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relief of the Niagara sufferers. Several other cases were mentioned. In regard to the question of the inconvenience, Mr. Jay cited the practice in other states-in Massachusetts, where the principle for which he contended was established in the year 1780, and had prevailed ever since; of New-Hampshire, Maine, Louisiana, Indiana, and other states, as well as in the federal constitution.

He remarked, however, that he had consulted gentlemen of more expe. rience than himself on the subject, and whose opinions he was disposed to respect. They were of opinion that it would be more correct to introduce the subject as a distinct provision of the Constitution. Without abandoning his object, therefore, he begged leave to withdraw the amendment, with the view of presenting the same hereafter in a different shape. Leave was granted, and the amendment withdrawn.

The amendment offered by Mr. P. R. Livingston was next in order.

MR. LIVINGSTON rose with an embarrassment and diffidence unusual to him. When he reflected, that the amendment submitted to the consideration of this Convention, had received the unanimous approbation of the select committee, he should approach it with awe, were it not that its consummation would rest with that power which created this Convention. It would be necessary to draw the attention of this body to that period of time, when our constitution was formed. We all know it was adopted in an hour of extreme peril, amidst the noise of musketry and the thunder of cannon; and is it to be wondered at, that their deliberations, under such circumstances, were in some measure erroneous? And is it not a matter of wonder under such circumstances, that you have a constitution, containing so much merit and so much wisdom, as the one under which we now livo? At that time it was necessary to give that negative power, which is found in the third article of the constitution. At that time the southern district of your state, which contained its greatest weight of population, was possessed by the enemy. Your northern frontier was literally laid waste by the savage. You then gave a power to the Convention, which you never would give under the present circumstances. What they did at that period was binding on the people-what you do now the people are to pass up

on.

There was in this state more disaffection, than in any other part of the union. Every thing depended on your executive: and you then had a patriot to direct the destinies of the commonwealth. You imposed the most implicit confidence in his integrity, his courage, and his patriotism. The framers of the constitution were afraid that the legislature might be destitute of patriotism, and encroach upon the liberties of the people. This state of things no longer exists. Then you had nothing to apprchend from the man, who was the governor of the state. He was fighting with a rope round his neck. Had the revolution terminated differently from what it did, he would have been made one of the first examples. Therefore this power was at that time wisely vested. It is to be wondered that they did not require a greater majority in the legislature to balance this check.

It is a fact not to be disguised, that a towering majority of this Convention represent the interests, feelings, and views of the friends of democratic government. In a republican government it will not be denied that all the power of the legislature is vested in, and emanates from, the people. If that maxim be not controverted, he was in favour of expunging every article in the constitution, which contravenes that great principle. He should propose a substitute in conformity with that principle. If the third article of the constitution, which relates to the council of revision, had been administered with integrity and wisdom, the amendment now proposed would never have been suggested. It would have excited the admiration of every jurist, and that feature would have been the pride of the constitution itself. If the construction of that great patriot and statesman, now living, and who once presided over the destinies of the state, had been followed, this amendment would never have been brought into contemplation. He gave the wise construction to it. When a law had passed both branches of the legislature, and was presented to the council, the only inquiry was, is it in violation of constitutional rights. If he found no defect in the constitutionality of the law, he did not extend his inquiries to its expedien

cy, or its tendency to promote the public good; but he left that to the judgment, good sense, and patriotism, which have ever characterized the representatives of the people. He declared that the two branches of the legislature ought to be the judges of what conduced to the public good. But the moment they began to assume the power of judging as to the expediency of laws, the people became alarmed.

The wisdom of the remark cannot be questioned, that from experience we derive every thing, and from the want of it, we are exposed to every thing. Then let me for a moment turn the attention of the Convention to our sister states. You will find that seven states, viz. Maine, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, have vested the veto in the hands of the governor, and in the event of a bill being returned, they require it to be passed by a majority of two thirds of each branch of the legislature. In the states of Rhode-Island, New-Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Ohio, no veto is provided by their constitutions. In Connecticut, Kentucky, Tennessee, Indiana, Missouri, and Alabama, the principle for which he was contending had been adopted, and the veto was placed in the hands of the governor; but if he objected, a majority of all the members elected, could pass the bill notwithstanding. In Illinois, the veto was lodged with the governor and council; but a majority of the legislature could nevertheless pass any bill that might be sent back with objections. In Vermont, the veto is placed in the hands of the governor and council; and if objected to, a bill must lie over for consideration one year. And in New-York, if the governor and council of revision object to a bill, we require a majority of two thirds of both houses to pass it. What is the result from this exposition? Why, several of the states have no negative at all. Eight or nine only require a majority to confirm, in case of a negative.

