APPENDIX. THE TRUE MEANING OF THE SYSTEM OF NATURE. INTRODUCTION. MAN, unfortunately for himself, wishes to exceed the limits of his sphere, and to transport himself beyond the visible world. He neglects experience, and feeds himself with conjectures. Early prepossessed by artful men against reason, he neglects its cultivation. Pretending to know his fate in another world, he is inatentive to his happiness in the present. The author's object is, to recal man to reason by rendering it dear to him,to dissipate the clouds which obscure the way to this happiness,-to offer reflections useful to his peace and comfort, and favourable to mental improve ment. So far from wishing to destroy the duties of morality, it is the author's object to give them double force, and establish them on the altar of virtue, which alone merits the homage of mankind. CHAPTER I. On Nature. Man is a being purely physical. The moral man is only the physical man, considered in a certain point of view. His organization is the work of nature; his visible actions and invisible movements are equally the natural effects and consequences of his mechanism. His inventions are the effect of his essence. His ideas proceed from the same cause. Art is only nature, acting by instruments which she has herself made-all is the impulse of nature.⚫ It is to physics and experience, that man in all his researches ought to have When we quit experience, imagination recourse. Nature acts by simple laws. leads us astray. 'Tis from want of experience that men have formed wrong ideas of matter.* *Men have fallen into a thousand errours, by ascribing an existence to the objects of our interior perceptions, distinct from ourselves, in the same manner as we conceive them separately. It becomes of importance, therefore, to examine the nature of the distinctions which subsist among those objects. Some of these are so distinct from others, that they cannot exist together. The surface of a body cannot at the same time be both white and black in all its parts: nor can one MAN is the work of nature, and sub-body be more or less extended than another ject to her laws, from which he cannot free himself, nor even exceed in thought. A being formed by nature, he is nothing beyond the great whole of which he forms a part. Beings supposed to be superior to, or distinguished from, nature, are mere chimeras, of which no real idea can be formed. of the same dimensions. Two ideas, thus other: since the existence of one of them distinguished, necessarily exclude one annecessarily infers the non-existence of the other, and, consequently, its own separate and independent existence. This class I call real or exclusive existence. But there is another class, which, in opposition to the former, I call fictitious, or imaginary existence. While a body is passing Indolence is gratified in following an implicit respect for ancient instiexample: habit, and authority, rather tutions. Credulity proceeds from inthan experience, which demands acti- experience. By consulting experivity, or reason, which requires reflec- ence and contemplating the universe, tion. Hence an aversion to every thing we shall only find in it matter and that deviates from ordinary rules, and motion. from one colour or shape to another, we successively experience different sensations: yet it is evident that we remain the same, it only being that body which changes colour or shape. But the body is neither its colour nor shape, since it could exist without them, and still be the same body. Neither is the shape or figure of a body, its colour, motion, extent, nor hardness; because those qualities are distinct from each other, and any of them can exist separate from and independent of the rest. But as they can exist together, they are not distinguished like those which cannot exist together at the same time. They cannot have a separate and distinct existence from bodies whose properties they are. The same power by which a white body exists, is that by which its whiteness also exists. What we call whiteness cannot exist of itself, separate from a body. This is the distinction between things capable of being separated, though found joined together, and which, though exciting in us different impressions, may yet be separately considered, and become so many distant objects of perception. This class of imaginary or fictitious objects, existing only in our mind, must not be confounded with the first class of objects, which have a real, exclusive, and independent existence of their own. compares them with other sensations. As the sentiment of real existence is clearer than that of imaginary or fictitious, we imagine that a similar distinction exists between all the objects that the mind conceives. Hence the operations of mind, and its different properties, have been considered, like real beings, as so many entities having a real existence of their own, and have thus acquired a physical existence, which they do not possess of themselves. Hence our mind has been distinguished from ourselves, as the part is from its whole. The mind itself has been separated from the soul, or that which animates, from that which makes us