when he hears the words spirituality, immateriality, incorporeality, divinity, &c., pronounced, neither his senses nor his memory afford him any assist by an exhibition of those qualities of which we judged them deficient: there arrives a moment in which the mind makes use of a multitude of experience which it has amassed without its hav-ance: they do not furnish him with ing been perceived, and, if I may be allowed the expression, without their own knowledge. any means by which he can form an idea of their qualities, nor of the objects to which he ought to apply them: in that which is not matter, he can only see vacuum and emptiness, which cannot be susceptible of any one quality. Thus, it cannot be too often repeated, all the ideas, all the notions, all the modes of existence, all the thoughts of man are acquired. His mind cannot All the errours and all the disputes act and exercise itself but upon that of of men, have their foundation in this, which it has knowledge; it can under- that they have renounced experience stand either well or ill only those things and the evidence of their senses, to give which it has previously felt. Such of themselves up to the guidance of nohis ideas that do not suppose some ex- tions which they have believed infused terior material object for their model, or innate, although in reality they are or one to which he is able to relate no more than the effect of a distemperthem, which are therefore called ab- ed imagination; of prejudices in which stract ideas, are only modes in which they have been instructed from their his interior organ considers its own pe- infancy; with which habit has familiculiar modifications, of which it chooses arized them; and which authority has some without respect to others. The obliged them to conserve. Languages words which he uses to designate these are filled with abstract words, to which ideas, such as bounty, beauty, order, are attached confused and vague ideas; intelligence, virtue, &c., do not offer of which, when they come to be exany one sense if he does not relate them amined, no model can be found in nato, or if he does not explain them by ture; no object to which they can be those objects which his senses have related. When man gives himself the shown him to be susceptible of those trouble to analyze things, he is quite qualities, or of those modes of exist- surprised to find that those words which ence and of acting, which are known are continually in the mouths of men, to him. What is it that points out to never present any fixed and determihim the vague idea of beauty, if he nate idea: he hears them unceasingly does not attach it to some object that speaking of spirits-of the soul and has struck his senses in a particular its faculties-of God and his attributes manner, to which, in consequence, he-of duration of space-of immenattributes this quality? What is it that represents the word intelligence, if he does not connect it with a certain mode of being and of acting? Does the word order signify any thing, if he does not relate it to a series of actions, to a chain of motion, by which he is affected in a certain manner? Is not the word virtue void of sense, if he does not apply it to those dispositions of his fellows which produce known effects, different from those which result from contrary inclinations? What do the words pain and pleasure offer to his mind in the moment when his organs neither suffer nor enjoy, if it be not the modes in which he has been affected, of which his brain conserves the remembrance or the impressions, and which experience has shown him to be either useful or prejudicial? But sity-of infinity-of perfection-of virtue of reason-of sentiment-of instinct-of taste, &c., without his being able to tell precisely what they themselves understand by these words. And yet words appear to have been invented but for the purpose of representing the images of things, or to paint, by the assistance of the senses, those known objects on which the mind is able to meditate, which it is competent to appreciate, to compare, and to judge. For man to think of that which has not acted on any of his senses, is to think on words: it is a dream of sounds; it is to seek in his own imagination for objects to which he can attach his wandering ideas. To assign qualities to these objects is, unquestionably, to redouble his extravagance. The word these objects be favourable or prejudicial to him? How is he to know what he ought to love, what he should hate, what to seek after, what to shun, what to do, what to leave undone? Yet it is upon this knowledge that his condition in this world rests-the only world of which he knows any thing; it is upon this knowledge that morals is founded. From whence it may be seen, that, by causing him to blend vague theological notions with morals, or the science of the certain and invariable relations which subsist between mankind, or by weakly establishing them upon chimerical beings, which have no existence but in his imagination, this science, upon which the welfare of society so much depends, is rendered uncertain and arbitrary, is abandoned to the caprices of fancy, is not fixed upon any solid basis. God is destined to represent to him an | the qualities of beings he is not able to object that has not the capacity to act feel? How can he judge whether on any one of his organs, of which, consequently, it is impossible for