was protected by the British cavalry.

On the other hand, the French General seems to have closely followed the movements of the allied armies, daily skirmishes having taken place between the light troops. On the 26th of September, he was posted in front of Lord Wellington's position, and though he was on the same day joined by the 8th corps, he made no demonstration of a hostile nature. But early on the morning of the 27th, he directed two attacks, one on the right and the other on the left of the allies, with the view, as is supposed, of forcing their position. In the first of these attacks, the enemy succeeded in obtaining temporary possession of the top of the ridge, but was soon after repulsed at the point of the bayonet; and in the second attack he was driven back before reaching the top of the hill, having lost in all 2000 killed, and a large proportion of wounded.

The attack was not renewed in the same day, farther than by the fire of the enemy's light troops; but a movement took place, of a large body of men from the left of his centre, with the view of penetrating by the Oporto road, to the rear of the position of the allied armies. This movement was so far successful that the enemy effected his passage through the Sierra. But his intention of penetrating to the rear of the allied troops was defeated by Lord Wellington's retreating with his whole

1

army to the left of the Mondego, from whence, by a continuation of the same movement, he has at length arrived within 20 miles of Lisbon, his right being at Villa Franca, and his left at Torres Vedras; in which position, it is said to be his determination to make a final stand, for the defence of Portugal. On the other hand, Massena's advanced guard is at VillaVerde, about 10 miles from the allied army, while his main body occupies a position distant about 20 miles. Colonel Trant, General Miller, and a variety of other officers, with detachments of Portuguese militia, are said to be in possession of stations in his rear. The division of General Romana is reported to be on its march to join Lord Wellington, and that of General Mortier to join Massena. The other detachments of troops that are dispersed in different parts of the country it is unnecessary to notice, since the great battle that will decide the fate of Portugal can never be influenced by those whose distance from the scene excludes them from any share in the contest.

Of the precise numbers of the two armies upon whose exertions the contest depends, various and contradictory rumours are in circulation. By some, the British troops. in the vicinity of Torres Vedras are said to amount to between 30 and 40,000 men, and the Portuguese to between 40 and 50,000, making, in whole, an army of $0,000; while, according

according to other accounts, they are diminished to 50,000. In like manner, the enemy's force is said, before the battle of Busaco, to have amounted to 70,000 men, and 10,000 being said to be disabled in that battle, Massena is supposed to have with him an army of 60,000

men.

Such are the statements, upon the faith of which the people of this country seem to entertain the most confident expectations of a result equally glorious to our troops and beneficial to the cause in which they are engaged. The long retreat of Lord Wellington is said not to have been dictated by necessity, but adopted from choice, to draw the enemy into a disadvantageous position. The French troops are said to be wasted with famine and disease, and their ranks thinned by desertions, while their present position is described as singularly perilous, with a superior and victorious enemy in their front, and large bodies of Portuguese militia in their rear; by which means, the defeat that is supposed to be inevitable, must, it is said, be equivalent to their total destruction.

Those, however, who have attended to that striking uniformity of success, which, during the course of the last twenty years, has constantly attended the progress of the French arms, and, much more, those who remember the many delusions which have been palmed upon the people of this country during that interesting period-the imposing

statements of numbers and posi tions, and the flattering predictions of success, one and all of which have been invariably falsified by the event, may be well pardoned for indulging some degree of scepticism as to the truth of the representations alluded to, and of the sanguine conclusions that are so eagerly built upon them. How often have we been told, that the French troops were wasted by diseases, dysenteries, and famine-that discontents were discovering themselves in the desertion of whole battalions, and that no escape remained for the enemy from that certain destruction which his own precipitate movements had brought upon him. How long and how regularly has this happy issue been prophesied in all our daily papers; and upon how many occasions have we been told, that the crisis was now arrived which was to place our adversary upon the summit of his fortune, from whence, having reached the highest point of his altitude, his declining course Notwithmust at length begin. standing all which pleasing predic tions, the constant result has been, that he has risen from the midst of all his supposed calamities to verify these presages of ruin upon the heads of his enemies. We do not urge this as a ground for a blind and implicit confidence in the necessary ascendency of the French arms in all situations, and under every possible variety of strength and circumstances. What we say is, that, seeing the constant course

of

of delusion which has prevailed in this country upon all similar occasions and emergencies, it becomes us, as rational beings, not to yield a rash belief to statements of dubious or questionable authority, or to conclusions which (though favourable to us) may be at variance with every principle of just reasoning.

