The Pride of Science.

NOTHING is more common than to hear persons ignorant of physical science enlarging upon what they term the arrogance of the philosopher in drawing his conclusions, and pretending to determine what is, and what must be, in regions utterly beyond the limits of sensible experience; nothing more usual than to meet with those who talk not only with disbelief, but with ridicule, of the theories of the scientific pedant; and in the most solemn tone, declaim against the pride of reason and philosophy as essentially hostile to the humility of faith. They seem to regard the speculations of physical science as mere fancies, in which the philosopher indulges for the sole gratification of his own wayward presumption, and in virtue of which he may assume a claim to the admiration of the vulgar. Little considering that these very speculations afford the only legitimate and substantial ground on which a reasoning inquirer can build his most sublime proofs of the existence and attributes of the Divine Being, that those very theories are nothing else than the expression and the embodying of that allpervading analogy and order in which the universal manifestations of the Divine mind are disclosed

to.us.

So long as correct induction is our guide, we may with safety pursue physical speculation to any

extent. The only real presumption is in the departure from sound inductive principles, and the attempt to interpret nature without their aid. Inductive research undoubtedly claims the right of an absolutely unlimited extent of inference, even when it points to objects too vast or too minute, too remote in space, or too deep in the abyss of time, to come at all within the grasp of our faculties. The sole consideration it regards is the accuracy and truth of its evidence; if this be in the first instance firmly established, the true philosopher will never shrink from admitting all its necessary consequences, however inconceivable may be their nature, and incalculable their extent.

If there were any reasonableness in prescribing such limits, if there were any real ground of doubt as to the universal preservation of the analogies of nature, it must be carefully observed that any such limitation would amount, in its direct consequences, to a limitation in those inferences on which we frame all our notions of the Deity; any such ground of doubt would (as far as it went,) tend to discredit our proofs of the Divine perfections.

If the deductions of science are unwarrantable intrusions of the vain imagination of the self-sufficient philosopher into those vast regions of creation which are purposely veiled from us, the objectors seem to forget that, by necessary consequence, they make the sublime conclusions of natural theology also an unwarrantable stretch of inference. If they

attach the charge of presumption to the speculations of natural science, it must be remembered they thereby attach the same accusation to the deductions of natural theology. If they condemn the conclusions of physical reasoning as arrogant and impious intrusions of human self-conceit into mysteries beyond the reach of the human faculties, so, by necessary consequence, they involve in the same condemnation the inferences which are dependent upon those researches, the belief in the infinite perfection, the unlimited immensity, power, and eternity of the Deity.

To some it is a peculiarly favourite topic, that the powers of the human mind are but limited; that there are mysteries in nature which must for ever baffle the most acute research; and, not content with the assertion that there are such boundaries imposed on all human speculation, are prone to affirm that the boundary has been reached whenever they meet with an unexplained phenomenon. They seem to dwell with special satisfaction on the circumstance that here is an instance of some natural wonder, in the comprehension of which the greatest philosopher is as much at a loss as the ignorant peasant. Such instances they often hold out as instructive and salutary checks to the pride of science, and humiliating to the pretensions of intellectual superiority. In reality, however, instead of the lofty moral tone which they affect, these reflections but too clearly betray the mere invidious workings of narrow pre

judice, in which self-satisfied ignorance consoles itself*.

But to those who rightly estimate at once the real powers of the human mind and the true character of the inductive method, it will be manifest how irrational such sentiments must be. So long as we follow diligently, and with becoming caution, the humble, but sure path of induction, we can never arrive at any bar to our inquiries except those which are imposed by the deficiency of facts; and we know by the testimony of all past experience, that the disclosure of new facts is daily advancing, and must perpetually accumulate. It is by the continual accession of fresh phenomena that new paths will be perpetually opening to judicious induction; and, by consequence, we may unhesitatingly anticipate perpetually new and extended manifestations of order and arrangement in nature, of Divine power, wisdom, and beneficence.

To indulge, then, in the low and absurd reflections just adverted to, is nothing else than to rejoice in the deficiency of proofs of the Divine perfections. It is to delight in blindness to the manifestations of Divine power and goodness; to prefer darkness to light, and to evince a disposition of congenial character. It is to refuse to recognise the proper and highest use for which our intellectual faculties are conferred upon us.

See Note K.

Interposition:-Permanent Laws.

THE notion of physical cause and effect being reduced to a bare "sequence," has been strongly objected to as injurious to the belief in the Divine agency in nature; and the supposition of an acting efficient cause in every natural phenomenon, has been emphatically insisted on as necessary for the support of that doctrine. But from the view we have here taken of the nature of physical causes, and their relation to moral, we see that, so far from supporting, the supposition of such direct perpetual intervention would, in fact, invalidate the evidence of a First Cause.

According to the view here supported of the nature of physical causes, it has sufficiently appeared that, in including in our idea the relation of the more particular to the more general fact, we have assigned the origin of our ideas of the closest and most inseparable union of cause and effect; and this relation is obviously dependent upon the degree in which we can generalize among the phenomena of nature; that is, upon the degree in which we can trace order and arrangement. Thus, the greater the extent to which we can trace physical causes, in this sense, the more surely founded is the inference of moral volition and all-powerful intelligence, derived from the contemplation of this order of causes.

And when we reflect upon the unbounded vastness