A DISSOLUTION is the civil death of the parliament; and this may be effected three ways: 1. By the king's will, expreffed either in perfon or by representation. For, as the king has the sole right of convening the parliament, so also it is a branch of the royal prerogative, that he may (whenever he pleases) prorogue the parliament for a time, or put a final period to it's exiftence. If nothing had a right to prorogue or diffolve a parliament but itself, it might happen to become perpetual. And this would be extremely dangerous, if at any time it should attempt to encroach upon the executive power as was fatally experienced by the unfortunate king Charles the firft; who, having unadvisedly past an act to continue the parliament then in being till fuch time as it fhould please to diffolve itself, at laft fell a facrifice to that inordinate power, which he himself had confented to give them. It is therefore extremely neceffary that the crown. fhould be empowered to regulate the duration of thefe affemblies, under the limitations which the English constitution has prescribed: so that, on the one hand, they may frequently and regularly come together for the dispatch of business, and redrefs of grievances; and may not, on the other, even with the consent of the crown, be continued to an inconvenient or unconstitutional length. (65)

2. A PARLIAMENT may be diffolved by the demife of the This diffolution formerly happened immediately upon the death of the reigning fovereign: for he being con

crown.

days, the king may iffue a proclamation, declaring that the parliament shall meet on a day, being not lefs than fourteen days from the date of such proclamation, and the two houses of parliament shall stand adjourned to the day and place declared in fuch proclamation. And the orders, which fhall be appointed for the day of adjournment, or for any day subsequent thereto, except fuch as shall be specially appointed for particular days, shall be deemed to be appointed for the day of adjournment fixed in the proclamation.

(65) A parliament may be diffolved by proclamation, as it was during the recefs in 1806.

fidered

fidered in law as the head of the parliament, (caput, principium, et finis,) that failing, the whole body was held to be extinct. But the calling a new parliament immediately on the inauguration of the fucceffor being found inconvenient, and dangers being apprehended from having no parliament in being in case of a difputed fucceffion, it was enacted by the statutes 7 & 8 W. III. c. 15. and 6 Ann. c. 7. that the parliament in being fhall continue for fix months after the death of any king or queen, unless fooner prorogued or diffolved by the fucceffor: that, if the parliament be, at the time of the king's death, feparated by adjournment or prorogation, it shall notwithstanding affemble immediately: and that, if no parliament is then in being, the members of the last parliament shall assemble, and be again a parliament.

[189] 3. LASTLY, a parliament may be diffolved or expire by length of time. For if either the legislative body were perpetual; or might last for the life of the prince who convened them, as formerly; and were so to be fupplied, by occafionally filling the vacancies with new representatives; in these cases, if it were once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy but when different bodies fucceed each other, if the people fee cause to disapprove of the present, they may rectify it's faults in the next. A legislative affembly also, which is fure to be separated again, (whereby it's members will themselves become private men, and subject to the full extent of the laws which they have enacted for others,) will think themselves bound, in intereft as well as duty, to make only such laws as are good. The utmost extent of time that the fame parliament was allowed to fit, by the ftatute 6 W. & M. c. 2. was three years; after the expiration of which, reckoning from the return of the first fummons, the parliament was to have no longer continuance. But by the statute I Geo. I. ft. 2. c. 38. (in order, profeffedly, to prevent the great and continued expences of frequent elections, and the violent heats and animofities confequent thereupon, and for the peace and fecurity of the government then just recovering from the late rebellion) this term was prolonged to seven years:

years: : and, what alone is an instance of the vaft authority of parliament, the very fame houfe, that was chofen for three years, enacted it's own continuance for seven (66). So that, as our conftitution now ftands, the parliament must expire, or die a natural death, at the end of every feventh year; if not fooner diffolved by the royal prerogative.

(66) This has been thought by many an unconstitutional exertion of their authority; and the reafon given is, that those who had a power delegated to them for three years only, could have no right to extend that term to seven years. But this has always appeared to me to be a fallacious mode of confidering the subject. Before the triennial act, 6 W. & M. the duration of parliament was only limited by the pleasure or death of the king; and it never can be supposed that the next, or any fucceeding parliament, had not power of repealing the triennial act; and if that had been done, then, as before, they might have fat seventeen or seventy years. It is certainly true, that the fimple repeal of a former statute would have extended their continuance much beyond what was done by the septennial act.

the

CHAPTER THE THIRD.

OF THE KING, AND HIS TITLE.

THE

HE fupreme executive power of these kingdoms is vested by our laws in a single person, the king or queen: for it matters not to which fex the crown defcends; but the person entitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately invested with all the enfigns, rights, and prerogatives of fovereign power; as is declared by ftatute 1 Mar. ft. 3. c. I.

In difcourfing of the royal rights and authority, I shall confider the king under fix diftinct views: 1. With regard to his title. 2. His royal family. 3. His councils. 4. His duties. 5. His prerogative. 6. His revenue. And first, with regard to his title.

THE executive power of the English nation being vested in a fingle perfon, by the general confent of the people, the evidence of which general consent is long and immemorial usage, it became neceffary to the freedom and peace of the ftate, that a rule fhould be laid down, uniform, univerfal, and permanent; in order to mark out with precifion, whe is that fingle perfon, to whom are committed (in fubfervience to the law of the land) the care and protection of the community; and to whom, in return, the duty and allegiance of every individual are due. It is of the highest importance to the public tranquillity, and to the consciences

of private men, that this rule fhould be clear and indisputable; and our conftitution has not left us in the dark upon this material occafion. It will therefore be the endeavour

of this chapter to trace out the conftitutional doctrine of the royal fucceffion, with that freedom and regard to truth, yet mixed with that reverence and respect, which the principles of liberty and the dignity of the subject require.

THE grand fundamental maxim upon which the jus corone, or right of fucceffion to the throne of these kingdoms, depends, I take to be this: " that the crown is, by common "law and constitutional custom, hereditary; and this in a "manner peculiar to itfelf: but that the right of inheritance "may from time to time be changed or limited by act of "parliament; under which limitations the crown still con❝tinues hereditary." And this propofition it will be the business of this chapter to prove, in all it's branches; first, that the crown is hereditary; fecondly, that it is hereditary in a manner peculiar to itself; thirdly, that this inheritance is fubject to limitation by parliament; lastly, that when it is fo limited, it is hereditary in the new proprietor.

1. FIRST, it is in general hereditary, or defcendible to the next heir, on the death or demife of the last proprietor. All regal governments must be either hereditary or elective: and, as I believe there is no instance wherein the crown of England has ever been afferted to be elective, except by the regicides at the infamous and unparalleled trial of king Charles I., it must of confequence be hereditary. Yet while I affert an hereditary, I by no means intend a jure divino title to the throne. Such a title may be allowed to have subfifted under the theocratic establishments of the children of Ifrael in Palestine; but it never yet fubfifted in any other country; fave only so far as kingdoms, like other human fabricks, are fubject to the general and ordinary dispensations of Providence. Nor indeed have a jure divino and an hereditary right any neceffary connection with each other; as fome have very weakly imagined. The titles of David and Jehu were

equally