him to prove either the existence or the qualities; still, his imagination, by dint of racking itself, will in some measure supply him with the ideas he wants, and compose some kind of a picture with the images or colours he is always obliged to borrow from those objects of which he has a knowledge: thus the Divinity has been represented under the character of a venerable old man, or under that of a puissant monarch, &c. It is evident, however, that man with some of his qualities has served for the model of this picture. But if The be informed that this God is a pure spirit; that has neither body nor extent; that he is not contained in space; that he is beyond nature; here then he is plunged into emptiness; his mind no longer has any ideas: it no longer knows upon what it meditates. This, Beings essentially different by their as will be seen in the sequel, is the natural organization, by the modificasource of those unformed notions which tions they experience, by the habits men have formed of the divinity; they they contract, by the opinions they acthemselves annihilate him, by assem-quire, must of necessity think differentbling incompatible and contradictory ly. His temperament, as we have seen, attributes. In giving him moral and decides the mental qualities of man'; known qualities, they make him a man; in assigning him the negative attributes of theology, they destroy all antecedent ideas; they make him a mere nothing-a chimera. From this it will appear that those sublime sciences which are called theology, psychology, metaphysics, have been mere sciences of words: morals and politics, which they too often infect, have, in consequence, become inexplicable enigmas, which nothing short of the study of nature can enable us to expound. * Man has occasion for truth; it consists in a knowledge of the true relations he has with those things which can have an influence on his welfare: these relations are to be known only by experience: without experience there can be no reason; without reason man is only a blind creature who conducts himself by chance. But how is he to acquire experience upon ideal objects, which his senses neither enable him to know nor to examine? How is he to assure himself of the existence and * See Vol. II., Chap. iv. this temperament itself, is diversely modified in him; from whence it consecutively follows, his imagination cannot possibly be the same, neither can it create to him the same images. Each individual is a connected whole, of which all the parts have a necessary correspondence. Different eyes must see differently, must give extremely varied ideas of the objects they contemplate, even when these objects are real. What, then, must be the diversity of these ideas if the objects meditated upon do not act upon the senses? Mankind have pretty nearly the same ideas, in the gross, of those substances that act on his organs with vivacity; he is sufficiently in unison upon some qualities which he contemplates very nearly in the same manner; I say very nearly, because the intelligence, the notion, the conviction of any one proposition, however simple, however evident, however clear it may be supposed, is not, nor cannot be strictly the same in any two men. Indeed, one man not being another man, the first cannot, for example, have rigorously and mathematically the same notion of his opinions of every kind. Thus of unity as the second, seeing that an the same diversity will be the fatal identical effect cannot be the result of source of his disputes, of his hatreds, two different causes. Thus when men and of his injustice, every time he shall agree in their ideas, in their modes of reason upon unknown objects, but to thinking, in their judgment, in their which he shall attach the greatest impassions, in their desires, and in their portance. He will never understand tastes, their consent does not arise from either himself or others in speaking of their seeing or feeling the same objects a spiritual soul, or of an immaterial God precisely in the same manner, but distinguished from nature; he will, pretty nearly, for language is not, nor from that moment, cease to speak the cannot be, sufficiently copious to de- same language, and he will never atsignate the vast variety of shades, the tach the same ideas to the same words. multiplicity of imperceptible differ- What, then, shall be the common ences which are to be found in their standard that shall decide which is the modes of seeing and thinking. Each man that thinks most correctly? What man has, I may say, a language which is the scale by which to measure who is peculiar to himself alone, and this has the best regulated imagination? language is incommunicable to others. what balance shall be found sufficientWhat harmony, then, can possibly ex-ly exact to determine whose knowledge ist between them when they discourse is most certain when he agitates subwith each other upon objects only known to their imagination? Can this imagination in one individual, ever be the same as in another? How can they possibly understand each other when they assign to these objects qualities that can only be attributed to the particular manner in which their brain is affected. For one man to exact from another that he shall think like himself, is to insist that he shall be organized precisely in the same manner, that he shall have been modified exactly the same in every moment of