one Lucius A. White, a brother of the defendant, with having, in the Eastern district of Missouri, in the United States, about the seventeenth of August, 1885, feloniously, and without lawful authority, caused to be printed three certain impressions, each in the likeness of a certain part, to-wit, the face, except the signatures and numbers, of a genuine treasury note of the denomination of 200 milreis of the empire of Brazil, with intent to defraud said empire, and other parties to the grand jurors unknown. And the district attorney of the Eastern district of Missouri, and the district attorney of this district, now present to me a copy of that indictment, and capias issued thereon, both duly certified, and ask me to issue the writ of removal provided for by statute in such cases. Section 1014, Rev. St.

The defendant now opposes the issuance of the writ, because he says that no offense is charged against him by the indictment, and that he should be discharged. He contends that because the impressions are without signatures and numbers, and without the indorsements on the back shown by the genuine treasury notes of the empire of Brazil, that the attempted offense was not completed, and the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

The language of the clause of the sixth section of the act of May 16, 1884, (Sess. Acts 1883-84, p. 23,) bearing upon this case, is: "And every person who prints, photographs, or in any other manner makes, executes, or sells, or causes to be printed, made, executed, or sold, or aids in printing, photographing, making, executing, or selling, any engraving, photograph, print, or impression in the likeness of any genuine note, bond, obligation, or other security, or any part thereof, of any foreign government," etc., is guilty of an offense.

My attention has been called to case of U. S. v. Williams, reported in 14 Fed. Rep. 550, where Judge DYER held it not to be an offense to have in one's possession certain unsigned impressions of a bond of the United States Silver Mining Company, etc., engraved and printed after the similitude of an obligation of the United States. The indictment was sought to be supported by a clause of section 5430 of the Revised Statutes, which does not add the words "or any part thereof" to the enumeration or description of the obligations or securities, the possession of which without authority is made penal. Those words do occur four times in the section, (5430,) but they relate to having possession of the plates without lawful authority, or making or suffering to be made an improper use of them, when lawfully held, or making, or assisting in making, or causing to be made any such plate, or to any one who prints or causes to be printed or otherwise makes any impressions, etc., of the obligations or other security, etc., all of whom are guilty of an offense; and in all of these cases the offense is complete when any part of the impression is made, or any part of the plate is made or used unlawfully. And the case cited does not oppose this construction. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the indictment charges an offense against the defendant.

The defendant says further that the writ of removal should not be issued, because the government's testimony offered before the examining commissioner shows that Lucius A. White was the principal in the commission of the offense, and that this defendant, if involved at all, was only an accomplice or accessory before the fact, and that whatever this defendant did was done in this district, and for his said acts he is answerable here, and only here. The indictment charges the defendant as principal, and charges an offense which, taking the face of the indictment for our guide, is within the jurisdiction of the United States district court for the Eastern district of Missouri, where the indictment was found. This objection is in the nature of a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of that court, to be supported by proof aliunde the record, and it appears to me that great confusion would result were such pleas freely entertained. I am aware that in Re Buell the district judge of the Eastern district of Missouri refused to issue the writ of removal, and ordered the discharge of the prisoner, because in that case it appeared on the face of the indictment that the publication of the libel was made in Detroit, Michigan, while the indictment was found in the District of Columbia, and that, on appeal to the circuit court, Judge DILLON affirmed Judge TREAT's ruling in the case. 3 Dill. 120. And there is a note to the report of the case in 3 Dill. to the effect that another indictment having been found in one of the courts for the District of Columbia against Mr. Buell, he was again arrested, and was discharged on habeas corpus by Judge TREAT, on the ground that the indictment was found by a grand jury of a court having no jurisdiction of the offense. How this fact was made to appear the note does not show.

It is well understood that want of jurisdiction deprives the record of a court of its force, and that, in the interest of liberty, this can be inquired into anywhere and at all times where a proper case is presented; but there is certain order and comity to be observed in all court proceedings and the authorized action of judges, and the case should present peculiar features of urgency to warrant the judge of one court in interrupting the progress of a case pending in another court by hearing and sustaining a plea which ordinarily should be heard by the judge of the court where the cause was proceeding.

