other words, because the purchase, or transfer to him, had not been made by means of, or accompanied by, any written instrument. We are confident that no court of common law would ever apply this rule to such a case, and with such an effect, unless so far as they might be constrained by the Statute of 1850. That is, no court of common law would consider a written instrument absolutely indispensable, and an oral transfer without one necessarily void and of no effect whatever. And still less would a court of equity. And as a court of admiralty always possesses and exercises full equity powers, we are of opinion, that in any such case, where the equity or moral justice of the case required it, even a court of admiralty, if it considered a written instrument indispensable, would either require of the seller that he should make such instrument as the law required, or, acting upon a familiar equity principle, would consider that to be done which ought to be done, and assuming that such written instrument had been made, would protect the rights of the purchaser accordingly.1 1 That Lord Stowell did not intend to assert as a positive rule, that a bill of sale is in all cases indispensable to the transfer of property in a ship, and that he considered it a question open to argument, appears to be the import of his concluding words in the case of The Sisters, 5 Rob. Adm. 155, 160. "Whilst Charnock was left in possession of the bill of sale, such a delivery as is here said to have taken place could not be a delivery of the title to the property. It was merely putting the property into the hands of another, for the purpose of executing a particular contract, but which contract was in fact never executed. Nothing less than an express declaration, made by Charnock to Tubbs, 'I deliver this to you for the use of Marsden,' could fairly raise the argument, how far delivery, coupled with the correspondence, could be held equivalent to a bill of sale." But see The Helena, 4 Rob. Adm. 3. That, independently of the registry acts, no bill of sale was necessary to transfer the property in a British vessel, would seem to follow from those cases which have determined that, where these acts do not apply, the ownership may be, at least primâ facie, established by evidence of possession under claim of title, or other matter in pais, as in the case of any other chattel. Robertson v. French, 4 East, 130; Thomas v. Foyle, 5 Esp. 88; Pirie v. Anderson, 4 Taunt. 652; The Nostra Signora de los Dolores, 1 Dods. 290. See also Bas v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. 381; United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392, 409; Hozey v. Buchanan, 16 Pet. 215. Under the American registry acts it is well settled, that a parol sale of a ship with delivery is good to pass the title from the vendor to the vendee, although the privileges of an American bottom are thereby forfeited. Wendover v. Hogeboom, Anthon's N. P. 121, 7 Johns. 308; Taggard v. Loring, 16 Mass. 336, 340; Lamb v. Durant, 12 Mass. 54; Bixby v. Franklin Ins. Co. 8 Pick. 86; Weaver v. The SECTION II. OF THE TRANSFER OF A SHIP BY BILL OF SALE. In England, the first bill of sale, by which the property in the vessel passes from the builder to the first purchaser or owner, is S. G. Owens, 1 Wallace, Jun. 349; Fontaine v. Beers, 19 Ala. 722; Leonard v. Huntington, 15 Johns. 298; Badger v. Bank of Cumberland, 26 Maine, 428; Vinal v. Burrill, 16 Pick. 401; Barnes v. Taylor, 31 Maine, 329; Mitchell v. Taylor, 32 Maine, 434; Welsh v. Parish, 1 Hill (S. C.), 155; The Amelie, 6 Wallace, 18. Nor is the national character, ipso facto, gone by such a transfer, but the registry act makes the production of a bill of sale requisite to entitle the ship to be registered anew, and the want of such new registry forfeits the national character. If, therefore, a bill of sale is executed at any time before application made for a new registry, it is sufficient. United States v. Willings, 4 Cranch, 48; Hatch v. Smith, 5 Mass. 42, 53. The effect of the forfeiture is not that the ship acquires the character of an alien ship for all purposes, but that she loses the privileges of an American vessel. Fontaine v. Beers, supra. The difference in the result of a non-compliance with the terms of the registry acts in the two countries has been well established in the case of other provisions common to the acts, and classed with them and enforced by the same penalties as the requirement of an instrument in writing, thus affording a strong presumption, independent of direct authority, that this diversity extends to the clause requiring such instrument. Thus the same section requires that the bill of sale shall "recite the certificate of registry." And the omission of this recital has been adjudged in Great Britain to invalidate the sale, so that the vendee who had taken possession of the vessel under the bill of sale could not retain her against the assignees of the vendor, who subsequently to the sale had become a bankrupt. Rolleston v. Hibbert, 3 T. R. 406. And relief was denied in equity. Hibbert v. Rolleston, 3 Brown's Ch. 571. See also Campbell v. Thompson, 2 Hare, 140. The case is the same with an executory agreement to sell. Biddell v. Leeder, 1 B. & C. 327; Brewster v. Clarke, 2 Meriv. 