[COPYRIGHTED.]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

POINTS SUGGESTED BY FLEET DRILL.

BY ENSIGN F. K. HILL, U. S. Navy.

The following criticisms are suggested by our recent squadron manœuvres:*

CONNING TOWER.

The conning tower is the place from which the captain is to direct a ship's movements in battle; and, logically, he (or his representative) should be there during fleet manœuvres. If the bridge is used in peace (and it is only a peace construction), the officers who have charge will never have the same ready command of the many instruments placed in the conning tower as if they always managed the ship from the tower. To make the case more plain, consider the instruments which are found on the bridge of the U. S. S. New York. (See list.) Every officer of the line knows so well where all these instruments are that he can put his hand upon them on the darkest night. This is from constant practice; but, as he rarely enters the conning tower, and never has to use the instruments there, he does not know their location. Hence, if suddenly called to work the ship in action, he would simply be confused. All of our ships with which the writer is familiar have their conning towers so placed that they are almost useless; and, judging by their late war, the Japanese and Chinese were no better off; for the officers state that they could not manœuvre their fleets from the conning tower, and only sought it for safety when engaged at short range.

Closely connected with the manoeuvring of the fleet, or ship, from the conning tower is the making of signals. At present,

*North Atlantic Squadron.

as everybody acknowledges, we have no system of war signals; and no one in our navy, so far as is generally given out, has proposed any feasible scheme to remedy the present lack. Flags are worthless, yet we still have them. Shapes are proposed, but have never been tried. The writer suggests the following:

A conning tower higher than at present; no peace bridge, no chart-house, etc., above the conning tower; but concentric with it, a cone-shaped mast having at its base and immediately over the conning tower a room sufficiently large to manipulate such gear as will work shapes placed on a steel pole projecting from the top of the cone mast. This signal manipulating room should be protected (2" steel) and in direct communication with the conning tower. On all large ships and battle-ships two of these conning towers and masts would be necessary, and should be connected by telephone. All the necessary instruments mentioned as being on the peace bridge should be placed in the conning tower, and habitually worked from that point.

Surrounding the conning tower, and on a level with it, a bridge should be placed so that the officer-of-the-deck would not be confined to the limits of the conning tower; and also such shutters should be furnished to the conning tower as might be kept open in ordinary cruising to give better sight and air to the helmsman within.

NOW AS TO THE FLEET.

Practically in all fleet battles of the future, the speed will be at least fifteen (15) knots; therefore fleet tactics should be carried. on at that speed. The judgment and practice acquired by handling a fleet at a speed of nine (9) knots are almost useless when the speed is increased to fifteen (15). The times at which the guide ship (in such movements as "forward into line, left oblique") should go ahead full speed are different for different speeds. The helm angles differ, as do many other minor points connected with the proper maintenance of the exact bearings and distances of the various ships. Why should we learn to manœuvre at nine (9) knots when we will have to throw away practically all ideas gained when we go into actual battle, or shall have to run at a low speed, which will place us at a great disadvantage? Of course, the first few days of drill with a new fleet might be at a low speed for safety; but the speed should be rapidly increased until actual war speed is obtained.

Closely connected with the speed and manoeuvring ability is the question of having the ships of a fleet as nearly as possible alike. Nearly every ship we have is slightly different from all others. Each one as it is built is the latest and best thing out, we are told. But would it not be better if we considered what ships are to do, and tried to make our fleets homogeneous? By this I do not mean that we are not to progress; but would it not be better to have some tactical unit, say four (4), and then let the vessels be built to form tactical units? Thus four (4) consecutive ships of a particular class would be exactly alike, built for a certain duty and station; and the next four (4) for some other duty and station, and so on. This would be particularly desirable in battle-ships, which remain at home and which should be grouped as a squadron and exercised together; so that when combined with another group of four (4) to form a fleet, there would only be a case of assimilating two (2) groups instead of eight (8) independent vessels, all of different characteristics. These groups of four (4) should all be exercised together when first commissioned, and then detailed to the same station, after which, with a certain amount of fleet drill at stated periods, they could be kept in a high state of efficiency. As an example of the results of such training of similar vessels, it may be stated that in the German navy they have units of torpedo-boats (seven (7) in a group) which are able to steam at full speed in echelon, while each vessel is in touch with its neighbors. Another argument for the group system is that if four (4) similar vessels are fighting together, the line of bearing on which any one can fight advantageously will be the same for all the others.

PERSONNEL.

The time that our admirals serve as commanders-in-chief is so brief that they hardly get into working condition themselves before. they are either relegated to the retired list or go on some shore duty. The cause of this trouble is that the slowness of promotion in the line has caused our officers to pass a great length of time in the lower grades and but a short time in the command grade. We even go to the extremity of making commodores do admiral's work, calling them acting rear admirals and giving them commodore's pay.

This shows that we should have more officers in the upper grades, and that such legislation should be enacted as would cause the time spent in the various grades to be more nearly equalized than at present.

As an example of the bad results of the present condition of affairs, it may be stated that on the home station, where most of the fleet drills are expected to take place, there is an average of one (1) new commander-in-chief each year, with frequent cases in which the admiral remains in command for a few months only. The commanding officers are not changed quite as often as the admirals, but even they frequently do not remain long enough to get the best results out of their respective ships. In addition to this, the commanding officers (or their representatives) do not handle their ships in fleet tactics as if in battle (for reasons stated in connection with the conning towers); and the writer, having served on five (5) of our modern cruisers, never knew but one commanding officer who went into the conning tower at great gun drill and from there controlled the battery; and even that one did not make a practice of going there.

The remedy for this is for the commanding officers to take their position during drill or gun practice in the place assigned them in battle, and from there to control the guns as if in battle: for certainly the captain should have drill and preparation as well as the divisional officers. After the captain has thoroughly drilled the ship, would it not be wise to imagine certain casualties, and allow the command to devolve on some of the other officers, giving each a turn, down to the lowest ensigns?

As for the watch officers, they always have their regular stations at drill and target practice, and are there as if for battle; and the only suggestion in regard to them is the one above, that they should succeed the captain in command and be drilled at his station.

There is but one test for all our exercises, viz., "Are they carried out as if in battle?" If they fail in that, they should be dropped or changed so as to stand the test.

LIST OF INSTRUMENTS ON BRIDGE OF THE U. S. S. NEW YORK.

I telephone.

5 speaking tubes.

4 electric buttons.

4 annunciators.

2 speed indicators (electric).

2 speed indicators (mechanical).

I revolution indicator.

I helm indicator.

2 electric tickers for revolution indicators.

I helm telegraph.

2 mechanical indicators for revolutions.

I automatic push-button for fog signals.

3 push-buttons with clock attachments for automatic working of siren, whistle and search-light.

I Ardois signal-box.

4 control stands for search-lights.