Granting, however, that this is such a case, the proof shows that Lucius A. White is a brother of defendant; that defendant employed Lucius A. to get printed for him, the defendant, what he called cigar labels, in the likeness of the treasury notes of Brazil; that Lucius ascertained where and on what terms he could get the printing done; that he submitted specimens of the work to defendant, and it was approved by defendant, and the impressions ordered; that Lucius' expenses were to be paid by defendant, and he was also to be paid for his time and trouble; that defendant ordered the printing and furnished the money to pay for it; that Lucius was not aware of any unlawful use the defendant intended to make of the labels, and was

ignorant of the fact that it was unlawful to have them printed as ordered; that they (the impressions) were printed in the Eastern district of Missouri. My opinion is that this evidence tends to prove this defendant the principal in the commission of the offense. The writ will be issued.

CONSOLIDATED ELECTRIC LIGHT Co. v. EDISON ELECTRIC LIGHT Co. and others.1

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. 1885.)

1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-SEVERAL ASSIGNMENTS BEFORE ISSUE.

Pending an application for letters patent the invention was assigned to corporation A., by it to corporation B., and by the latter to the complainant, all the assignments being recorded in the patent-office before the issuance of the patent. The patent issued to corporation A. Held, on demurrer to bill setting out this title, the patent was not void for want of interest of record in the patentee.

2. SAME-REV. ST. § 4895.

The purpose of section 4895 of the Revised Statutes is to permit a patent to issue to the person who has the record title to the invention, and is attained when the patent runs to the ultimate assignee; and therefore a patent may issue to the person who, by the records of the office, is assignee of the invention, although not technically the assignee of the inventor; citing Selden v. Stockwell Gas-burner Co., 19 Blatchf. 544; S. C. 9 Fed. Rep. 390.

3. SAME-LEGAL TITLE VESTS, WHEN.

The legal title to a patent vests at once on its issuance to the person who, by the record, is entitled to it; but it is not mandatory under the language of the statute that the patent run in form to such record owner; citing Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477.

4. SAME-TO WHAT ASSIGNEE ISSUED.

A patent is properly issued to any assignee whose assignment is duly recorded when it can be done without impairing the rights of any other person having a paramount title to the invention, and is therefore valid when issued to any such assignee of record.

In Equity.

E. N. Dickerson, Amos Broadnax, and H. R. Garden, for complainants.

William M. Evarts, John C. Tomlinson, and Richard N. Dyer, for defendants.

WALLACE, J. The bill of complaint alleges infringement by the defendant of letters patent for a new and useful improvement in electric lights, of which Sawyer and Man were the inventors, bearing date May 12, 1885, granted to the Electro-dynamic Light Company, its successors and assigns, as assignee of Sawyer and Man. It appears by the bill that the application for the patent was filed by the inventors in January, 1880; that in January, 1880, they assigned their whole interest in the invention to the Electro-dynamic Light Company; that in April, 1881, that company assigned the invention to

'Reported by Charles C. Linthicum, Esq., of the Chicago bar.

the Eastern Electric Manufacturing Company; and that the Eastern Electric Manufacturing Company, in September, 1882, assigned the invention to the complainant. It further appears that all of these assignments were duly recorded in the patent-office more than two years before the patent was granted.