live. In the mind, a distinction has been made between the understanding and the will; in other words, between that which perceives and that which wills, that which wills and that which wills not. Our perceptions have been distinguished from ourselves, and from one another; hence thoughts, ideas, &c., which are nothing but the faculty of perception itself, viewed in relation to some of its functions. All these, however, are only modifications of our essence, and no more distinguished from themselves, nor from us, than extension, solidity, shape, colour, motion, or rest, from the same body. Yet absolute distinctions have been made between them, and they have been considered as so many small entities, of which we form the assemblage. According, therefore, to those philosophers, we are composed of thousands of little bodies, as distinct from one another as the different trees in a forest, each of which exists by a particular and independent power. Innumerable errours have arisen by confounding those distinctions. In mathematics, for example, we hear every moment of points and lines, or extensions without length, and surfaces having length and breadth without depth, though geometers themselves confess, that such bodies neither do nor can exist, but in the mind, while every body in na- With regard to things really distinct from ture is truly extended in every sense. Un-us, not only their properties, but even the relaskilful materialists have fallen into gross ab- tions of those properties, have been distinguishsurdities, by mistaking, for real and distinct ed from themselves, and from one another; existences, the different properties of exten- and to these a real existence has been given. sion, separately considered by mathemati- It was observed, that bodies act upon, strike cians. Hence, they formed the world of and repel one another, and, in consequence atoms, or small bodies, without either bulk of their action and reaction, changes were or extension, yet possessing infinite hardness, produced in them. When, for example, I put and a great variety of forms. Bodies such my hand to the fire, I feel what is called heat: as those can only exist in the minds of atom- in this case, fire is the cause, and heat the ists. effect. To abridge language, general terms, applying to particular ideas of a similar nature, were invented. The body that produces the change in another, was called the cause,— and the body suffering the change, the effect. As those terms produce in the mind some idea of existence, action, reaction, and change, the habit of using them makes men believe that they have a clear and distinct perception of them. By the continual use of these words, me nhave at length believed, that there can exist a cause, neither a substance, nor a body; a cause, though distinct from all matter, without either action or reaction, yet capable of producing every supposable effect. If even able men can be so clumsily deceived, by not distinguishing between the real existence of external bodies, and the fictitious existence of perceptions, existing only in the mind, it is not to be wondered at, that a multitude of errours should have arisen, in comparing, not only those perceptions themselves, but even their mutual relations with one another. I do not say, that sensations can exist separate from ourselves. The sentiments of pleasure and pain, though not distinct from him who feels them, certainly are so from my mind, which perceives, reflects upon, and CHAPTER II. Of Motion and its Origin. Ir is motion which alone forms the connexions between our organs and external and internal objects. A cause is a being that puts another in motion, or which produces the change that one body effects upon another by means of motion. We only know the manner in which a body acts upon us by the change it produces. It is from actions only that we can judge of interior motions, as thoughts, and other sentiments-when we see a man flying we conclude him to be afraid. The motion of bodies is a necessary consequence of their essence. Every being has laws of motion peculiar to itself. Every body in the universe is in motion. Action is essential to matter. All beings but come into existence, increase, diminish, and ultimately perish; metals, minerals, &c., are all in action. The stones which lie upon the ground act upon it by pressure. Our sense of smell is acted upon by emanations from the most compact bodies. Motion is inherent in nature, which is the great whole, out of which nothing can exist, and is essential to it. Matter moves by its own energy, and possesses properties, according to which it acts. In attributing the motion of matter to a cause, we must suppose, that matter itself has come into existence-a thing impossible; for since it cannot be annihilated, how can we imagine it to have had a beginning? The visible end of all the motions of bodies, is the preservation of their actual form of existence, attracting what is favourable, and repelling whatis prejudicial to it. From the moment of existence, we experience motions peculiar to a determined essence. Every cause produces an effect, and there cannot be an effect without a