75; Hughes v. Morris, 2 De G., M., & G. 349, 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 291. So where a certificate was misrecited. Westerdell v. Dale, 7 T. R. 306. These provisions of the registry acts do not, however, extend to transfers by operation of law. Curtis v. Perry, 6 Ves. 739 a; Ex parte Yallop, 15 Ves. 60, 68; Bloxam v. Hubbard, 5 East, 407. In America such an omission merely forfeits the national character of the vessel. Mitchell v. Taylor, 32 Maine, 434; D'Wolf v. Harris, 4 Mason, 515, 533; Wooley v. Comtant, 4 Johns. 54. So with the insufficient recital of the certificate. Philips v. Ledley, 1 Wash. C. C. 226, 229. So with the omission to enroll called the grand bill of sale, and is distinguished by this name from the bills of sale by which subsequent transfers are made.1 But we have no such distinction in this country. Whether any bill of sale is essential to a transfer, we have already considered. If any be necessary, and that a transfer of a ship by a written. instrument is customary and proper we have already said, and no one has ever doubted, there is no form for one prescribed by law, or by any usage so established as to have the force of law.3 - If a ship be mortgaged, we know no reason why it does not come under the common law, or statute law where that exists, in relation to mortgages of personal property, unless the Statute of 1850, ch. 27, interferes with and controls the State statutes. For most of our States have now statutes requiring, to make a mortgage of personal property valid, either a transfer of possession, or a record of the mortgages; and they prescribe a place for the record. But the statute of 1850 requires that every transfer, including, of course, mortgages, should be registered in the customhouse. The questions then occur, is the registry of the transfer in the custom-house sufficient, so that registry under the State statutes is unnecessary; or, secondly, is registry in the customhouse indispensable, or is it enough that the transfer is recorded under the State statutes. Waiving the question of the constituthe bill of sale in the custom-house. Hozey v. Buchanan, 16 Pet. 215. See also, as to the distinction between the British and American registry acts, with respect to the consequence of a neglect to comply with their provisions generally. Colson v. Bonzey, 6 Greenl. 474, 475. 1 Abbott on Shipping, 3. the transfer of a ship at sea. India Co. 7 T. R. 228, 234. In England, the grand bill of sale is necessary to 2 Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. 661; Wheeler v. Sumner, 4 Mason, 183; Morgan v. Biddle, 1 Yeates, 3; 3 Kent, Com. 133. See the remarks of Parke, B., on the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 55, § 31, in Hunter v. Parker, 7 M. & W. 322, 343. See also Fox v. The Lodemia, Crabbe, 271. To entitle " a bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, conveyance, or discharge of mortgage, or other incumbrance of any vessel" to be recorded, it must be duly acknowledged before a notary public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds." Acts of 1865, c. 101, 13 U. S. Stats. at Large, 66 519. In Thompson v. Van Vechten, 5 Abbott, Pr. 458, it was held, that the act of 1850 did not abolish or supersede the State statute of New York relating to the recording of mortgages. Reports of this case at subsequent stages, but not on this point, may be found in 6 Bosw. 373, 27 N. Y. 568. The same point was tionality of the Statute of 1850, which we have already considered, we are of opinion that the United States statute controls the State statute, so far, that record under this latter would have no effect as legal notice of the transfer. At least, if it be constitutional, we do not see how its requirements can be superseded or supplied by those of a State law.1 But the statute of 1850 only applies, it has been held, to vessels which are registered, licensed, or enrolled, and a mortgage of a vessel which comes under none of these heads need not be recorded at the custom-house, but may be recorded according to the provisions of the statute of the State where she decided in Horton v. Davis, 26 N. Y. 495. And in Etna Ins. Co. v. Aldrich, 26 N. Y. 92, the same principle was applied to a law of the State of Illinois. The object of the law was interpreted by Wright, J., as follows: "It seems to me that it was passed to apply between the government and the owners of a certain class of vessels; that its purpose was to secure a complete record in the office of the collector of the customs, of the title to enrolled and registered vessels; and its object was not to regulate and control the transfer of property in vessels generally, but to provide a custom-house regulation which would better protect the government against violations of its revenue system, and enable its officers to enforce the rules relating to the national commerce." 