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Wickham to M. Barthelemi, he did not agree to; and, in contra diction to this being the general mode of negotiation, he quoted the negotiations which ended in the peace of 1763 and of 1782, both of which were conducted in a mode diametrically oppofite. It was difficult to judge of the fincerity of men, and painful to doubt it; but, placing himself in the fituation of the French, he thould not have thought minifters fincere: and this might account for their answer.

Lord Lauderdale obferved that the war had completely, failed in the two objects for which it was declared to be undertaken, - the fafety of our allies, and the prevention of French principles. He infifted much upon the equi-vocal appearance of the late negotiation, and obferved, that if the republic of France had evinced an enmity to monarchical government by avoiding the mention of the word king, the government of England had with equal care, in the late pretended negotiation, avoided any recognition of the republic, or even the mention of its name. In inveighing against ministers, his lordship feverely, ani.madverted upon their treatment of admiral Cornwallis, The court martial against him he confidered as capriciously and unneceffarily held, and the acquittal of the admiral as a difgrace to the board of admiralty. His lordfhip pointedly ridiculed the idea of minifters having quietly abandoned their old ground of objection to negotiate on the fcore of the rapid fucceffion of rulers in France, and the inftability of that government, and having expreffed a defire to treat with one of the duration of five months. With respect to the length of the motion,

to which minifters objected, for that they might thank themfelves. It was a long and black catalogue of their abfurdities; and the matters to which it pointed were too im portant to be abridged.

The lord chancellor ftrongly objected to the motion, and thought it would have been more confiftent with common sense, and answered party purposes perhaps more effectually, to have petitioned his ma jefty to change minifters fo incapable and incorrigibly, obftinate. His lordship ftrongly infifted upon the advantages we had gained in the war, and the flourishing state of our resources! The motion went, he obferved, to condemn that very conduct, and thofe very measures, to the propriety of which the house had fo often affented. This was for their lordships to pafs a vote of cenfure on themselves. On a divifion of the house, there appeared, for the question 10, againftit 110.

The fame motion, which had been introduced into the house of lords by the earl of Guildford, was brought forward on the fame day by Mr. Fox in the houfe of commons. He began by stating, that, after the difappointments he had incurred in his different endeavours to ftop the deftructive career of minifters, he should not again have addreffed the houfe, except in expreffing his folemn proteft against the measures purfued, had not fe veral events occurred during the laft year, to alter the fentiments of thofe by whom he was oppofed. The event of the greatest importance was the negotiation at Bafle, by the event of which it was afcertained that there was no immediate profpect of peace, and that it was not in the power of thofe entrusted with the administration of public

affairs,

affairs, to obtain terms from the enemy which they could offer to the nation. It could not, therefore, be difputed, that our situation was worse than when, whether by conqueft or conceffion, we had a profpect of peace. Of the circumftances, Mr. Fox faid, which reduced us to this fituation, he proposed to enter into a detail. Whatever might be urged concerning its not being our bufinefs to inquire into the caufes of the evil, but to difcover and apply the remedy, 'he would contend that the true way of getting out of difficulty, was to review the causes by which it was produced, and thence to form plans for our deliverance. The corollary of this propofition was, that the houfe fhould retrace the fteps taken in the prefent war, and fee, whether much of its fatality was not to be afcribed to our own fyftem. He propofed to look retrofpectively instead of profpective. ly. Mr. Fox, in defence of his defire to inquire whether the principles acted upon had not been fundamentally wrong, quoted the argument of Demofthenes; when, Speaking of the Athenians, he compared their calamities with the mifmanagement of their rulers, and contended that, their misfortunes do far from being a caufe of deSpair, were a ground of hope. "If," faid he, "they had fallen into thefe misfortunes by natural and irremediable causes, there might be reafon for defpairs but if they are the fruits of misconduct, it may be poffible by wifdom and prudence to repair the evil This argument, he thought, applied exactly to us, and there was ground for prefumption that the change in our fituation in four years had been owing to the con

duct of those who had the charg of public affairs.

