikoff's note within a week after the arrival of the note to Reschid Pasha, the Emperor ordonnera à ses troupes d'occuper les Principautés,' was dated the 1st of June.

"It is thus clearly established that the British fleet was not sent to the waters of Turkey in disregard of considerations submitted to Her Majesty's Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and that on the day before the instruc

tions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe left London the decision to occupy the Principalities was taken by the Russian Government; and I say that decision was taken, because the Russian Government could never for one moment seriously have expected the submission of the Porte to the terms, sans variante,' that a regard for its own dignity and security had a few days before compelled it to decline. Yet Count Nesselrode, in his circular despatch of July 2, affirms that the presence of the English and French fleets in the Bay of Besika has mainly provoked and fully justifies the occupation of the Principalities; he insists that they are in sight of the capital, from which they are nearly 200 miles distant, and that their maritime occupation of the Turkish waters and ports can only be balanced by a military position on the part of Russia.

"But Her Majesty's Government must, in the strongest terms, protest against this assertion; and they deny that any resemblance exists between the position of the combined fleets in Besika Bay and that of the Russian armies in the Principalities.

The fleets have

the same right to anchor in Besika Bay as in any port in the Mediterranean. Their presence there violates no treaty and no territory; it infringes no international law; it is no menace to Turkish independence, and it assuredly ought to be no cause of offence to Russia; whereas by occupying the Principalities Russia does violate the territory of the Sultan and the special treaty which regards that portion of his dominion. It is an infraction of the law of nations, and an act of direct hostility against the Sultan, which