How does it stand connected with the experience of this state? Might he be permitted to invite the attention of the convention to a sister state. He did it with a view to show, that more able statesmen, greater civilians, and more profound jurists, are not to be found in any state in the union-he alluded to the state of Virginia. Yet in that state, they thought it necessary to adopt, and had adopted the great principle for which he contended. It was the great platform, which he should never leave, that all power emanates from the people. He was placed here in an awkward dilemma, as a committee had made a report, without assigning any reasons which led them to such a result. In his argument he must anticipate, and be presumed one of the reasons was, that it was wise to lodge the revisory power somewhere, as it had been urged that acts of violence would be committed by the legislature. This was presuming what never ought to be presumed, that the legislature would deliberately pass a law against the public interest, and in open violation of public or private rights. It had been asked where was the security against an infraction of the rights and hiberties of the people? He answered, the shield between the rights of citizens and the encroachments of legislative power, was an independent and upright judiciary. Where you have on the bench talents, wisdom, and integrity, there could be no act of the legislature in violation of the constitution, without the intervention of this department. Could the life of an individual be put in jeopardy without a jury of his country? The judiciary, therefore, furnished ample security, whenever there was a violation of the great charter of their rights, which was paramount to all law. If the judicial department but do their duty, all laws in violation of the constitution are but as blank paper.

Is there no danger to be apprehended from the chief magistrate, if you retain that article of the constitution, which permits him to hold his office for three years? And if the appointing power should so be disposed of, that he should have the right of nominations to the senate, you give him a vast patronage, which carries with it an overwhelming influence. He asked the convention whether it would not be in the power of the chief magistrate, where the state of things might make it necessary to subserve his purposes, to prevent the passage of any law. The senate, he said, consisted of thirty-two members, and it will require twenty-two members in that branch, to pass a bill which may have received his negative.-When you come into the other branch, it will require more than eighty members.

What, asked Mr. L. has led to the destruction of the third article of the constitution? It was the violence of the executive and council of revision, in endeavouring to restrain the passage of some important bills. A bill passed by a majority of eight in the senate, and thirty in the house, was defeated by a contemptible minority with the executive at their head. It was these acts that agitated the feelings of the public. Is it not absurd to suppose that about forty members in this house, and eleven in the senate, with the chief magistrate, should possess more wisdom than more than one hundred men?

Another reason, sir, in the way of anticipation, is this-I know it will be urged-it will be said that if you require only a bare majority of members elected, you may as well not have a qualifying negative. Not so. I am to presume, and ever shall presume, that that body of men, who are to represent the interests of the state, and who will represent the talents, wealth, integrity, and good sense of the country, will not come here and persevere in the passage of a law which will be fatal to the public interest. Inasmuch as they are the creatures of the community, should they be guilty of such a procedure they would never darken the door of a legislative forum again. That is your security. Legislators may be guilty of an error once; but if shewn to them, they will have more magnanimity than to persist in it.

Many cases may be supposed, and they are not the creatures of the imagination, on which this power vested in an individual, would be highly dangerous. Such a state of things has existed in the union; nay, it has existed in our own state. It is but yesterday since the thunders of the cannon have ceased-since we were engaged in an awful war which was to determine whether our independence could be sustained by the patriotism and valour of the country. A proposition was made for raising a volunteer corps, necessary for our defence, and to save the state from destruction. You saw one branch of the government willing to raise the corps, but they would not let them pull a trigger out of the margin of the state. Suppose a like emergency should occur again, and both branches of the legislature should pass the necessary act for our defence, but a minority of one branch, of numbers enough, with a chief magistrate whose views were in accordance with that minority-how could you get along in that hour of peril? Your state must be ruined, and the national union shaken to its foundation. Our independence would be placed upon a barrel of gunpowder, liable at any moment to be blown up.

Mr. L. in conclusion, said he would not trust a man, place him where your will. In politics, as in dealings, he would consider every man a rogue. He was for going on the safe side. Keep the power with the people. They will not abuse it. With these views, sir, said he, I shall at present content myself, making this frank and candid confession, that if any views of this subject, of mine, shall be pointed out to me as erroneous, there will be no citizen in this Convention who would more readily retract them, and go with the majority.

JUDGE PLATT. Having the honour, Mr. chairman, of being one of the select committee who made the report now under discussion, it becomes my duty to aid in explaining the reasons which induced that report.

The first point which presented itself for the consideration of the committee, was, whether it was wise and expedient to retain any check over the legislative department by way of a qualified negative upon the acts of the senate and assembly. The committee deemed it unsafe to dispense entirely with the supervising power at present reposed in the council of revision. We deemed it essential to the public safety to vest somewhere in firm and independent hands, a limited veto upon the legislative will.

