nations, the savages of Africa and America; of narrow domestic republics, in ancient Greece and modern Switzerland; and unreasonably require the same paucity of laws, the same conciseness of practice, in a nation of freemen, a polite and commercial people, and a populous extent of territory. In an arbitrary despotic government, where the lands are at the disposal of the prince, the rules of succession, or the mode of enjoyment, must depend upon his will and pleasure. Hence there can be but few legal determinations relating to the property, the descent, or the conveyance of real estates; and the same holds in a stronger degree with regard to goods and chattels, and the contracts relating thereto. Under a tyrannical sway trade must be continually in jeopardy, and of consequence can never be extensive: this therefore puts an end to the necessity of an infinite number of rules, which the English merchant daily recurs to for adjusting commercial differences. Marriages are there usually contracted with slaves; or at least women are treated as such: no laws can be therefore expected to regulate the rights of dower, jointures, and marriage settlements. Few also are the persons who can claim the privileges of any laws; the bulk of those nations, viz., the commonalty, boors, or peasants, being merely villeins and bondmen. Those are therefore left to the private coercion of their lords, are esteemed (in the contemplation of these boasted legislators) incapable of either right or injury, and of consequence are entitled to no redress. We may see, in these arbitrary states, how large a field of legal contests is already rooted up and destroyed. Again; were we a poor and naked people, as the savages of America are, strangers to science, to commerce, and the arts as well of convenience as of luxury, we might perhaps be content, as some of them are said to be, to refer all disputes to the next man we met upon the road, and so put a short end to every controversy. For in a state of nature there is no room for [*327] municipal laws; and the nearer any nation approaches to that state the fewer they will have occasion for. When the people of Rome were little better than sturdy shepherds or herdsmen, all their laws were contained in ten or twelve tables; but as luxury, politeness, and dominion increased, the civil law increased in the same proportion; and swelled to that amazing bulk which it now occupies, though successively pruned and retrenched by the emperors Theodosius and Justinian. In like manner we may lastly observe, that, in petty states and narrow territories, much fewer laws will suffice than in large ones, because there are fewer objects upon which the laws can operate. The regulations of a private family are short and well known; those of a prince's household are necessarily more various and diffuse. The causes therefore of the multiplicity of the English laws are, the extent of the country which they govern; the commerce and refinement of its inhabitants; but, above all, the liberty and property of the subject. These will naturally produce an infinite fund of disputes, which must be terminated in a judicial way; and it is essential to a free people, that these determinations be published and adhered to; that their property may be as certain and fixed as the very constitution of their state. Province of the judge.- For though in many other countries every thing is left in the breast of the judge to determine, yet with us he is only to declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model, the law. Hence a multitude of decisions, or cases adjudged, will arise; for seldom will it happen that any one rule will exactly suit with many cases. And in proportion as the decisions of courts of judicature are multiplied, the law will be loaded with decrees, that may sometimes (though rarely) interfere with each other: either because succeeding judges may not be apprised of the prior adjudication; or because they may think differently from their predecessors; or because the same arguments did not occur formerly as at present; or, in fine, because of the natural imbecility [*328] and imperfection that attends all human proceedings. But whenever this happens to be the case in any material point, the legislature is ready, and from time to time, both may, and frequently does, intervene to remove the doubt; and, upon due deliberation had, determines by a declaratory statute how the law shall be held for the future. Reason for conflict of decision.- Whatever instances, therefore, of contradiction or uncertainty may have been gleaned from our records, or reports, must be imputed to the defects of human laws in general, and are not owing to any particular ill construction of the English system. Indeed, the reverse is most strictly true. The English law is less embarrassed with inconsistent resolutions and doubtful questions, than any other known system of the same extent and the same duration. I may instance in the civil law; the text whereof, as collected by Justinian and his agents, is extremely voluminous and diffuse; but the idle comments, obscure glosses, and jarring interpretations grafted thereupon, by the learned jurists, are literally without number. And these glosses, which are mere private opinions of scholastic doctors (and not like our books of reports, judicial determinations of the court), are all of authority sufficient