one, being such as he never received by sensation and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.

§. 14. The names of complex ideas when to be made intelligible by words. Simple ideas, as has been shown, can only be got by experience, from those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When by this means we have our minds stored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a condition to define, and by definition, to understand, the names of complex ideas, that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a simple idea, that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impossible, by any words, to make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an idea a man is acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it, there another name, of the same idea which he has been accustomed to, may make him understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever, is any name, of any simple idea, capable of a definition.

§. 15. Fourthly, names of simple ideas least doubtful.Fourthly, But though the names of simple ideas have not the help of definition to determine their signification; yet that hinders not, but that they are generally less doubtful and uncertain, than those of mixed modes and substances. Because they standing only for one simple perception, men, for the most part, easily and perfectly agree in their signification: and there is little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once, that whiteness is the name of that colour he has observed in snow or milk, will not be apt to misapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which when he has quite lost,' he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown, real essence, with properties depending thereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes the difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple ideas, the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the signification of name be obscure or uncertain.

§. 16. Fifthly, simple ideas have few ascents in lineá prædicamentali.-Fifthly, This farther may be observed, concerning simple ideas and their names, that they have but few ascents in lineá prædicamentali (as they call it), from the lowest species to the summum genus. The reason whereof is, that the lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it, that so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some

other thing in one idea common to them both; which having one name, is the genus of the other two: v. g. there is nothing can be left out of the idea of white and red, to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as rationality being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with brute, in the more general idea and name of animal. And, therefore, when to avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and several other such simple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain to do it by a word which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when white, red, and yellow, are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it signifies no more, but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet a more general term, to comprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple ideas, they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only by one sense and so the general term quality, in its ordinary acceptation, comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, with distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain, which make impressions on the mind, and introduce their ideas. by more senses than one.

§. 17. Sixthly, names of simple ideas stand for ideas, not at all arbitrary. Sixthly, The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes, have also this difference: that those of mixed modes stand for ideas, perfectly arbitrary: those of substances, are not perfectly so; but refer to a pattern, though with some latitude and those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what difference it makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following chapters.

The names of simple modes differ little from those of simple ideas.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS.

§. 1. They stand for abstract ideas, as well as other general names.-The names of mixed modes being general, they stand, as has been shown, for sorts or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence. The essences of these species also, as has been shown, are nothing but the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of mixed modes, have nothing but what is common to them, with other ideas; but if we take a little nearer survey of

them, we shall find that they have something peculiar, which, perhaps, may deserve our attention.

§. 2. First, the ideas they stand for, are made by the understanding. The first particularity I shall observe in them is, that the abstract ideas, or, if you please, the essences, of the several species of mixed modes, are made by the understanding, wherein they differ from those of simple ideas; in which sort, the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives such as are presented to it, by the real existence of things operating upon it.

§. 3. Secondly, made arbitrarily, and without patterns.—In the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes, are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence. Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly. It unites and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specific ideas, whilst others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward things, pass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does the mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex ideas of substances, examine them by the real existence of things: or verify them by patterns, containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his idea of adultery, or incest, be right, will a man seek it any where amongst things existing? Or, is it true, because any one has been witness to such an action? No: but it suffices here, that men have put together such a collection, into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and specific idea, whether ever any such action were committed in rerum natura, or no.

§. 4. How this is done.-To understand this aright, we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things; First, It chooses a certain number. Secondly, It gives them connexion, and makes them into one idea. Thirdly, It ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes, are the workmanship of the mind; and consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making.

§. 5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the idea is often before the existence.-Nobody can doubt, but that these ideas of mixed

modes, are made by a voluntary collection of ideas put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect, that this sort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can doubt, but the ideas of sacrilege, or adultery, might be framed in the minds of men, and have names given them; and so these species of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well discoursed of, and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them, whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain, how much the sorts of mixed modes, are the creatures of the understanding, where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exist: and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about species of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings : beings that had no other existence, but in their own minds. And, I think, nobody can deny, but that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed.

§. 6. Instances; murder, incest, stabbing.-To see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them, will satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent ideas, into one complex one; and by the common name it gives them, makes them the essence of a certain species, without regulating itself by any connexion they have in nature. For what greater connexion in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a sheep, with killing; that this is made a particular species of action, signified by the word murder; and the other not? Or what union is there in nature, between the idea of a relation of a father, with killing, than that of a son, or neighbour, that those are combined into one complex idea, and, thereby, made the essence of the distinct species, parricide, whilst the other make no distinct species at all? But though they have made killing a man's father or mother, a distinct species from killing his son or daughter; yet, in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the same species, as in that of incest. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas, such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature, are left loose, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then,

that the mind, by its free choice, gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas, which, in nature, have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out; why else is the part of the weapon, the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the distinct species called stabbing, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we shall see more by-and-by; but this, I say, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, pursuing its own ends, and that, therefore, these species of mixed modes, are the workmanship of the understanding; and there is nothing more evident, than that, for the most part, in the framing these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things; but puts such together, as may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precise imitation of any thing that really exists.

§. 7. But still subservient to the end of language.-But though these complex ideas, or essences of mixed modes, depend on the mind, and are made by it with great liberty; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which abstract ideas are made; and though they be combinations made of ideas, that are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves, as several other, to which the mind never gives a connexion that combines them into one idea; yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The use of language is, by short sounds, to signify, with ease and dispatch, general conceptions: wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one. In the making, therefore, of the species of mixed modes, men have had regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those they have combined into distinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others, that in nature have as near an union, are left loose and unregarded. For to go no farther than human actions themselves, if they would make distinct abstract ideas of all the varieties might be observed in them, the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices, that men make and name so many complex ideas of these mixed modes, as they find they have occasion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of killing, the idea of father, or mother, and so make a distinct species from killing a man's son or neighbour, it is because of the different heinousness of the