In a free representative government there is a strong and natural tendency to excessive legislation. That department must be composed of a very numerous body of men. In general we may hope, that they will possess sound and upright intentions; but a majority of them will probably possess little experience in framing laws: and the nature of man, and our own experience shew, that men, suddenly elevated to power, have a natural proneness to use their power immoderately. Our state, in common with others, has from time to time had many bold and rude reformers; who see evils and disorders all around them, in whatever does not accord with their own narrow views of public policy; and

who often apply remedies with so unskilful a hand, and with so little wisdom and circumspection, that in curing one evil, they create many others. Such an inexperienced lawgiver has his eye intently fixed on some particular mischief which he supposes to exist, and then, with a strong hand he extirpates that evil; but in doing so he often throws down the fences erected for the security of private rights. Almost every man who comes to the legislature seems to suppose that he is bound to do something; and this propensity is so strong, that it is of ten excited into a passion and a rage. All change in the public laws of the state is in itself an evil. It renders the rule of action for a time unknown or uncertain. The stability of laws inspires confidence; and the success of all our prospective plans in the various business of life must essentially depend on that stability. Fickle caprice is the law of a tyrant's will; and in proportion as our laws are unstable, they partake of that characteristic feature of tyranny.

Besides, sir, it is not to be disguised, that we are at all times exposed to the arts and designs of ambitious demagogues, to selfish intriguers, who speculate on the public bounty, through means of party favouritism; and to that esprit de corps, which under strong party excitement, often infests with contagious influence, all who are within its immediate atmosphere. The pride of our nature is often humbled, when we see men, who in their private life and character are deserving of all our confidence and esteem: yet, when associated in large assemblies, and inflamed with party zeal, are induced to commit intemperate acts of outrage and violence under the false pleas of public necessity, or of retaliation and self-defence—acts, of which any one of them, in a moment of calm refection, would blush to think himself capable.

These, sir, are some of the infirmities and vices inherent in our form of governinent; and so long as man continues imperfect and depraved, these evils must ever attend the many blessings which we enjoy under our happy republic. But while this truth admonishes that perfection is unattainable in any human device; it solemnly warns us on this occasion, to retain or provide every suitable check and guard against those evils; so far as human sagacity and wisdom can discern and prevent them.

On this subject, sir, it is important to realize the distinction between the actual power of legislation, and a mere negative velo. The power of making or altering the law ought unquestionably to be confided to the two houses of the legislature exclusively. That power expands itself to all objects not forbiden by the constitution, or the fundamental and universal principles of justice.— Such vast powers are obviously liable to great abuse and if abused, the injurious effects are permanent; and in a great measure incurable. If the legislature pass a law which is unconstitutional, the judicial tribunals, if the case be regularly presented to them, will declare it null and void. But in many cases, a long time elapses between the passing of the act, and the judicial interpretation of it; and what, let me ask, is the condition of the people during that interval? Who, in such a case, can safely regulate his conduct? In many cases a person is compelled to act in reference to such a statute, while he is necessarily involved in doubt as to its validity.

But where the legislature abuse their discretion, on questions of expediency merely, the mischief is often still worse. In all cases of private acts, which comprize three fourths of our statute book, the evil of an improvident act is incurable, because it usually vests private rights in individuals or corporations which no power under the government can afterwards repeal or annul. No matter how unequal, unwise, or inconvenient, such laws must be carried into effect. Fieri non debet; factum valet.

But in regard to the evils which might by possibility flow from the improper exercise of the qualified veto on the legislature, they are very limited in their effects, and of far less dangerous character. The council of revision, or the executive holding this check, can originate no bill, nor make nor alter any law. The effect of the objections where they prevail, can only produce the result of suspending the legislative will of the two houses. And the worst consequence which can ordinarily happen, is, that the people must remain under the law as it stood; until the voice of the people, through their new representatives, shall odeve a change,

Having come to the conclusion that such a check is indispensable to the public safety; the next question in order, is, whether it shall be retained in the council of revision, or transferred to the governor alone? I yesterday voted for the abolition of the council of revision, but with an implied supposition, that a similar power vested in the executive, should be substituted, according to the report of the select committee.

In deciding this important question, I think it proper on this occasion (especially after the remarks made by the honourable member from Dutchess, Mr. Livingston) to give a concise history of the operations of the council of revision, from the origin of the government, down to the present period. I have devoted most of my time since I had the honour to be appointed on the select committee, to an examination of the minutes of that council. I have made an abstract in the form of a schedule, shewing the number of bills objected to by the council in each year, and the distinct grounds of objection in each case. I think this document cannot fail to be useful in our deliberations; because the past operations and experience under the exercise of this supervising power will aid and guide our judgment, as to its probable effects and operation hereafter. I now ask the attention of the committee to the abstract which I have alluded to; which is as follows:

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