to be vouched and relied on: which must needs breed great distraction and confusion in their tribunals. The same may be said of the canon law; though the text thereof is not of half the antiquity with the common laws of England; and though the more ancient any system of laws is, the more it is liable to be perplexed with the multitude of judicial decrees. When, therefore, a body of laws, of so high antiquity as the English, is in general so clear and perspicuous, it argues deep wisdom and foresight in such as laid the foundations, and great care and circumspection in such as have built the superstructure. The occasion for law-suits. But is not (it will be asked) the multitude of law-suits, which we daily see and experience, an argument against the clearness and certainty of the law itself? By no means: for *among the various disputes and controversies [*329] which are daily to be met with in the course of legal proceedings, it is obvious to observe how very few arise from obscurity in the rules or maxims of law. An action shall seldom be heard of, to determine a question of inheritance, unless the fact of the descent be controverted. But the dubious points which are usually agitated in our courts, arise chiefly from the difficulty there is of ascertaining the intention of individuals, in their solemn dispositions of property; in their contracts, conveyances, and testaments. It is an object, indeed, of the utmost importance in this free and commercial country, to lay as few restraints as possible upon the transfer of possessions from hand to hand, or their various designations marked out by the prudence, convenience, necessities, or even by the caprice, of their owners; yet to investigate the intention of the owner is frequently matter of difficulty, among heaps of entangled conveyances or wills of a various obscurity. The law rarely hesitates in declaring its own meaning; but the judges are frequently puzzled to find out the meaning of others. Thus the powers, interest, the privileges, and the properties of a tenant for life, and a tenant in tail, are clearly distinguished and precisely settled by law: but what words in a will shall constitute this or that estate, has occasionally been disputed for more than two centuries past, and will continue to be disputed as long as the carelessness, the ignorance, or singularity of testators shall continue to clothe their intentions in dark or new-fangled expressions. the Facts, not law, generally in dispute. But notwithstanding so vast an accession of legal controversies, arising from so fertile a fund as the ignorance and wilfulness of individuals, these will bear no comparison in point of number to those which are founded upon the dishonesty, and disingenuity of the parties: by either their suggesting complaints that are false in fact, and thereupon bringing groundless actions; or by their denying such facts as are true, in setting up unwarrantable defences. Ex facto oritus jus (law arises from fact): if therefore the fact be perverted or misrepresented, the law which arises from thence will unavoidably be unjust or partial. *And, in order to prevent this, it is nec[*330] essary to set right the fact, and establish the truth contended for, by appealing to some mode of probation or trial, which the law of the country has ordained for a criterion of truth and falsehood. These modes of probation or trial form in every civilized country the great object of judicial decisions. And experience will abundantly show, that above a hundred of our law-suits arise from disputed facts, for one where the law is doubted of. Practice comparatively simple.-About twenty days in the year are sufficient in Westminster-hall to settle (upon solemn argument) every demurrer, or other special point of law that arises throughout the nation: but two months are annually spent in deciding the truth of facts, before six distinct tribunals, in the several circuits of England: exclusive of Middlesex and London, which afford a supply of causes much more than equivalent to any two of the largest circuits. The trial, then, is the examination of the matter of fact in issue: of which there are many different species, according to the difference of the subject, or thing to be tried: of all which we will take a cursory view in this and the subsequent chapter. For the law of England so industriously endeavours to investigate truth at any rate, that it will not confine itself to one, or to a few, manners of trial; but varies its examination of facts according to the nature of the facts themselves: this being the one invariable principle pursued, that as well the best method of trial, as the best evidence upon that trial which the nature of the case affords, and no other, shall be admitted in the English courts of justice. The species of trials in civil cases are seven. By record; by inspection, or examination; by certificate; by witnesses; by wager of battel; by wager of law; and by jury. I. Trial by record. First then of the trial by record. This is only used in one particular instance: and that is where a matter of record is pleaded in any action, as a fine, a judgment or [*331] the like; and the opposite party pleads, "nul tiel record," that there is no such matter of record existing: upon this, issue is tendered and joined in the following form, "and this he prays may be inquired of by the record, and the