cause. If every motion, therefore, be ascribable to a cause; and these causes being determined by their nature, essence and properties; we must conWhence has matter come? It has clude, that they are all necessary, and always existed. What is the original that every being in nature, in its given cause of its motion? Matter has al- properties and circumstances, can only ways been in motion, as motion is a act as it does. .Necessity is the infalliconsequence of its existence, and ex-ble and constant tie of causes to their istence always supposes properties in the existing body. Since matter possesses properties, its manner of action necessarily flows from its form of existence. Hence a heavy body must fall. CHAPTER III. Of Matter and its Motion. THE changes, forms, and.modifications of matter alone proceed from effects: and this irresistible power, universal necessity, is only a consequence of the nature of things, in virtue of which the whole acts by immutable laws.* * Changes are produced in bodies by their action and reaction upon one another. The same body, at present a cause, was previously an effect; or, in other words, the body which produces a change in another, by actthe action of another body. One body may, ing upon it, has itself undergone a change by in relation to others, be, at the same time, THE View of the regular motions of nature produces, in the human mind, the idea of order. This word only expresses a thing relative to ourselves. The idea of order or disorder is no proof that they really exist in nature, since there every thing is necessary. Disorder in relation to a being is nothing but its passage into a new order or form of existence. Thus, in our eyes, death is the greatest of all disorders; but death only changes our essence. We are not less subject afterwards to the laws of motion. Intelligence is called the power of acting according to an end, which we know the being possesses to whom we ascribe it. We deny its existence in both cause and effect. While I push forward a body with the stick in my hand, the motion of the stick, which is the effect of my impulse, is the cause of the progression of the body that is pushed. The word cause, only denotes the perception of the change which one body produces in another, considered in relation to the body that produces it; and the word effect, signifies nothing more than the perception of the same change, considered relatively to the body that suffers it. The absurdity of supposing the existence of independent and absolute causes, which neither are nor can be effects, must appear obvious to every unbiassed understanding. The infinite progression of bodies which have been in succession, cause and effect, soon fatigued men desirous of discovering a general cause for every particular effect. They all at once, therefore, ascended to a first cause, supposed to be universal, in relation to which every particular cause is an effect, though not itself the effect of any cause. The only idea they can give of it is, that it produced all things; not only the form of their existence, but even their existence itself. It is not, according to them, either a body, or a being like particular beings; in a word, it is the universal cause. And this is all they can say about H From what has been said, it must appear. that this universal cause is but a chimera, a mere phantom, at most an imaginary or fictitious being, only existing in the minds of those who consider it. It is, however, the Destiny of the Greeks, the God of philosophers, Jews, and Christians,-the Benevolent Spirit of the new Parisian sect of Saint-Simonians; the only sect which has ever yet attempted to found a worship upon principles bearing any resemblance to morality, reason, or common sense. Those who, without acknowledging this universal cause, content themselves with par beings whose forms of action are different from ours. When we do not perceive the connexion of certain effects with their causes, we attribute them to chance. When we see, or think we see, what is called order, we ascribe it to an intelligence, a quality borrowed from ourselves, and from the particular form in which we are affected. An intelligent being thinks, wills, and acts, to arrive at an end. For this purpose, organs, and an end similar to our own, are necessary. They would above all be necessary to an intelligence supposed to govern nature, as without organs, there can neither be ideas, intuition, thought, will, plan nor action. Matter, when combined in a certain manner, assumes action, intelligence, and life.