his existence; that he shall have received the same temperament, the same nourishment, the same education; in a word, that he shall require that other to be himself. Wherefore is it not exacted that all men shall have the same features? Is man more the master of his opinions? Are not his opinions the necessary consequence of his nature, and of those peculiar circumstances which, from his infancy, have necessarily had an influence upon his mode of thinking and his manner of acting? If man be a connected whole, whenever a single feature differs from his own, ought he not to conclude that it is not possible his brain can either think, associate ideas, imagine, or dream precisely in the same manner with that other. The diversity in the temperament of man is the natural and necessary source of the diversity of his passions, of his taste, of his ideas of happiness, jects which experience cannot enable him to examine; that escape all his senses; that have no model; that are above reason? Each individual, each legislator, each speculator, each nation, has ever formed to himself different ideas of these things, and each believes that his own peculiar reveries ought to be preferred to those of his neighbours; which always appear to him as absurd, as ridiculous, as false as his own can possibly have appeared to his fellow. Each clings to his own opinion, because each retains his own peculiar mode of existence, and believes his happiness depends upon his attachment to his prejudices, which he never adopts but because he believes them beneficial to his welfare. Propose to a man to change his religion for yours, he will believe you a madman; you will only excite his indignation, elicit his contempt; he will propose to you, in his turn, to adopt his own peculiar opinions; after much reasoning, you will treat each other as absurd beings, ridiculously opiniated and stubborn; and he will display the least folly who shall first yield. But if the adversaries become heated in the dispute, which always happens when they suppose the matter important, or when they would defend the cause of their own self-love, then their passions sharpen, they grow angry, quarrels are provoked, they hate each other, and end by reciprocal injury. It is thus, that for opinions which no man can demonstrate, we see the Brahmin despised; the Mo hammedan hated; the Pagan held in contempt; and that they oppress and disdain each other with the most rancorous animosity: the Christian burns the Jew because he clings to the faith of his fathers; the Roman Catholic condemns the Protestant to the flames, and makes a conscience of massacring him in cold blood; this reacts in his turn; again the various sects of Christians have leagued together against the incredulous, and for a moment suspended their own bloody disputes, that they might chastise their enemies: then, having glutted their revenge, they returned with redoubled fury to wreak over again their infuriated vengeance on each other. If the imaginations of men were the same, the chimeras which they bring forth would be everywhere the same; there would be no disputes among them on this subject if they all dreamt in the same manner; great numbers of human beings would be spared, if man occupied his mind with objects capable of being known, of which the existence was proved, of which he was competent to discover the true qualities by sure and reiterated experience. Systems of philosophy are subject to dispute only when their principles are not sufficiently proved; by degrees experience, in pointing out the truth, terminates these quarrels. There is no variance among geometricians upon the principles of their science; it is only raised when their suppositions are false, or their objects too much complicated. Theologians find so much difficulty in agreeing among themselves, simply because in their contests they divide without ceasing, not known and examined propositions, but prejudices with which they have been imbued in their youth, in the schools, in their books, &c. They are perpetually reasoning, not upon real objects, of which the existence is demonstrated, but upon imaginary systems, of which they have never examined the reality; they found these disputes not upon averred experience nor upon constant facts, but upon gratuitous suppositions, which each endeavours to convince the other are without solidity. Finding these ideas of long standing, and that few people refuse to admit them, they take them for incontestable truths, that ought to be received merely upon being announced; whenever they attach great importance to them, they irritate themselves against the temerity of those who have the audacity to doubt, or even to examine them. If prejudice had been laid aside, it would perhaps have been discovered that many of those objects which have given birth to the most shocking, the most sanguinary disputes among men, were mere phantoms which a little examination would have shown to be unworthy their notice. The most trifling reflection would have shown him the necessity of this diversity in his notions, of this contrariety in his imagination, which depends upon his natural conformation diversely modified, and which necessarily has an influence over his thoughts, over his will, and over his actions. In short, if he had consulted morals and reason, every thing would have proved to him, that beings who call themselves rational, were