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Opinion of the Court.

would still be entitled to recover, if he were able to show that he never assented to the compromise, or repudiated it, and revoked the authority of his attorneys. In this particular, the case resembles one wherein the plaintiff claims an amount sufficient to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction, but fails to prove such amount. If the claim be made in good faith, the court does not lose jurisdiction, but may proceed and enter judgment for the amount actually due.

But while, after the removal of the case to the Circuit Court of the United States, it might properly be docketed and tried by the court as an equity suit, it still remained, so far as the rights of the plaintiff were concerned, a special proceeding under the Territorial statute; and the powers of the court in dealing with it were gauged, not merely by its general equity jurisdiction, but by the special authority vested in its own courts by the statutes of the Territory. Had the case never been removed to the Circuit Court, it would have proceeded in the State court as a special proceeding under the Territorial statute, and we are of opinion that, upon its removal to the Circuit Court, petitioner lost no right to which he would have been entitled had the case not been removed. Even if it were treated as in form a bill in equity, the right of the complainant would be gauged as well by the statute under which the bill was filed, as by the general rules of equity jurisprudence. If any action or proceeding in a State court were subject to be defeated or impaired by one of the parties exercising his statutory right to remove it to a Federal court, no one would be safe in instituting such a proceeding in any case wherein, by reason of diversity of citizenship or otherwise, it might be subject to removal. While the Federal court may be compelled to deal with the case according to the forms and modes of proceeding of a court of equity, it remains in substance a proceeding under the statute, with the original rights of the parties unchanged.

Although the statute of a State or Territory may not restrict or limit the equitable jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and may not directly enlarge such jurisdiction, it may establish new rights or privileges which the Federal courts may

Opinion of the Court.

enforce on their equity or admiralty side, precisely as they may enforce a new right of action given by statute upon their common law side. Thus in Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, a statute of the State of New York giving to the pilot, who first tendered his services to a vessel, and was refused, a right to half pilotage, was held to be enforceable upon the admiralty side of the District Court. See also the cases of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 520, and Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 203. So, in Reynolds v. Crawfordsville Bank, 112 U. S. 405, a bill in equity under a statute of Indiana, which averred that a deed was void upon its face, was held sufficient to support the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States in that district, to quiet the title of the complainant as against such deed, although courts of equity had generally adopted the rule that a deed void upon its face does not cast a cloud upon the title, which a court of equity will undertake to remove. It was also said in Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 231, that "a party by going into a national court does not lose any right or appropriate remedy of which he might have availed himself in the State courts of the same locality. The wise policy of the Constitution gives him a choice of tribunals." Other cases to the same effect are Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640; Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86.

The case having been removed to the Circuit Court upon petition of defendant, it does not lie in its mouth to claim that such court had no jurisdiction of the case, unless the court from which it was removed had no jurisdiction.

As the merits of the case, though appearing upon the record, were not argued by counsel, the decree will be

Reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Statement of the Case.

HILTON'S ADMINISTRATOR v. JONES.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.

No. 1. Submitted October 28, 1895. - Decided November 18, 1895.

L. filed his petition in a State court of Nebraska, setting forth that he was the owner, as trustee for two infants, of an undivided two-thirds interest in a tract of land in that State, and individually in his own right of the other undivided third; that the lands yielded no revenue and were encumbered with unpaid taxes, etc.; and praying for leave to sell or mortgage one-half of the lands, declaring his willingness to join in the deed or mortgage as to his individual interest. A supplementary petition accompanied this and was filed with it, certifying to the integrity of L., and praying that power might be given him to sell or mortgage the premises as asked. This petition was signed by several parties in interest, among whom was H. The court, in its decree, recited the title as stated in the petition, and authorized the sale as asked for. On a bill filed by H. to establish his title to one undivided third part of the lands, and prosecuted after his death by his administrator, Held, that the alleged title of H. was res judicata; that he was estopped from maintaining this suit; and that it was not open to him or his representative in this suit to question the authority of the attorney of H. in the proceedings in the state court.

THIS was a bill in equity, filed by George H. Hilton, appellant's intestate, to cancel certain deeds, and to establish the title of the complainant to an undivided one-third of about 1900 acres of land, the greater portion of which is situated in Lancaster County, Nebraska, and near to the city of Lincoln.