* ticular causes, have generally distinguished them from material substances. Seeing the same change often produced by different actions or causes, they conceived the existence of particular causes, distinct from sensible bodies. Some have ascribed to them intelligence and will, hence gods, demons, genii, good and bad spirits. Others, who cannot conceive the existence of a mode of action different from their own, have imagined certain virtues to proceed from the influence of the stars, chance, and a thousand other dark, unintelligible terms, which signify nothing more than blind and necessary causes. Among the innumerable errours into which men are continually falling, by confounding fictitious with real objects, is that of supposing an infinite power, cause, wisdom, or intelligence, to exist, from only considering the properties of wisdom, power, and intelligence, in the beings whom they see. The term infinite is totally incompatible with the existence of any thing finite, positive or real: in other words, it carries with it the impossibility of real existence. Those who call a power, quantity, or number infinite, speak of something undetermined, of which no just idea can be formed; because, however extended the idea may be, it must fall short of the thing represented. An infinite number, for example, can neither be conceived nor expressed. Admitting for a moment, the existence of such a number, it may be asked, whether a certain part, the half for example, may not be taken from it? This half is finite, and may be counted and expressed; but by doubling it, we make a sum equal to an infinite number, which will then be determined, and to which a unit may at least be added. This sum will then be greater than it was before, though infinite, or that to which nothing could be added, yet we can make no addition to it! It is, therefore, at the same time, both CHAPTER VI. Of Man, his Physical and Moral Distinctions-His Origin. MAN is always subject to necessity. His temperament is independent of him, yet it influences his passions. His blood more or less abundant or warm, his nerves more or less relaxed, the aliments upon which he feeds, all act upon him and influence him. Man is an organized whole, composed of different matters, which act according to their respective properties. The difficulty of discovering the causes of his motions and ideas, produced the division of his essence into two natures. He invented words, because ignorant of things. Man, like every thing else, is a production of nature. What is his origin? We want experience to answer the question. Has he always existed, or is he an instantaneous production of nature? Either of the cases is possible. Matter is eternal, but its forms and combinations are transitory. It is probable, that he was produced at a particular period of our globe, upon which he, like its other productions, varies according to the difference of climate. He was doubtless produced male and female, and will exist so long as the globe remains in its present state. When that is changed, the human species must give way to new beings, capable of incorporating themselves with the new qualities which the globe will then possess. When we are unable to account for the production of man, to talk of God and of creation, is but confessing our ignorance of the energy of nature. infinite and finite, and consequently possesses properties exclusive of one another. We might, with equal propriety, conceive the existence of a white body which is not white, or, in other words, a mere chimera; all we can say of which is, that it neither does nor can exist. What has been said of an infinite number, equally applies either to an infinite cause, intelligence, or power. As there are different degrees of causation, intelligence, and power, those degrees must be considered as units, the sum of which will express the quantity of the power, and intelligence, of such causes. infinity of power, action, or intelligence, to which nothing can be added, nor conceived, is impossible, never has existed, and never can exist. An Man has no right to believe himself a privileged being in nature. He is subject to the same vicissitudes as its other productions. The idea of human excellence is merely founded on the the partiality which man feels for himself. CHAPTER VII. Of the Soul and its Spirituality. WHAT is called the soul moves with us. Now, motion is a property of matter. The soul also shows itself ma-terial in the invincible obstacles which · it encounters on the part of the body. If the soul causes me to move my arm when there is no obstacle in the way, it ceases doing so when the arm is pressed down by a heavy weight. Here then is a mass of matter which annihilates an impulse given by a spiritual cause, which, being unconnected with matter, ought to meet with no resistance from it. in the body that is moved. Motion supposes extent and solidity When we ascribe action to a cause, we must therefore consider that cause to be material. While I walk forward, I do not leave The my soul behind me. Soul, therefore, possesses one quality in common with soul makes a part of the body, and exthe body and peculiar to matter. through a state of infancy and of deperiences all its vicissitudes, in passing bility, in partaking of its pleasures and pains; and with the body exhibiting marks of dulness, debility, and death. In short, it is only the body viewed in relation to some of its functions. What sort of substance is it which nor felt? An can neither be seen immaterial being, yet acting upon matter! How can the body inclose a fugitive being, which eludes all the senses. CHAPTER VIII. Of the Intellectual Faculties-All derived from Sensation. SENSATION is a manner of being affected, peculiar to certain organs of |