conservative,) said, in case Parliament will not give way, Government must be carried on without it, and its dissolution brings relief from senseless zealots and presumptuous fools. At some future time, when the Members and the people have become wise, it may be called together again or not; for nobody has the power or the right to compel the King on this point; nay, if we enquire into the highest, the divine right, it knows nothing of Parliaments, Upper and Lower Houses, elections, and Speakers, but simply orders the people to obey the magistrates. And not merely the Clergy but the judges laid down the principle that the King can do no wrong, and the Parliament could the less limit the King's absolute rights, as he is the source of all right, and may, if it appears necessary, dispense with all laws. The petition of right, which is now so often appealed to, is, however, nothing but a petition, which the King willingly grants, as far as it is for the welfare of his people, but always disregards when injury might result from his attending to it. If many persons represent the matter in another light, it is only to make themselves popular. The King's right to decide in ecclesiastical and religious affairs can be still less disputed, than his unlimited authority in matters of State, and least of all can his right be doubted to give unconditional orders to all persons in office. It is an absurd innovation to make them answerable to

any person but to him. When they execute his commands, they always do right, and are free from all responsibility.

Those who took a different view of the subject answered: whether the King will have the power to govern without a Parliament, the future will decide; but that he has no right to do so, is manifest from the clear letter of the laws, and the custom of centuries. His rights are inviolable only if he acknowledges and performs his duty, and he is no less subject to the law than any other person. What the Parliament politely called a petition of right, became, by the royal sanction, a law, binding all parties, and he who denies this, very significantly indicates that still stronger guarantees against the arbitrary will of the King must be found. With respect to religion and eternal salvation, a foreign more than papal despotism, can be still less tolerated than unlimited tyranny in the State: lastly, it is quite absurd that officers who violate the plainest laws, should be freed by a royal order from all responsibility.

As our space does not allow us to enter into a detailed examination of these several views, we will make only two observations. Firstly, it was a great error to believe that these important political and religious questions interested only a few turbulent spirits, and that when these were gained by

favours or terrified by punishments, nothing more would be heard of them.

Secondly, the first view logically includes the rejection of all formal public rights and of all legal securities, and leads almost necessarily to the idea of doubling the power of the latter by force: and of opposing the absolute power of the King, (which pretends to be above all laws,) the equally erroneous doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, which claims limitation from all restrictions of law, and leaves the caprice of every moment to decide.

Meantime, very much depended upon the persons whom the King would employ, and how he would govern without a Parliament. With respect to the former, Clarendon, a partisan of the Court, says in substance: "The Lord Keeper, Coventry, a prudent, well informed man, who never went beyond his sphere, sometimes censured as inactive because he would not assist in the innovations, the consequences of which he foresaw. The Lord Treasurer Weston, not without talents, but immoderately ambitious, profuse, alternately too forward and too timid, without elevation of character and sentiment, and suspected of Catholicism, only not by the Roman Catholics themselves. The Earl of Arundel, the possessor of many antiquities, a humourist, properly speaking ignorant, who, in general, cared very little about Court and public affairs. The Earl

of Pembroke, able and esteemed, but devoted to all kinds of pleasures, especially to women. The Earl of Carlisle, an experienced courtier, and well versed in foreign affairs, but a bon vivant, and prodigal in the extreme. The Earl of Holland, pliant, and not to be depended upon. The Earl of Montgomery, a good judge of dogs and horses."

It is evident that all the men here named would not have been capable of directing the affairs of State even in tranquil times, much less at so critical a moment. In fact, two other men soon acquired more decided influence, namely, Thomas Wentworth afterwards created Earl of Strafford, and Laud, who had been raised to the see of Canterbury, after the death of Archbishop Abbot, in August, 1623.

The first was a descendant of the Wentworths who had distinguished themselves in Parliament in the reign of Elizabeth, and had himself advocated the rights of the people with energetic vehemence; had supported to the utmost the petition of right, and suffered himself to be thrown into prison for refusing to contribute to the loan illegally imposed. Since that time, (though not without the fault of the Court,) indications of more serious designs had appeared among the friends of the popular party, yet nothing had been done to cause a total change of opinions and principles. If, therefore, Strafford, following the honorable invitation of the King, had faithfully united with him, and acted with energy

for the preservation of his rights, as well as those of the people, he would merit implicit praise. Instead of this, he hurried to the opposite extreme, and thereby proved that his preceding actions rested on no solid foundation, or that he was one of those demagogues who, as is so often the case, are but tyrants in disguise. Whatever his defenders may say, it shews no consistency, no unity of principles and sentiments, for a man to suffer himself to be imprisoned to-day for not paying an unvoted loan, and to-morrow to assist in imprisoning others for refusing to pay the unvoted ship money. Strafford incontestably possessed great energy of mind and will; from the moment he got the power into his hands, he was disposed to make use of it like the tyrants who sometimes appear in the history of the world, and are, not without reason, celebrated. But while he indiscriminately set aside all the demands of the age for the attainment of this egotistical object, and recognized no law but his own will and that of the King, he in a great measure produced the evils which he desired to combat, and blindly plunged himself and his master into the same ruin. A truly great man would have mediated between the two parties in such a manner that they must in the end have acknowledged that their own safety was to be found in his guidance; whereas now, after pas

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