4. Duty to see that the Laws be Faithfully Executed. IN RE NEAGLE. Supreme Court of the United States. October, 1889. 135 U. S. 1. Mr. Justice MILLER, on behalf of the court, stated the case as follows: This was an appeal by Cunningham, sheriff of the county of San Joaquin, in the State of California, from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, discharging David Neagle from the custody of said sheriff, who held him a prisoner on a charge of murder. On the 16th day of August, 1889, there was presented to Judge Sawyer, the Circuit Judge of the United States for the Ninth District, embracing the Northern District of California, a petition signed by David Neagle, deputy United States marshal, by A. L. Farrish, on his behalf. The petition recited the circumstances of a rencontre between said Neagle and David S. Terry, in which the latter was instantly killed by two shots from a revolver in the hands of the former. The main allegation of this petition was that Neagle, as United States deputy marshal, acting under the orders of Marshal Franks, and in pursuance of instructions from the Attorney General of the United States, had, in consequence of an anticipated attempt at violence on the part of Terry against the Hon. Stephen J. Field, a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, been in attendance upon said justice, and was sitting by his side at a breakfast table when a murderous assault was made by Terry on Judge Field, and in defense of the life of the judge the homicide was committed for which Neagle was held by Cunningham. Mr. Justice MILLER after stating the case, the opinion of the court. delivered If it be true, as stated in the order of the court discharging the prisoner, that he was held "in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States," there does not seem to be any doubt that, under the statute on that subject, he was properly discharged by the Circuit Court. Without a more minute discussion of this testimony, it produces upon us the conviction of a settled purpose on the part of Terry and his wife, amounting to a conspiracy, to murder Justice Field. And we are quite sure that if Neagle had been merely a brother or a friend of Judge Field, traveling with him, and aware of all the previous relations of Terry and the judge,—as he was, of his bitter animosity, his declared purpose to have revenge, even to the point of killing him, he would have been justified in what he did in defence of Mr. Justice Field's life, and possibly of his own. But such a justification would be a proper subject for consideration on a trial of the case for murder in the courts of the state of California, and there exists no authority in the courts of the United States to discharge the prisoner while held in custody by the state authorities for this offence, unless there be found in aid of the defense of the prisoner some element of power and authority asserted under the government of the United States. This element is said to be found in the facts that Mr. Justice Field, when attacked, was in the immediate discharge of his duty as judge of the Circuit Courts of the United States within California; that the assault upon him grew out of the animosity of Terry and wife, arising out of the previous discharge of his duty as circuit justice in the case for which they were committed for contempt of court; and that the deputy marshal of the United States, who killed Terry in the defense of Field's life, was charged with a duty under the law of the United States to protect Field form the violence which Terry was inflicting, and which was intended to lead to Field's death. We have no doubt that Mr. Justice Field when attacked by Terry was engaged in the discharge of his duties as Circuit Justice of the Ninth Circuit, and was entitled to all the protection under those circumstances which the law could give him. We cannot doubt the power of the President to take measures for the protection of a judge of one of the courts of the United States, who, while in the discharge of the duties of his office, is threatened with personal attack which may probably result in his death, and we think it clear that where this protection is to be af forded through the civil power, the Department of Justice is the proper one to set in motion the necessary means of protection. The correspondence between the marshal of the Northern District of California, and the Attorney General, and the district attorney of the United States, for that district, although prescribing no very specific mode of affording this protection by the Attorney General, is sufficient, we think, to warrant the marshal in taking the steps which he did take, in making the provisions which he did make, for the protection and defence of Mr. Justice Field. But there is a positive law investing the marshals and their deputies with powers which not only justify what Marshal Neagle did in this matter, but which imposed it upon him as a duty. But all these questions being conceded, it is urged against the relief sought by this writ of habeas corpus, that the question of the guilt of the prisoner of the crime of murder is a question to be determined by the laws of California, and to be decided by its courts, and that there exists no power in the Government of the United States to take away the prisoner from the custody of the proper authorities of the States of California and carry him before a judge of the court of the United States, and release him without a trial by jury according to the laws of the State of California. That the statute of the United States authorizes and directs such a proceeding and such a judgment in a case where the offence charged against the prisoner consists in an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States and by virtue of its authority, and where the imprisonment of the party is in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, is clear by its express langinge, It would seem as if the argument might close here. If the duty of the United States to protect its officers from violence, even to death, in the discharge of the duties which its laws impose upon them, be established, and Congress has made the writ of habeas corpus one of the means by which this protection is made efficient, and if the facts of this case show that the prisoner was acting both under authority of the law, and the directions of his superior officers of the Department of Justice, we can see no reason why this writ should not be made to serve its purpose in the present case. To the objection made in argument, that the prisoner is discharged by this writ from the power of the State court to try him for the whole offence, the reply is, that if the prisoner is held in the State court to answer for an act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United States, which it was his duty to do as marshal of the United States, and if in doing that act he did no more that was necessary and proper for him to do, he cannot be guilty of a crime under the law of the State of California. When these things are shown, it is established that he is innocent of any crime against the laws of the State, or of any other authority whatever. There is no occasion for any further trial in the State court, or in any court. The Circuit Court of the United States was as competent to ascertain these facts as any other tribunal, and it was not at all necessary that a jury should be impanelled to render a verdict on them. It is the exercise of a power common under all systems of criminal jurisprudence. There must always be a preliminary examination by a committing magistrate, or some similar authority, as to whether there is an offence to be submitted to a jury, and if this is submitted in the first instance to a grand jury, that is still not the right of trial by jury, which is insisted on in the present argument. We have thus given this case, a most attentive consideration to all the questions of law and fact which we have thought to be properly involved in it. We have felt it to be our duty to examine into the facts with a completeness justified by the importance of the case, as well as from the duty imposed upon us by the statute, which we think requires of us to place ourselves, as far as possible, in the place of the Circuit Court and to examine the testimony and the arguments in it, and to dispose of the party as law and justice require. The result at which we have arrived upon this examination is, that in the protection of the person and the life of Mr. Justice Field while in the discharge of his official duties, Neagle was authorized to resist the attack of Terry upon him; that Neagle was correct in the belief that without prompt action on his part the assault of Terry upon the judge would have ended in the death of the latter; that such being his well-founded belief, he was justified in taking the life of Terry, as the only means of preventing the death of the man who was intended to be his victim; that in taking the life of Terry, under the circumstances, he was acting under the authority of the law of the United States, and was justified in so doing; and that he is not liable to answer in the courts of California on account of his part in that transaction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court authorizing his discharge from the custody of the sheriff of San Joaquin County. Mr. Justice LAMAR (with whom concurred Mr. Chief Justice FULLER) dissenting. Mr. Justice FIELD did not sit at the hearing of this case and took no part in its decision. 5. Power of Regulation. FIELD V. CLARK. Supreme Court of the United States. October, 1891. These were suits by importers to obtain a refund of duties claimed to have been illegally exacted on imported merchandise under the tariff act approved October 1, 1890, 26 St. 567, c. 1244. Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. Duties were assessed and collected according to the rates established by what is known as the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890. The importers severally protested against the assessment upon the ground that the act was not a law of the United States. The appellants question the validity of the act of October 1, 1890, upon three grounds to be separately examined. Second. The third section of the act of October 1, 1890, c. 1244, sec. 3, is in these words: "Sec. 3. That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing the following articles, and for this purpose, on and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninetytwo, whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, |