Mr. Fox then reverted to our fituation at the opening of the budget in 1792, three years after the French revolution, when the minifter ftated to the houfe every circumftance which could prove the utmost national profperity. He then (faid Mr. Fox) admitted, that fifteen years of peace was, perhaps, rather too much to expect,, but we had as rational hopes of continued tranquillity as had ever exifted in the hiftory of modern times. This was full two years after the first revolution; after the national affembly had compelled the king to come to Paris, which was faid, to be his goal; after the national affembly had annihilated, the titles, and destroyed the feudal tenures of the nobility; after it had confif cated the church lands, banished part of the clergy, and compelled the reft to take an oath contrary in many inftances to the dictates of their confciences. Even after the flight of the king, all thefe circumftances were infufficient to cloud the profpect of perhaps a fifteen years' peace. That minifters further faw no probability of a rupfure, was to be inferred from our not at first taking any part in the difputes between France and Aus Aria, by whom hoftilities had then commenced, and from the measure of funding the four per cents. Thus ended the feffion of 1792; in the fummer, vagation of that year, a republic was fubftituted for a monarchy in France; an act which, however unjust, and impolitic in thefe by whom it was perpetrated,, Great Britain as a nation had certainly no concern with. All the events that could be fup pofed to have influence by exK 2

ample

ample upon the conftitution of England, had already happened. To the changes that had taken place, thofe already stated jacobin principles were in full force prior to this event. If then the principles established before the 10th of Auguft were calculated to give minifters confidence in the continuance of tranquillity, the change of that day could not deftroy it. Mr. Fox ridiculed the concern expreffed for the monarchy of France, whofe restless ambition had occafioned the public debt and the national burdens of this country. He thought there was a time, before the war broke out with Auftria, when this Country might have exercifed with effect the dignified office of a mediator, to which it was called by the events of the preceding year. The event to which he principally referred, Mr Fox faid, was the trea ty of Pilnitz, by which Ruffia and Pruffia avowed their intention of interfering in the internal affairs of France, if they were fupported by the other European powers: this certainly was an aggreffion againft France. This treaty was, he believed, only a menace which the parties did not mean to carry into effect; but that did not alter its ef.fect upon France. This Mr. Fox inferred from the fituation of the dif ferent courts of Europe, which were fo circumftanced that no two of them could act but by general confent.

The dreadful maffacres of Paris, which Mr. Fox very feelingly deplored, did not, however, he contended, make any difference in our relative fituation: they exactly refembled maffacres in former periods, in which Great Britain was more nearly affected, but in which the did not interpofe. The invafion of the Auftrian Netherlands, which took place in October, was forefeen

in April; would it not then have been wife in this country to have mediated between the two powers, and prevented the invafion? The more the aggrandifement of France was to be dreaded, the greater was the reafon for exercifing the office of a mediator before the war com menced. Soon after this, Mr. Fox faid, the recall of lord Gower from Paris took away every means of explanation and conciliation; mon fieur Chauvelin was indeed permit ted to continue here, but in a dubious character, and not treated in a way to favour conciliation, which brought him to the immediate caufes of the war: thefe, Mr. Fox faid, had generally been reduced to three; firft, the way in which certain individuals belonging to the correfponding fociety were received by the French government: fecondly, the decree of the 19th of November: and thirdly, the claims fet up against the monopoly held by the Dutch of the navigation of the Scheldt. Refpecting the firft, no complaint was made, no diffatisfaction stated. Refpecting the decree, was it ever complained of? was its revocation, or any explanation of it, ever demanded? This was a circumstance fo nearly connected with the exiftence of government, that he knew not how to feparate them. A refu fal was made to recognife the government of France; and then all conciliation was at an end. The moment that all means of explanation were withdrawn by the recall of lord Gower, a virtual declaration of war was made; yet, through M. Chauvelin, the French had manifefteda ftrong defire for explanation. All writers on the laws of war, Mr. Fox faid, agreed that an infult, an outrage, or even an aggreffion, was not a legitimate caufe of war, unless an explanation is refufed. Was

there,

ed that if a negotiation had been entered into upon the opening of the Scheldt, matters might not have been arranged? the Dutch did not, how ever, at the time, think the Scheldt worth difputing about, and, in fact, fo little cared for the affiftance we forced upon them, that Holland was not conquered by the arms of France, but by the Dutch them felves. It was a reafon given against recognising the French republic, that it would offend our allies; would, Mr. Fox asked, our ally of Pruffia after swallowing fo much of the treasure of this country, have deferted us one day fooner? Had we recognised it, we might equally at this time have availed ourfelves of the affiftance of Austria.