1 It is well settled that a law of Congress, which is in accordance with the constitution, is the supreme law of the land, and that a State law which comes in conflict with it must cease to operate, so far as it is repugnant to the law of the United States. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; License Cases, 5 How. 504, 574; Fox v. State of Ohio, 5 How. 410; United States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560; Moore v. State of Illinois, 14 How. 13; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Nathan v. State of Louisiana, 8 How. 73; United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490; Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Prigg v. Commonwealth of Penn. 16 Pet. 539; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 419; Brown v. State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Norris v. City of Boston, 4 Met. 282, 288; People v. Brooks, 4 Den. 469. See also Port Wardens of N. Y. v. Cartwright, 4 Sandf. 236, opinion of Paine, J. It is provided by statute in New York, that a steamboat navigating the waters of that State at night shall carry two lights. It is also provided by an act of Congress that steamers shall carry one or more lights. In Fitch v. Livingston, 4 Sandf. 492, a steam propeller, licensed as a coaster, going up the Hudson on a voyage from Philadelphia to Albany, came into collision with another steamer, and was found by the jury to be in fault because she carried only one light. It was argued, that, having complied with the provisions of the United States statute, she had done all that was necessary, but the court held that she was bound to comply with the statute of the State through whose waters she was passing. See, however, The Steamboat New York v. Rea, 18 How. 223. belongs. So, a canal boat is not a vessel within the meaning of this statute.2 An important question arises under this act, viz. where conveyances should be recorded. It has been held by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts that the custom-house where the vessel was last registered is the proper place. Mr. Justice Clifford, on the other hand, in a well-reasoned opinion holds that conveyances must be recorded at the home port of the vessel. The act does not apply to charter parties,5 nor to the lien of a material man for supplies." The act in question provides that no bill of sale, &c.,“ shall be valid against any person other than the grantor or mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, and persons having actual notice thereof," unless such bill of sale is recorded. It is familiar law under registry acts relating to real estate, that if a subsequent purchaser has knowledge of a prior unrecorded deed he is bound by it. There are two kinds of notice, direct or actual, and constructive. This act it will be noticed by implication excludes the latter, hence it is not enough to show that the subsequent purchaser had knowledge of circumstances calculated to lead to inquiry, if with the inquiry made the facts do not convey actual notice of the bill of sale.8 1 Veazie v. Somerby, 5 Allen, 280. The Massachusetts Rev. Stats. of 1836 ch. 74, contained provisions relative to mortgages of personal property. The U. S. statute was passed in 1850, and in 1851 an act was passed by the Legislature of Massachusetts declaring that it should not be necessary to the validity of any mortgage or transfer "of any ship or vessel" that it should be recorded by any city or town clerk. Stat. 1851, c. 57. It was held, that this statute had reference to the U. S. Stat. of 1850, and that it did not apply to vessels which were not registered, licensed, or enrolled. Veazie v. Somerby, supra. 2 Hicks v. Williams, 17 Barb. 523. Potter v. Irish, 10 Gray, 416. The Martha Washington, U. S. C. C. Maine, 25 Law Reporter, 22. The Brig Minnie, U. S. D. C..South Carolina, 6 Am. Law Register, 328. So held also under a State 7 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 397; 4 Greenl. Cruise, 452. Law of South Carolina, relating to the registry of conveyances of vessels. Cape Fear Steamboat Co. v. Conner, 3 Rich. 335. The Parker Mills v. Jacot, 8 Bosw. 161. In Pomeroy v. Stevens, 11 Met. 244, 247, under a statute containing the words "actual notice," Wilde, J. said: "Since this provision, no implied or constructive notice of an unregistered deed will give it validity against a subsequent purchaser or attaching creditor. It is not sufficient to prove facts that would reasonably put him on inquiry. He is not bound to inquire; but the party relying on an unregistered deed, against a subsequent |