Opinion of the Court. nature and character of the transaction considered, which we have endeavored to do, and find it unlike, in its most important features, any one of the numerous cases cited. We have examined all the cases accessible to us, which have been cited, and find no one of them, in its leading features, like this. It is not like the case of Butler et al. v. Haskell, 4 Dessaussure, 651. The note of that case is: The heirs apparent of an idiot, whose estate was in the hands of a committee, being weak, illiterate and necessitous, and finding a difficulty in procuring and perpetuating the evidence of their relationship, employed an agent to transact the business for them, at a commission of ten per cent on the amount to be recovered; the agent afterwards purchased their interest in the estate at about one-fourth its ultimate value; when the estate was recovered, he took from them, in pursuance of his purehase, a conveyance of their interest and a power of attorney to promote the decree, and to receive to his own use their share of the estate yet to be accounted for. The contract of purchase. was set aside on the ground of gross inadequacy of price, connected with the weakness and necessities of the sellers; and on the further ground, that the agent was legally incapacitated to purchase from his principal the estate which was the subject of the agency, so long as this relation of confidence existed. This decision was made in 1817, and the last clause of it is not the law as now understood, as the authorities abundantly show. Thus, Mr. Justice STORY says, in his treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, "it is therefore for the common security of all mankind, that gifts procured by agents, and purchases made by them from their principals, should be scrutinized with a close and vigilant suspicion. Agents are not permitted to become secret vendors or purchasers of property which they are authorized to buy or sell for their principals; or, by abusing their confidence, to acquire unreasonable gifts or advantages; or indeed, to deal validly with their principals in any case, except where there is the most entire good faith, and a full disclosure of all facts and circumstances, and an absence of Opinion of the Court. all undue influence, advantage or imposition." 1 vol. sec. 315. It is not like the case of Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Vesey, 272, where a widow lady settled upon a clergyman and his family the great bulk of her estate, of the value of which she was ignorant, she diving in the West Indies, some thousands of miles from the property. It was a clear case of imposition, undue influence and fraud. It is not like the case of Pickett v. Loggon, ib. 215, where a conveyance by lease and release and fine was set aside upon great inadequacy of consideration combined with misrepresentation and surprise upon parties in extreme pecuniary distress, ignorant of their interests, and not properly protected. In a note to this case is the following passage from Story's treatise, from which we have quoted, supra, sec. 251: "If proper time is not allowed to a party, and he acts improvidently; or if he is importunately pressed; if those in whom he places confidence make use of strong persuasions; if he is not fully aware of the consequences, but is suddenly drawn to act; if he is not permitted to consult disinterested friends, or counsel, before he is called upon to act in circumstances of sudden emergency, or unexpected right or acquisition." It is not like the case of Greenfield's Estate, 2 Harris, 14 Penn. State R. 489, where a widow lady, of the age of eightysix, hard of hearing, and otherwise infirm, made a deed of conveyance to four persons, for the consideration of $100, one of whom was her confidant and adviser, in which an estate was conveyed worth $200,000. The deed was absolute on its face, but was accompanied by a written declaration of trust, executed on the same day. Neither of the deeds was read to her or by her, and she was dependent on others, in whom she placed confidence, for advice and direction in her pecuniary affairs. The court say, "looking to the whole case as it is presented by both proofs and pleadings, the questions may be asked, was Mrs. Greenfield aware that, by the terms of the declaration, her estate was to be burdened with the payment of $40,000 as compensation to the trustee? Did she know that Opinion of the Court. this sum was payable, though each of the trustees might decline the burden of the trust within a year after its creation? She might have been acquainted with the first provision without being cognizant of the last, for they are widely separated in the deed. Who shall say it was not so? And yet to sustain it, I repeat, it must be clearly established she not only knew of, but comprehended both thoroughly. It is extremely difficult to believe she understood, and deliberately assented to this. The doubt is sufficient to invalidate the provision." The case of Griffiths v. Robins, 3 Mad. Ch. R. 105, top paging, is so meagre of facts, unaccompanied by any argument of the court, that it can not be regarded as authority on this point. The court say, "I do not think it necessary to enter into all the transactions stated to be attendant on the deed, and in the manner which it was prepared. It is sufficient to say, that the defendants have not made out that case which the policy of this court requires from persons standing in that relation to the donor in which they have placed themselves." The decree was according to the prayer of the bill, that the deeds of gift be given up. It is not like the case of Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cowen. 