other doth the like;" and hereupon the party pleading the record has a day given him to bring it in, and proclamation is made in court for him to "bring forth the record by him in pleading alleged, or else he shall be condemned;" and, on his failure, his antagonist shall have judgment to recover. The trial, therefore, of this issue is merely by the record; for, as Sir Edward Coke (b) observes, a record or enrolment is a monument of so high a nature, and importeth in itself such absolute verity, that if it be pleaded that there is no such record, it shall not receive any trial by witness, jury, or otherwise, but only by itself. Thus, titles of nobility, as whether earl or no earl, baron or no baron, shall be tried by the king's writ or patent only, which is matter of record. (c) Also in case of an alien, whether alien friend or enemy, shall be tried by the league or treaty between his sovereign and ours; for every league or treaty is of record. (d) And also, whether a manor be to be held in ancient demesne or not, shall be tried by the record of domesday in the king's exchequer. II. Trial by inspection, or examination, is when, for the greater expedition of a cause, in some point or issue, being either the principal question or arising collaterally out of it, but being evidently the object of sense, the judges of the court, upon the testimony of their own senses, shall decide the point in dispute. For where the affirmative or negative of a question is matter of such obvious determination, it is not thought necessary to summon a jury to decide it; who are properly called in to inform the conscience of the court in respect of dubious facts: and therefore when the fact, from its nature, must be evident to the court either from ocular demonstration or other irrefragable proof, there the law departs *from [*332] its usual resort, the verdict of twelve men, and relies on the judgment of the court alone. As in case of a suit to reverse a fine for non-age of the cognizor, or to set aside a statute or recognizance entered into by an infant; here, and in other cases of the like sort, a writ shall issue to the sheriff; (e) commanding him that he constrain the said party to appear, that it may be ascertained by the view of his body by the king's justices, whether he be of full age or not; "ut per aspectum corporis sui constare poterit justiciariis nostris, si prædictus A sit plenæ ætatis necne." (f) If, however, the court has, upon inspection, any doubt of the age of the party (as may frequently be the case), it may proceed to take proofs of the fact; and, particularly, may examine the infant himself upon an oath of voir dire, veritatem dicere, that is, to make true answer to such questions as the court shall demand of him; or the court may examine his mother, his godfather, or the like. (g) In like manner if a defendant pleads in abatement of the suit that the plaintiff is dead, and one appears and calls himself the plaintiff, which the defendant denies: in this case the judges shall determine by inspection and examination, whether he be the plaintiff or not. (h) Also if a man be found by a jury an idiot a nativitate, he may come in person into the chancery before the chancellor, or be brought there by his friends, to be inspected and examined, whether idiot or not: and if, upon such view and inquiry, it appears he is not so, the verdict of the jury, and all the proceedings thereon, are utterly void and instantly of no effect. (2) Another instance in which the trial by inspection may be used, is when upon an appeal of mayhem, the issue joined is whether it be mayhem or no mayhem, this shall be decided by the court upon inspection; for which purpose they may call in the assist[*333] ance of surgeons. () And, by analogy to this, in an action of trespass for mayhem, the court (upon view of such mayhem as the plaintiff has laid in his declaration, or which is certified by the judges who tried the cause to be the same as was given in evidence to the jury) may increase the damages at their own discretion; (k) as may also be the case upon view of an atrocious battery. ( But then the battery must likewise be alleged so certainly in the declaration, that it may appear to be the same with the battery inspected. Also to ascertain any circumstances relative to a particular day past, it hath been tried by an inspection of the almanac by the court. Thus upon a writ of error from an inferior court, that of Lynn, the error assigned was that the judgment was given on a Sunday, it appearing to be on 26 of February, 26 Eliz., and upon inspection of the almanacs of that year, it was found that the 26th of February in that year actually fell upon a Sunday: this was held to be a sufficient trial, and that a trial by a jury was not necessary, although it was an error in fact; and so the judgment was reversed. (m) But in all these cases, the judges, if they conceive a doubt, may order it to be tried by jury. III. The trial by certificate is allowed in such cases, where the evidence of the person certifying is the only proper criterion of the (e) 9 Rep. 31. (f) This question of non-age was formerly, according to Glanvil (7. 13, c. 15), tried by a jury of eight men, though now it is tried by inspection. (g) 2 Roll. Abr. 573. (k) 1 Sid. 108. (h) 9 Rep. 30. (7) Hardr. 408. (i) Ibid. 31. (j) 2 Roll. Abr. 578. 1 All appeals of mayhem are now abolished. |