there, he afked, a man who believette, the friend of the very monarch for whom minifters profeffed to have taken up arms, and the inhofpitality practifed to M. Lameth: the behaviour of the allies to Dumouriez was, he ftated, equally impolitic. It had, he obferved, been stated that the fole object of Great Britain was to procure a just and honourable peace, and that this was the object of the confideration of the allies. Why was not that ob. jest attempted before the defertion of Pruflia and Spain? Their feceffion might eafily have been forefeen, and ought to have been provided against. Mr. Fox entered with his ufual ability into the power of the French to preferve peace, but ridiculed the plea of not feeking it till the establishment of a regular government, Mr. Fox next proceeded to a when they had fettled themfelves in comprehenfive statement of the dif- a permanent government, afcerferent tranfactions of the war. Soon tained the extent and boundaries of after our taking the field, the French their conquefts, and given to the were driven from Auftria, and Hol- territory of other nations the very land was fafe, and M. Maret was inherent quality of their own de

feat to this country with propofals partment. He very ably argued for peace. These were, however, against what had fo frequently been refufed, becaufe minifters had de- advanced refpecting the decayed re, Serted the fyftem of neutrality, and fources of France. Whatever had the fafety of their allies, but infa- ed irresistible. Mr. Fox cenfured no longer confining their views to been faid, at this time they appeartuated with fuccefs, began to feek the delay which had arifen between

indemnity.

cenfured the

Mr. Fox pointedly want of a determined

the speech from the throne and any attempt at negotiation. The time

object, which had appeared on our for it was, he obferved, favourable, dictory circumstances which this paign. The delay did not however had occafioned. The emperor was feem to have arifen from a wish to taking towns in Alface in the name confult with the allies, fince it did of the king of Hungary, while we not appear that they either fanç were taking Valenciennes for the tioned or difapproved the negotition of 1791 at Toulon, in the name the whole face of the transaction, emperor, proclaiming the conftitu- ation. He could not, he faid, on of Louis XVII, and taking poffef- putting himself in the place of the Son of Martinique, and fummon- French, have thought minifters finBritain. Mr. Fox ftated the horrid French, that they cannot give up ing Dunkirk for the king of Great cere. The pretence fet up by the reatment received by M. La Fay- any territories which have been conK3 folidated

folldared with free republic, was, be the gaterjuit; but it was a'cirat doubled is indig, nation again minifters who had brought us into ni 1 lamentable first ation. A complete change of his majefty's counci's wa, be tought, neceffary, and to bring the corn. fellors to fee the errors of their pat condi&t. Should the prefent mi-, nifters prove an exception to the rule that no miniker who commenced and carried on a var ever made an advantageous peace, they fhould fhew a conviction of their palt errors, and renounce the principles on which they have acted, before they can hope to put an end with honour ad fafety to a war fo condufted. We had, ne fid, completely failed in all the objefts for which it was undertaken. Hiland was loft, the king of France exiled, and the power and aggrandifement of the republic greater than ever. Of our allies, the king of Pruffia has been injured the leaft; Spain had been forced to make peace; and Sardinia, the very pattern of fidelity, proves alfo to be an exa.nple of misfortune. Ruffa had indeed foffered nothing: her object was to plunder Poland, in which fhe had been collaterally fupported by England. This, he obferved, was a moral blow to another profeffed objeft in the war, the prefervation of the balance of power. If the country was now to be faved, it was, he faid, neceffary to retrace our steps: all other remedies were mere palliatives, and he therefore recommended a complete change of fyftem.

It was obferved by the chancellor of the exchequer, that, whatever was our prefent fituation, "it was certa'nly wifer not to fix our attention on the past," but to look to what can and fill remains to be done.

With refpeft to the origin of the war, Mr. Pin infifted upon the aggreftion lying on the fide of the French, andt at this was the general op sien ofall candid and in par. till men. 1ftend of the retrofpects which lad been entered into, it would have been more becoming in 2 friend to his country to have pointed out the line of conduct which it woy : be right to purfor; not that he wished, Mr. Pitt faid, to evade a retrospect, but because he fet it of more im ortance to call the attention of the house to the actual state of trings which appeared to have been entirely overlooked. The conclufion to which the fpeech juft delivered went, was to record a confeffion and ret.actation of our paft errors, that we are embarked in a conteft in which we wantonly and unjustly engaged, though, the defence was in fact fuch as our deareft interefts called for, and fuch as a regard to justice and to every moral principle legitimated and fanctified. Would the houfe then refcind all the refolutions it had come to fince the commencement of the war? Every proper measure for the attainment of peace muft, he stated, have been put in practice by lim, not only from motives of public duty, but of the perfonal eafe, and to effect the favourite object he had in view, that of redeeming the public debt, and. the 4 per cents. With refpect to our having with-held from propofing a mediation, the attempt would have been hazardous, and would only have expofed us to difficulties and difputes, if we were determined, as we ought to be, to enforce that mediation on the parties who refused to admit it. What, he asked, was the great ufe intended to be made of peace if fo procured? Was it fit that we

fhould

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