537, decided in the court of errors. That was a clear case of fraud and imposition practiced by a son, who had full control over his father, by which he obtained from his father a deed for his farm, valued at $9000. It is not like the case of Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Vesey, 292, where a conveyance from a ward to her guardian, under circumstances showing fraud and imposition, was set aside. The case of McArtee v. Engart, 13 Ill. 242, decides only, that mere inadequacy of consideration in the conveyance of land, as between vendor and vendee, would not justify the interposition of a court of equity to set aside the conveyance, unless it was so gross and palpable as to shock the moral sense; but, when fraudulent practices are used, under such peculiar circumstances as make the vendor the prey of the vendee, Opinion of the Court. the aid of the court may be had. The facts of the case show fraudulent practices of an aggravated character. The case of Casey v. Casey, 14 ib. 112, but recognizes the well established rule which we have quoted: when confidence is reasonably reposed, it must not be abused. The party relied on must see that he meets fully and fairly the responsibility of his position, and takes no advantage, either to the injury of another or for his own gain. The case of Jennings v. McConnel, 17 ib. 150, was a case between client and counsel, and the uniform rule recognized, that, in such cases, it is not incumbent on the client to prove fraud; upon showing the relation, the onus is upon the attorney to show fairness, adequacy and equity, and upon failure to make proof, courts of equity treat the case as one of constructive fraud. The case of Dennis v. McCagg, 32 ib. 429, is to the same effect. The case of Baldwin v. Dunton, 40 ib. 188, is upon the question of mental capacity to make a contract for the sale and conveyance of land, and has no bearing upon the point now under discussion. The case of Gibson v. Russell, 2 Young and Collier, 21 Eng. Ch. Rep. 104, has a direct bearing on one point of this part of the case, and that is, in relation to the expressed money consideration. In that case, there was a simulated payment of £1000, effected in this way: The grantee, an old and infirm man, and not in full possession of his faculties, but worth £30,000, made a conveyance to his medical attendant of the most valuable part of his estate, on the payment by the latter of that amount of money, which the grantor had privately handed to him for that express purpose. The deed, it was held, stated, contrary to the truth, a money consideration, and that was held one of the proofs of fraud in obtaining the conveyance. If the consideration of the deed now in question rested alone upon the money expressed in it, and there was in fact no Opinion of the Court. money paid, it would be, palpably, a circumstance from which fraud might be inferred, if there was proof the grantor was imbecile, or incapable of knowing what he was doing. But we have already said all we deem necessary to be said on this point of the case. We are satisfied the deed of March 20, 1865, is liable to none of the objections made to it, and is, in all respects, a valid instrument. We will now consider the deeds executed in September, 1867. It is objected to those, also, that they were obtained by fraud and undue influence, while the grantor was of weak and unsound mind, and were the result of fraud and conspiracy on the part of Muhlke and Ernst, by undue influence, not only to obtain a large share of the property of Carl Uhlich, to the exclusion of complainant and August, but also fraudulently to obtain from complainant conveyances confirmatory of such fraud, and further assurance of the title to the lands thus fraudulently obtained by them, and to deprive complainant of the property he was told was given to him, and to obtain, in addition, covenants of warranty from him of their title. And further, that the deed of complainant was obtained from him through fraud, and was without consideration, and executed and delivered under a mistake of law and of fact, and under threats and compulsion. In regard to these deeds, we can not concur with the views expressed by the learned judge who tried this cause. Nor do we concur in the opinion, that the will of 1861 was valid for any purpose connected with this cause. It had not been probated, and no rights were claimed under it, by any of the parties to this suit, and was superseded by the will executed July 10, 1867, which, in its turn, was superseded by the deeds of September of that year. The will of 1867 was not probated, nor were any rights claimed under it, nor was it before the court for adjudication. The charges in the bill of complaint against these deeds are of a loose and general nature, and no proof is offered to |