When it is said that Lord Wellington rested on his arms without the smallest attempt to disturb the enemy in the siege of important fortresses, that, after witnessing the fall of these strongholds, he began his retreat, and continued it, closely followed by the enemy over a line of two hundred miles, all for the purpose of drawing the enemy into a disadvantageous position, it naturally occurs to us, that besides the extreme and obvious improbability of such a statement, it is contradicted by Lord Wellington's own account of his conduct after the battle of Busaco; from which it clearly appears, that his retreat, upon that occasion, was a measure of necessity, and not of choice; since, otherwise, the enemy must have infallibly turned his left, and, penetrating to his rear, have intercepted his retreat to Lisbon. To guard against this movement, Lord Wellington himself states, that he fell back, and continued to do so, until he reached his present position, within a few miles of the coast.

Considering, indeed, the whole circumstances attending the very singular attack of the French Ge

neral upon the heights of Busaco, combined as it was with the subsequent attempt to occupy a position. in rear of the allied army, it may be doubted whether the former movement was not intended as a feint to occupy the attention of Lord Wellington, until the latter should be executed. It is to be considered, that wherever it is deemed of importance to carry a particular position, it is the constant practice of the French Generals to direct against it a series of successive and desperate attacks, renewing them occasionally with fresh troops, and returning to the charge after every repulse, until their efforts be crowned with suc

cess.

Of this there are numerous instances to be found in the history of the late wars; in some of which, the French troops, though driven back six or eight times with great slaughter, have as often reiterated the charge, until the enemy has been dislodged; sparing no sacrifice of men, but considering every such loss as the necessary price to be paid for advantages which they cannot otherwise obtain. Had the heights of Busaco been deemed a post of sufficient importance to be carried, there seems no reason to doubt that the same method would have been followed; in place of which, we find that only one attack was made upon the right and left of the position, and that, upon its failure, without a single attempt at a renewal of it, the enemy directed his whole attention to the other,

other, and, as it appears, the chief movement in his view, by endeavouring to penetrate to the rear of the allied army, clearly evincing that the attack was but a secondary object, and intended as a mask to the principal operation. The design, however, was so far frustrated by the timely retreat of the British General; and the enemy closely following, without any new attack, has at length occupied a position in his immediate vicinity.

With regard to the perils that are supposed to surround this position, menaced by Lord Wellington in front, and by the Portuguese militia in the rear, it is to be observed, that General Massena is one of the first even of the great commanders in the French service; trained amidst the most sanguinary battles and complicated movements of modern warfare;-that his experience is large as his capacity; and that the uniform skill, intrepidity, and caution, which have ensured a striking course of success to almost all his campaigns, have procured him the surname of the Fortunate among his companions in arms. It is, moreover, to be considered, that his life, his fortune, and his fame, are all hazarded upon this issue; and, under such circumstances, it is, to say the least, not probable that he should commit the

gross and palpable blunder of allow

ing his position to be straitened of surrounded. He, doubtless, knows and disregards, in the mean time, the movements of the Portuguese militia in his rear, because he hur ries on to Lord Wellington, against whom the blow must be struck that is to decide the fate of Portugal. "There is a tide in the affairs of men, that must be taken at the flood;" and, following that stream of events, the French General has reduced the campaign to an issue upon one point. There will be fought the battle by whose result all inferior movements and hostili. ties must be regulated. Here the Portuguese militia are excluded, by distance, from any participation; and though they were all present, it may admit of a question, how far the British troops would be benefited by such auxiliaries.