The defendant has demurred to the bill, and the point raised by the demurrer is that the patent is void because the Electro-dynamic Light Company, the grantee named in the patent, had assigned its interest to the complainant before the patent issued, and had no interest of record in the patent at the time the same was issued. The demurrer admits the validity of the assignments made by the Electro-dynamic Light Company to the Eastern Manufacturing Company, and by the latter company to the complainant, and no question is made, or can be made, respecting their efficacy to invest complainant with the title of the Electro-dynamic Light Company to the invention. The title thus acquired by the complainant is as effectual to protect the defendant against any claims of the Electro-dynamic Light Company as if the assignment had been made by that company to the complainant after the patent had issued. If the demurrer is good, the complainant, although the owner of the invention and the sole party entitled to enjoy the monopoly conferred by the patent, will be defeated because of the inadvertence or erroneous action of the patent-office in issuing the patent to a corporation which cannot challenge the complainants' rights or assert any adverse claim against the defendant. It may well happen occasionally in the pressure of business at the patent-office that an assignment made during the pendency of an application may be overlooked, although duly recorded, and the patent be issued to the inventor or to an intermediate assignee whose assignment is on record. If, whenever this happens, the patent is to be deemed void notwithstanding the title of the grantee named in it is instantly vested in the true owner by operation of law, and notwithstanding no possible injury or inconvenience can be occasioned to third persons or to the public, the result would be one of such unnecessary hardship that it is not reasonable to suppose that it could have been contemplated by congress while framing the provisions of the patent laws. The person entitled to the benefit of the monopoly might not ultimately lose his property. He might be able to induce the proper authorities of the government to file a bill in equity in the name of the United States to repeal the patent because granted by mistake, (U. S. v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525; Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434,) but he would lose it in the mean time.

As the property in the monopoly is the creature of statute, the defendant properly asserts that no title was acquired by the complainant, unless it has devolved pursuant to the statutory provisions which authorize patents to be issued to the assignees of inventor. These provisions are found in section 4895, Rev. St., which declares that "patents may be granted and issued or reissued to the assignee of

the inventor or discoverer, but the assignment must first be entered of record in the patent office." This section is a reproduction of section 33 of the patent law of 1870, and there is no other section or no other language in the act which bears upon the present question. The section originated in section 6 of the act of 1837. 5 St. at Large, 191. Prior to that act there was no provision of law for issuing a patent to any person except the inventor. That section employed the language of the present section. The question then is what is meant by the term "the assignee of the inventor or discoverer." In one sense the assignee of the inventor can be no other than the person or corporation to whom the inventor or discoverer has executed an assignment. The grantee in the present case, the Electro-dynamic Light Company, did not cease to be "the assignee of the inventor" because it became an assignor to the complainant, although it did cease to have any legal or equitable interest in the invention after executing the assignment to the complainant. The language of the section is as literally and accurately satisfied when the patent is issued to the inventor's assignee as it is when it is issued to the assignee's assignee. The latter is an assignee of the patent, but not strictly the assignee of the inventor Congress recognized this distinction in section 4 of the patent law of 1793, which was the earliest provision for the protection of assignees, and authorized their assignments to be recorded in the patent-office. That section, after providing that any inventor might assign his invention, declared that "the assignee, having recorded the said assignment in the office of the secretary of state, shall thereafter stand in the place of the original inventor, both as to right and responsibility, and so the assignee of assigns to any degree." It would seem, therefore, that the term "assignee," as first used in the patent laws, was used in its most strict and literal sense; and was understood to refer to the inventor's assignee; and that, in order to extend the benefits of the provision to subsequent assignees, it was deemed proper to designate them as "assignees of assigns to any degree."

It is undoubtedly a fair and reasonable interpretation of the section in question to hold that the patent may issue to the person who, by the records of the office, is assignee of the patent, although not technically the assignee of the inventor. Such was the ruling in Selden v. Stockwell Gas-burner Co., 19 Blatchf. 544; S. C. 9 Fed. Rep. 390. The purpose of the section is to permit a patent to issue to the person who has the title to the invention upon the records of the patentoffice. This purpose is attained when the patent runs to the ultimate assignee of the invention. 1. is equally well attained when the patent runs to the inventor, or to the inventor's assignee, if, by force of an assignment on record at the time, the grant inures as soon as the patent issues to the ultimate assignee. That the legal title vests at once in the person who, by the records, is entitled to it, was held in Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477. That case is also authority for the v.25F,no.12-46