EMINENT DOMAIN.

TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE. Continued.

4. Of rent against the owner pending proceedings. The commission-
ers not having acquired title nor possession, no tenancy existed during
the proceedings, to justify an award of rent against the owner in pos-
session. Cook v. South Park Commissioners, 115.

5. Interest on an award. No interest accrues on an award before
judgment, nor can a party causing or contributing to delay, have in-
terest, until entry of final judgment. Ibid. 115.

6. Interest on the judgment. A judgment in a proceeding for the
condemnation of private property for public use, awarding damages,
will bear interest, although no execution can be issued upon the judg-
ment. Ibid. 115.

7.

Verdict upon awards-execution—mandamus. The verdict upon
an award being special, no execution can issue upon it; but the prop-
erty does not pass until payment. Mandamus is necessary to compel

the commissioners to act. Ibid. 115.

S. Of the character of compensation required. The constitution de-
clares that no man's property shall be taken or applied to public use
without just compensation being made to him: Held, this compensa-
tion must be pecuniary in its character because it is in the nature of
a compulsory purchase. Statutes authorizing municipal bodies to
exercise the right of eminent domain, must be strictly construed.
Weckler v. City of Chicago, 142.

ERROR.

ERRONEOUS JUDGMENT.

1. Not void. See ATTACHMENT, 3.

2. Whether chancery will undertake to correct an erroneous judgment.
See CHANCERY, 6.

ESTOPPEL.

DENYING VALIDITY OF AN AWARD.

Party estopped by acting under the award. See ARBITRATIONS
AND AWARDS, 6.

EVIDENCE.

PAROL EVIDENCE.

1. To explain a written contract—and that two papers form a part of
the same contract. Where a person holding the note of another agrees

with the maker to forfeit the note if he should buy or sell goods in the
line of the wholesale millinery goods business in the city of Chicago
before the first of July, 1870; and bill of sale, from the payee to the
maker, bearing date prior to the agreement, showed a sale by the
former to the latter of all of his interest, the partnership goods, books
good will, etc., belonging to a firm of which they were members:
Held, in a suit on the note, that it might be shown by parol that both
papers, although bearing different dates, were executed at the same
time, and formed part of the same contract; that, by such evidence, it
might be shown what was the character of the business in which they
were engaged, and to which the bill of sale and good will related; but
parol evidence as to the negotiations that occurred previous to and at
the time of the sale, are inadmissible in such a case, because they were
merged in the written agreement, and the separate agreements must
refer in some manner to the same thing before they can be viewed as
one instrument, and construed in the light of surrounding circumstan-
Greenebaum v. Gage, 46.

ces.

2. To vary the terms of a written agreement. A party can no more
vary the terms of a written agreement by parol in a court of equity
than in a court of law. Verbal understandings can not be proved for
such purpose. Gibbons v. Bressler, 110.

3. To alter, or add a condition to a promissory note. See FRAUD, 1.
4. To establish a trust. See TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 2.

OPINIONS OF WITNESSES.

5. In an action against a city to recover damages for personal in-
juries alleged to have resulted from an unsafe condition of the side-
walk, where a witness had stated that there was a thin coating of ice
throughout the city, his opinion as to whether it increased the diffi-
culty of passing over the sidewalks was inadmissible, as it was for the
jury to draw conclusions on that question from the evidence before
them without the aid of the witness. City of Rockford v. Hildebrand,
155.

ADMISSIONS.

6. When an admission involves a conclusion as to the party's legal
rights, and does not relate to a particular fact, and where it is mani-
fest that it was made in ignorance of his legal rights, it is entitled to
but little weight. Merrick v. Peoria Coal Co. 472.

CONVERSATIONS.

7. Where a witness details a conversation, the party against whom
the evidence is offered is entitled to the whole of the conversation.
Barber, 271.

Phares v.

EVIDENCE. CONVERSATIONS. Continued.

8. Out of the presence of the person sought to be affected by them.
Where parties enter into an arrangement to develop a patent for the
improvement of street cars, it is error, when it is sought to charge one
of the number for money loaned him by another of its members, to
admit in evidence conversations between other members of the firm
when defendant was absent, and which occurred prior to his connec-
tion with the speculation, and which were not communicated to him.
Aiken v. Hodge, 436.

HEARSAY.

9. Evidence of the opinions expressed by persons in New York and
elsewhere as to the value of an invention, was hearsay, and inadmis-
sible. If such opinions could be received, the persons expressing
them should have been called. Ibid. 436.

10. Declarations of third parties should not be admitted in evi-
dence until the party against whom they are offered is connected with
them. Ibid 436.

DECLARATIONS OF A PARTY.

11. In his own favor. It is error to permit a party to introduce his
own declarations in reference to the matter in dispute, made when the
person against whom they are offered was not present. The party is
a competent witness, and should be introduced to prove the facts.
Ibid. 436.

IN RESPECT TO THE RELEASE OF SURETIES.