What may be the issue of the battle to which we have alluded, it is not easy to guess, in the present absence of all authentic accounts of the relative strength of the two armies. The most sanguine among us, it is believed, however, will scarcely venture to anticipate a more favourable result, than what took place at Talavera; and, under such circumstances, the best intelligence we can receive, seems to be that of the safe embarkation of our own army.

INDIA.

The following details of the capture of Amboyna, tranfmitted by Rear-Admiral Drury to the Secretary of the Admiralty, are published in the London Gazette of the 25th September last :

Government-Houfe, Castle New Victoria, Amboyna, Feb. 11, 1810. SIR-Since my letter of the 8th instant, acquainting your Excellency with the capture of the Dutch brigs of war, Rembang and Hope, by his Majefty's fhip Dover, under my command, off the island of Am'boyna, the services of the force under my orders, and the capture of the said ifland, require that I fhould enter into a detail thereof.

I have therefore to inform your Excellency, that being joined on the 9th by his Majefty's fhip Cornwallis, and a Dutch floop of war (the Mandarine), which the had taken, I proceeded immediately up the harbour of Amboyna, and anchored in Lahha Bay, from whence we were enabled to examine tolerably well the numerous batteries erected fince the English restored the island in 1808, on the different heights commanding the fort and anchorage of Victoria, as well as the anchorage of Por tuguele Bay.

These anchorages are alfo further protected by the fort of Victoria, the fea-face of which is extremely ftrong, a battery close on the beach, well to the right of the fort, mounting four twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, two fix-pounders, and one brafs thirty-two-pounder, and a heavy battery built upon piles far out in the fea, mounting nine twelve-pounders (iron), and one brafs thirty-two-pounder.

On the morning of the 16th the plan of attack was determined upon, in confult ation with Captains Montagu and Spencer of the Royal Navy, Captain Major Henry Court of the Honourable the Eaft India Company's coaft artillery, commanding the troops, and Captains Philips and Forbes of the Madras European regiment.

The arrangements for the attack were, that 400 men, felected as per mar October 1810.

gin, under the command of Capt. Court, fhould be landed a little to the right of Portuguese Bay, and advance immediately to the attack of the batteries on the heights commanding that anchorage, as well as the town and fort of Victoria, and that at the fame time the fhips fhould commence their attack on the fort and fuch batteries as

they could be brought to bear upon, About two p. m, the boats being all out, and every thing in readinefs for landing the party felected for that fervice, the fhips were got under weigh, and flood across the bay, with the apparent intention of working out to fea; but by keeping the fails lifting, and other manœuvres, we contrived to drift in towards the spot fixed upon for a landing, at the fame time keeping the boats on the oppofite fide of the fhip, fo as not to be perceived by the

enemy.

The

Upon a nearer approach, the preparative fignal was made, to bear up and fail large; the fhips bore up together with a fine breeze, and paffing within cable's length of the landing-place, flipped all the boats at the fame moment per fignal. troops, feamen, and marines, were inftantly landed, and formed, agreeably to the direc tions iffued by Captain Court, to whose report of their further proceedings I beg leave to refer your Excellency.

The fhips immediately commenced an attack upon the fort and furrounding batteries, which was continued without inter miffion for two hours and a half, by which time, having drifted very close in, expofed to an extreme heavy fire, particularly from the heights on the left of the town, with red hot fhot, and the object of the attack being accomplished by the unexampled intrepidity of the troops, feamen, and marines, in ftorming, and gaining poffeffion of the heights commanding Portuguese Bay, I took advantage of a fpirt of wind off

the

176 troops; feamen and marines of the Dover, 85; feamen and marines of the Cornwallis, 105; feamen and marines of the Samarang, S5. Total 401, including officers.