ence in loans, fubfcriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-transactions, which will greatly increase this influence; and that over those persons whose attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most desirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen confequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to fupport them establishing our present perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new fince the restoration in 1660; and by far the greatest part fince the revolution in 1688. And the fame may be faid with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created. All which put together give the executive power fo perfuafive an energy with respect to the perfons themselves, and fo prevailing an intereft with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the lofs of external prerogative.

BUT, though this profufion of offices should have no effect on individuals, there is still another newly-acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a difciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown: raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot, it is true, only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year they must, by the nature of our constitution, if raised at all, be at the absolute disposal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how great a truft is thereby repofed in the prince by his people; a trust, that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.

ADD to all this, that befides the civil lift, the immense revenue of almost seven millions sterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or carried to the finking fund, is firft depofited in the royal exchequer, and thence iffued out to the refpective offices of payment. This revenue [337 ] the people can never refufe to raife, because it was made perpetual by act of parliament: which also, when well confidered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high importance.

UPON

UPON the whole therefore I think it is clear, that, whatever may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any transactions in the last century. Much is indeed given up; but much is also acquired. The ftern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence: the flavish and exploded doctrine of non-refiftance has given way to a military eftablishment by law and to the disuse of parliament has fucceeded a parliamentary trust of an immenfe perpetual revenue. When, indeed, by the free operation of the finking fund, our national debts fhall be leffened; (when the posture of foreign affairs, and the univerfal introduction of a wellplanned and national militia, will suffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when in consequence of all) our taxes fhall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will flowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it flowly and imperceptibly rofe. But till that shall happen, it will be our especial duty, as good subjects and good Englishmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and fervile influence from those who are intrufted with its authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a fovereign, who, in all thofe public acts that have perfonally proceeded from himself, hath manifected the highest veneration for the free conftitution of Britain; hath already in more than one instance remarkably strengthened it's outworks; and will therefore never harbour a thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public liberty.

CHAPTER THE NINTH.

OF SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES.

IN

a former chapter of these Commentaries a we diftinguished magistrates into two kinds; supreme, or those in whom the fovereign power of the state refides; and subordinate, or those who act in an inferior fecondary sphere. We have hitherto confidered the former kind only; namely, the fupreme legiflative power or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king and are now to proceed to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate magistrates.

AND herein we are not to inveftigate the powers and duties of his majesty's great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal fecretaries, or the like; because I do not know that they are in that capacity in any confiderable degree the object of our laws, or have any very important fhare of magistracy conferred upon them; except that the fecretaries of state are allowed the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial. Neither fhall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord chancellor, or the other judges of the superior courts of justice; because they will find a more proper place in the third part of these Commentaries. Nor fhall I enter into any minute difquifitions,

with regard to the rights and dignities of mayors and aldermen, or other magistrates of particular corporations: because [339 these are mére private and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the domestic constitution of their respective franchises. But the magiftrates and officers, whose rights and duties it will be proper in this chapter to confider, are fuch as are generally in use, and have a jurisdiction and authority dispersedly throughout the kingdom: which are principally fheriffs; coroners; juftices of the peace; constables; furveyors of highways; and overfeers of the poor: in treating of all which I fhall enquire into, first, their antiquity and original; next, the manner in which they are appointed and may be removed; and lastly, their rights and duties. And firft of fheriffs.

I. THE sheriff is an officer of very great antiquity in this kingdom, his name being derived from two Saxon words, rcine genera the reeve, bailiff, or officer of the fhire. He is called in Latin vice-comes, as being the deputy of the earl or comes; to whom the cuftody of the fhire is faid to have been committed at the first divifion of this kingdom into counties. But the earls in process of time, by reason of their high employments and attendance on the king's person, not being able to transact the business of the county, were delivered of that burden: reserving to themselves the honour, but the labour was laid on the sheriff. So that now the sheriff does all the king's bufinefs in the county; and though he be still called vice-comes, yet he is entirely independent of, and not subject to the earl; the king by his letters patent committing cuftodiam comitatus to the fheriff, and him alone.

SHERIFFS were formerly chofen by the inhabitants of the feveral counties. In confirmation of which it was ordained by statute 28 Edw. I. c. 8. that the people should have elec

• Dalton of sheriffs, c. I.

tion of sheriffs in every fhire, when the shrievalty is not of inheritance. For antiently in some counties the sheriffs were hereditary; as I apprehend they were in Scotland till the statute 20 Geo. II. c. 43.; and still continue in the county of Weftmorland to this day (1): the city of London having alfo [ 340 ] the inheritance of the shrievalty of Middlesex vested in their body by charter (2). The reason of these popular elections is affigned in the fame ftatute, c. 13. "that the commons "might chufe fuch as would not be a burden to them." And herein appears plainly a strong trace of the democratical part of our conftitution; in which form of government it is an indispensable requifite, that the people should chuse their own magiftrates. This election was in all probability not absolutely vested in the commons, but required the royal approbation. For in the Gothic conftitution, the judges of the county courts (which office is executed by our sheriff) were elected by the people, but confirmed by the king: and the form of their election was thus managed the people, or incolae territorii, chose twelve electors, and they nominated three perfons, ex quibus rex unum confirmabat". d 3 Rep. 72. f Stiern. de jure Goth. l. I. c. 3.

(1) The earl of Thanet is hereditary sheriff of Westmorland. This office may defcend to, and be executed by, a female; for "Ann countess of Pembroke had the office of hereditary sheriff "of Westmorland, and exercised it in perfon. At the affizes at "Appleby fhe fat with the judges on the bench." Harg. Co. Litt. 326.

(2) The election of the fheriffs of London and Middlesex was granted to the citizens of London for ever in very ancient times, upon condition of their paying 300l. a year to the king's exchequer. In confequence of this grant they have always elected two fheriffs, though thefe conftitute together but one officer; and if one die, the other cannot act tiil another is elected. (4 Bac. Abr. 447.) In the year 1748, the corporation of London made a byelaw, impofing a fine of 600l. upon every person who, being elected, fhould refuse to serve the office of sheriff. See the cafe of Evans, efq. and the chamberlain of London, a Burn. E. L. 185. But