12. And herein of evidence on cross-examination. Ir an action on a
promissory note by the payee against the maker and his sureties, one
of the issues involved was, whether or not the sureties had been re-
leased by an agreement between them and the payee upon a sufficient
consideration. The existence of such an agreement was positively
testified to by one of the sureties and the principal maker, and as pos-
itively denied by the payee. In rebuttal the plaintiff introduced a wit-
ness who detailed a conversation between the payee and the sureties
in regard to an application which they intended to make to the prin-
cipal maker, to prevail upon him to secure the debt in some other
manner. It was also in evidence that the principal maker had executed
to the payee a certain mortgage. Upon cross-examination the witness
was asked if anything was said in that conversation about releasing
the sureties from the note. Objection was made to the question and
sustained by the court: Held, the question should have been an-
swered. Phares v. Barber, 271.

EVIDENCE.

IN RESPECT TO THE RELEASE OF SURETIES.

Continued.

13. It could not be said that the refusal of the court to permit the
question to be answered excluded no fact from the jury, for it fore-
stalled inquiry which may have resulted in important testimony.
Phares v. Barber, 271.

AS TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF A WITNESS.

14. In respect to the effect of the mortgage given by the principal
maker of the note to the payee, on the liability of the sureties, the
former testified as follows: "My understanding was at the time, and
still is, that the mortgage was given to release the securities and se-
cure the payment of the note. I think Barber (the payee) understood
it in that way also:" Held, the evidence was properly excluded from
the jury. The purpose in the execution of the mortgage could only
be ascertained by the acts and declarations of the parties in connec-
tion with the instrument. The object of the testimony should have
been, not to obtain the idea of the witness upon undisclosed facts, but
to elicit facts to enable the jury to form their own conclusion. Ibid.
271.

ORDINANCE OF A CITY, AS EVIDENCE.

15. In a suit against the city. It is not error to admit the ordinances
of a city when it is sued for injury resulting from neglect in keeping
the sidewalks in a safe condition, when they tend to show the city has
control thereof and had taken the streets under its cognizance. Such
ordinances are relevant to the issue and therefore proper evidence,
and if likely to mislead, the defendant should ask instructions to obvi-
ate such tendency and confine the evidence to its legitimate purpose.
City of Rockford v. Hildebrand, 155.

PROOF OF ORDINANCES.

16. Whether sufficient. Where the mayor of the city testified that
the book from which ordinances were read, marked "City Records,"
was the original record of the city wherein was recorded all city or
dinances; that it was kept in the office occupied by the city clerk and
himself, and he had access to it: Held, the ordinances were sufficiently
proved to permit them to be read in evidence, without proof of their
publication. Ibid. 155.

CONTRADICTING A WITNESS.

17. By his testimony on a former trial-phonographic report of testi-
mony. A transcribed phonographic report of the evidence of a wit
ness given on a former trial, can not be read for the purpose of
contradicting the witness on the subsequent trial. The legislature
has not declared that such reports shall be evidence for any purpose.
Phares v. Barber, 271.

EVIDENCE. Continued.

RELATIVE FORCE OF EVIDENCE.

18. As to whether a mortgage sale was fraudulent. Where it is charged
that the purchaser at a mortgage sale really bought the property for
the mortgagee and not for himself, but being called by the complain-
ants as witnesses, both emphatically deny it, but about a year and nine
months after the sale the purchaser, who had meantime been drawing
the rents of the property, then conveyed the fee to the mortgagee, the
inference from such a conveyance is not so strong as to overturn their
positive testimony. Burr et al. v. Borden et al. 389.

AS TO DURATION OF AN AGENCY.

19. Where it is claimed that a person employed a stage manager
for the season at $60 per month, it was not error to admit evidence of
the acts done by the agent in the fall in reference to the business of
the next year, when the acts were done with the knowledge or ap-
proval of the employer, as tending to show that the agent was em-
ployed for the season. Fuller v. Little, 21.

20. Where such evidence is admitted, and the court instructed the
jury that it should not prejudice defendant unless the acts were
authorized or ratified by him: Held, that the evidence could have
worked defendant no harm. Ibid. 21.

CROSS-EXAMINATION.

21. Leading questions. On cross-examination a party has a right to
propound leading questions. Phares v. Barber, 271.

22. Disclosing the object of questions. Counsel are not bound to dis-
close the object of questions, upon cross-examination, when the court
can easily see that they are germane to the issue. Ibid. 271.

BURDEN OF PROOF.

In case of loss of goods by a carrier-burden of proof as to use of
proper care. See CARRIERS, 3.

EVIDENCE UNDER CERTAIN ISSUES. See PLEADING AND EVI-
DENCE.

IMPEACHING A WITNESS.

Of the manner thereof. See WITNESSES, 4, 5.

EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. See CRIMINAL LAW, 5.

EXCEPTIONS AND BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

1. Necessity thereof. Where it is assigned for error that there was
a variance between the bond declared on and that offered in evidence,