made to think variously, without on that account, ceasing to live peaceably with each other, love each other, and lend each other mutual succours; and that whatever might be their opinions upon subjects either impossible to be known or to be contemplated under the same point of view: every thing would have joined in evidence to convince him of the unreasonable tyranny, of the unjust violence, and of the useless cruelty of those men of blood, who persecute mankind in order that they may mould others to their own peculiar opinions: every thing would have conducted mortals to mildness, to indulgence, to toleration; virtues unquestionably of more real importance to the welfare of society than the marvellous speculations by which it is divided, and by which it is frequently hurried on to sacrifice the pretended enemies to these revered opinions. From this it must be evident of what importance it is to morals to examine the ideas to which it has been agreed to attach so much worth, and to which man, at the irrational command of fanatical and cruel guides, is continually sacrificing his own peculiar happiness and the tranquillity of nations. Let him return to experience, to nature, and to reason; let him consult those objects nent felicity; let him study nature's laws; let him study himself; let him consult the bonds which unite him to his fellow mortals; let him tear asunder the fictitious bonds that enchain him to a mere phantom. If his imagination must always feed itself with illusions, if he remains steadfast in his own opinions, if his prejudices are dear to him, let him at least permit others to ramble in their own manner or seek after truth as best suits their inclination; but let him always recollect, that all the opinions, all the ideas, all the systems, all the wills, all the actions of man, are the necessary consequence of his nature, of his temperament, of his organization, and of those causes, either transitory or constant, which modify him: in short, that man is not more a free agent to think than to act: a truth that will be again proved in the following chapter. that are real and useful to his perma- | or transitory, depends upon the material elements by which it is surrounded, that form its texture, constitute its temperament, enter into it by means of the aliments, and penetrate it by their subtility. The faculties which are called intellectual, and those qualities which are styled moral, have been explained in a manner purely physical and natural. In the last place it has been demonstrated that all the ideas, all the systems, all the affections, all the opinions, whether true or false, which man forms to himself, are to be attributed to his physical and material senses. Thus man is a being purely physical; in whatever manner he is considered, he is connected to universal nature, and submitted to the necessary and immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings she contains, according to their peculiar essences or to the respective properties with which, without consulting them, she endows each particular species. Man's life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant. He is born without his own consent; his organization does in nowise depend upon himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by causes, whether visible or concealed, over which he has no control, which necessarily regulate his mode of existence, give the hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. He is good or bad, happy or miserable, wise or foolish, reasonable or irrational, without his will being for any thing in these various states. Nevertheless, in despite of the shackles by which he is bound, it is pretended he is a free agent, or that independent of the causes by which he is moved, he determines his own will, and regulates his own condition. CHAPTER XI. Of the System of Man's Free Agency. THOSE who have pretended that the soul is distinguished from the body, is immaterial, draws its ideas from its own peculiar source, acts by its own energies, without the aid of any exterior object, have, by a consequence of their own system, enfranchised it from those physical laws according to which all beings of which we have a knowledge are obliged to act. They have believed that the soul is mistress of its own conduct, is able to regulate its own peculiar operations, has the faculty to determine its will by its own natural energy; in a word, they have pretended that man is a free agent. It has been already sufficiently proved that the soul is nothing more than the body considered relatively to some of its functions more concealed than others: it has been shown that this soul, even However slender the foundation of when it shall be supposed immaterial, this opinion, of which every thing ought is continually modified conjointly with to point out to him the errour, it is the body, is submitted to all its motion, current at this day and passes for an and that without this it would remain incontestable truth with a great number inert and dead: that, consequently, it of people, otherwise extremely enlightis subjected to the influence of those ened; it is the basis of religion, which, material and physical causes which supposing relations between man and give impulse to the body; of which the unknown being she has placed above the mode of existence, whether habitual | nature, has been incapable of imagining L |