Philosophical Papers: Volume 3, Realism and Reason

Etukansi
Cambridge University Press, 27.12.1985 - 312 sivua
This is the third volume of Hilary Putnam's philosophical papers, published in paperback for the first time. The volume contains his major essays from 1975 to 1982, which reveal a large shift in emphasis in the 'realist' position developed in his earlier work. While not renouncing those views, Professor Putnam has continued to explore their epistemological consequences and conceptual history. He now, crucially, sees theories of truth and of meaning that derive from a firm notion of reference as inadequate.
 

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Sisältö

Models and reality
3
Equivalence
26
Possibility and necessity
46
Reference and truth
69
Two dogmas revisited
87
There is at least one a priori truth
98
Analyticity and apriority beyond Wittgenstein and Quine
115
Computational psychology and interpretation theory
139
Philosophers and human understanding
184
Why there isnt a readymade world
205
Why reason cant be naturalized
229
Quantum mechanics and the observer
248
Vagueness and alternative logic
271
Beyond historicism
287
Bibliography
304
Acknowledgements
309

Reflections on Goodmans Ways of Worldmaking
155
Convention a theme in philosophy
170

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According to John Passmore, Hilary Putnam's work is a "history of recent philosophy in outline" (Recent Philosophers). He adds that writing "about "Putnam's philosophy' is like trying to capture the wind with a fishing-net." Born in Chicago and educated at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of California at Los Angeles, Putnam taught at Northwestern University, Princeton University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before moving to Harvard University in 1965. In his early years at Harvard, he was an outspoken opponent of the war in Vietnam. Although he writes in the idiom of analytic philosophy, Putnam addresses major themes relating science to ethics and epistemology. If these themes are reminiscent of David Hume---as, for that matter, is much of analytic philosophy---his treatment of them is not. Putnam's work is far more profoundly shaped by recent work in logic, foundations of mathematics, and science than would have been possible for Hume; Putnam has contributed to each. He differs from Hume and stands more in the tradition of Willard Quine and American pragmatism in his treatment of the crucial distinctions between analytic and synthetic statements and between facts and values. Both distinctions, sharply made by Hume, are claimed by Putnam not to be absolute. He attempts to show, for example, that basic concepts of philosophy, science, and mathematics all are interrelated, so that mathematics bears more similarity to empirical reasoning than is customarily acknowledged.

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