Paley remarks) with a high hand, in the face of God, and in defiance of the sanctions of religion. For a more full and very satisfactory and interesting view of this subject, I refer the reader to the sentiments of Heineccius*. They will be found in Part III., Section A.

*This treatise was in a forward state of preparation for the press, before I had an opportunity of making myself acquainted with the sentiments of that learned and sensible writer: I have, therefore, preferred making an extract, rather than attempt to interweave his views with my own. The dissertation from which that extract is made, and which he calls A Treatise on the Lubricity or Slippery Uncertainty of the Suppletory Oath, is a work well deserving a careful examination.

CHAPTER III.

DEFINITION OF AN OATH.

THE first point in our proposed inquiry, after tracing an oath to its true origin, would seem to be to settle its definition. And this is not so readily and easily determined as it might, at first sight, be supposed to be. A difficulty presents itself to us on the very threshold, involving, in some measure, our own national practice in England of employing the imprecatory form, and bearing directly on the objections of one of those few classes in our community, who refuse to bind themselves by the oath prescribed by our law. Dr. Paley*, seems not to have been aware of this difficulty, nor of the distinction made conscientiously by many excellent Christians. His definition of an oath runs thus ; "It is the calling upon God to witness, i. e., to take notice of what we say, AND it is invoking his vengeance, or renouncing his favour, if what we say be false, or what we promise be not performed."

It is somewhat curious, that the Archdeacon's next words are "Quakers and Moravians refuse to swear upon any occasion." This is a mistake. The fact is, that whilst Quakers object to an oath in any form, the Moravians would not refuse to swear, were that form of oath observed which the

*Moral Philos., b. iii., part 1, c. 16.

first part of Dr. Paley's definition specifies,namely, the solemn appeal to God as the witness of our words; but they shudder at the thought of imprecating, under any circumstances, directly, and in their own words, the vengeance of the Supreme Being upon their souls; an imprecation implied in the latter member of his definition. They, consequently, refuse our form of swearing, "So help me, God," SO, upon condition of my speaking the truth, and not otherwise.

This distinction is not recognised in an Act lately passed, 9 Geo. IV. c. 74, for the better administration of justice in India; which is the more surprising, because the law was made under the auspices of so able and so well-informed a person as the then Chairman of the Board of Control; it is usually called Mr. Wynne's Act. Its provision, as to the point before us, is couched in these terms." And be it enacted, that every Quaker or Moravian, who shall be required to give evidence in any case whatever, civil or criminal, shall, instead of taking an oath in the usual form, be permitted to make his or her solemn affirmation or declaration, in the words following, that is to say,-I, A. B., do solemnly, sincerely, and truly declare and affirm." This confusion, for such it is, is the more remarkable, because Acts of Parliament had already most clearly recognised the distinction. By 8 Geo. c. 6, the Quakers were

allowed, for certain purposes, instead of taking an oath, to make a declaration in the very words, word for word, of the form prescribed by Mr. Wynne's Act for both Quakers and Moravians; whereas, by 22 Geo. II. c. 30, the Moravians were relieved, by having the form of attestation substituted which no Quaker would admit. This law is intituled "An Act for encouraging the people, known by the name of the Unitas Fratrum,' or United Brethren, to settle in his Majesty's Colonies in America." Its enactment is this;-"Every person, being a member of the Protestant Episcopal Church, known by the name of Unitas Fratrum,' or United Brethren, which Church was formerly settled in Moravia and Bohemia, and [members of which] are now in Prussia, Poland, Germany, the United Provinces, and also in his Majesty's dominions, who shall be required, on any lawful occasion, to take an oath, shall, instead of the usual form, be permitted to make his solemn affirmation in these words,-I, A. B., do declare, in the presence of Almighty God, the witness of what I say." This is to all intents and purposes an oath. It is, I think, matter of regret, that this distinction, so evidently recognised in former Acts, should have been overlooked in Mr. Wynne's Bill. It is not a mere verbal distinction. The difference is real and practical. No one could make the Moravian's attestation, unless he acknowledged the Deity as the moral Governor of the

world. The Quaker's affirmation an Atheist might make without any inconsistency.

The case of the Separatists will be found in Part III., Section B.

Phillips, indeed, in his beautifully luminous and able Treatise on the Law of Evidence, seems to take it for granted, that "our law (like that of most other civilized nations) requires a witness to believe, not only that there is a God and a future state of rewards and punishments, but also that, by taking the oath, he imprecates the divine vengeance upon himself, if his evidence shall be false*." But, as we shall often be reminded, this view is neither universally taken, nor is it insisted upon by the jurisprudence of all European countries. M. Merlin, having stated that, by the ancient law, the members of two religions in France had the privilege of taking their own peculiar oath, Jews and Anabaptists, observes of the latter, "their religion only allows them to say 'Yes,' to the form of oath administered by the judge, and forbids them to lift their hand, because they believe that would be to provoke the Lord from the highest heaven; an act which, according to them, would be an impiety more fitted to destroy the credit of him who should be guilty of it, than to merit confidence+."

Conceiving that the reader might desire to review

* Phillips, c. 3.

Répertoire Universel et Raisonné de Jurisprudence.