The litigation originally consisted of two suits, which were heard together in the lower court. The other suit, in which the two surviving sons of the appellant's intestate here were complainants, was appealed to this court, but was dismissed by reason of the appellants failing to print the record. In that suit the appellants claimed a beneficial interest in twothirds of the lands. In this suit appellant claims an undivided one-third of the same lands.

The facts of the case are substantially as follows:

1. On October 26, 1861, complainant's intestate, George H.

Statement of the Case.

Hilton, being the owner of the lands described in the bill, conveyed the same for a nominal consideration to his brother “John Hilton, his heirs and assigns forever," in trust for the benefit of his sons George L., James F., and Joseph B. Hilton, "in equal portion, said trustee having authority to sell and convey all or any portion at any time or in any way at his discretion, for their benefit, the following-described real estate," etc., "to have and to hold the same to the only proper use of said John Hilton, in trust as aforesaid, his heirs and assigns forever." This trust was accepted.

2. On September 16, 1863, said John Hilton as trustee, by warranty deed, absolute in terms, and for the expressed consideration of $1000, conveyed all the said lands to Alice B. Hilton, now Alice B. Ducharme, a sister of the three cestuis que trustent. It appeared upon the face of the deed that Hilton conveyed as trustee for the three sons of complainant George H. Hilton.

3. On November 22, 1865, Alice B. Hilton, upon the eve of her marriage, conveyed the same premises to Augusta Hilton, her sister, a girl of 18 years, by an absolute deed without mentioning the trust.

4. On May 18, 1866, George H. Hilton, the original complainant, and his wife Honora, also executed to their daughter Augusta a deed of the same land with the following clause: "This deed is made to perfect the title in Augusta Hilton, as it appears that the deed made by above grantors dated 26 October, 1861, through which title to said lands vested in her, has not been recorded and has been mislaid or lost;" concluding with the following clause: "To have and to hold the same to the said Augusta Hilton, her heirs and assigns forever," with a short covenant of warranty and of seizin.

5. On August 25, 1871, George L. Hilton, having attained his majority, Augusta Hilton conveyed to him in fee an undivided one-third part of all said lands with the usual covenants of warranty. It seems, too, that on the same day Augusta Hilton also conveyed to her brother George the remaining undivided two-thirds of the property, in trust for his two brothers. This deed, however, does not appear in the

Statement of the Case.

record of this case, and is immaterial so far as the undivided one-third in controversy is concerned.

6. On September 11, 1872, said George L. Hilton conveyed an undivided one-third of 180 acres of said lands in fee by deed to Smith B. Galey, for a consideration of $3500, and on September 16, 1872, by a second deed to Galey, for a consideration of $5000, his entire interest in all the lands.

7. On September 18, 1873, the said Galey, together with said George L. Hilton, conveyed to William C. Lincoln an undivided one-third of the same lands, with a covenant against their own acts. The other defendants took their titles from Lincoln.

There were allegations in the bill that these conveyances from George H. Hilton to Galey, and from Galey to Lincoln, were for an inadequate consideration, and were procured by fraud, and that Lincoln's title was defective, unauthorized, illegal, and void.

On December 13, 1873, a petition was filed in the District Court of the county of Lancaster by William C. Lincoln, as plaintiff, against James F. Hilton, Joseph B. Hilton, infants under the age of 21 years; George II. Hilton, the appellant's intestate; Alice B. Ducharme, Augusta Hilton, George L. Hilton, and Nora M. Lincoln, setting forth that the plaintiff held in trust for James F. and Joseph B. Hilton, the two infants, a two-thirds interest in the lands in question; that the lands were wild and uncultivated, yielding no revenue; that the infants had no other property; that the unpaid taxes amounted to over $1500; that, owing to the mismanagement of John Hilton, the financial embarrassment of George H. Hilton, and to several unlawful conveyances of such lands, they became the subject of long and expensive litigation, and the plaintiff was obliged to expend large sums of money in maintaining the rights of said infants; that although the various conveyances of the property terminating in the deed to himself, conveyed the legal title, it had been questioned whether it was not necessary to have a decree of the court, confirming the equitable title in the plaintiff, that he might be able to procure the full value of the lands in case the court should deem it best to dis

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