to be, "the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right;" for which the offender may forgery, as there was no false making. R. v. White, 2 C. and K. 404. Where two persons have the same name, and one signs this name with intention that the instrument shall be thought that of the other person, it is forgery. Meade v. Young, 4 T. R. 28; Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127. So if one uses his own name with fraudulent intent to represent a fictitious firm. R. v. Rogers, 8 C. and P. 629. So where the defendant induced his servant to sign a blank bill, and then filled it up, intending to charge another person of the same name as the servant. R. v. Blenk insop, 2 C. and K. 531; see R. v. Epps, 4 F. and F. 81. Where one intends to utter a note as being the note of some one not the signer, but of the same name, and induces an innocent person, who does not intend to bind himself, to sign it, it is forgery. "It matters not by whom the signature is attached, if it be not attached as his own. If the note is prepared for the purpose of being fraudulently used as the note of another person, it is falsely made." The fraudulent intent necessary need not be "in the mind of the one who holds the pen in writing the signature. If that is done at the dictation or request of another, and for his purposes and use, and his designs are fraudulent so as to make it a forgery if he had written it himself, then the instrument is a forged one." Com. v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311. A fraudulent error in keeping books by a confidential clerk was held forgery. Biles v. Com., 32 Pa. St. 529. But in State v. Young, 46 N. H. 266, it is held, that a man cannot be guilty of forgery by making a false entry in his own books, in his own possession, and before any settlement under which another has acquired rights, because the writing must be false, not genuine, without regard to the truth of what it contains-“a writing which is the counterfeit of something which has been or is a genuine instrument, or one which purports to be a genuine instrument, which it is not." The rule is said to be that "the writing or instrument which may be the subject of forgery must generally be or purport to be the act of another, or it must be at the time the property of another, or it must be some writing or instrument under which others have acquired" some rights, or liabilities sought to be effected, without their consent, by alteration. In R. v. Closs, Dears. and B. 460, a man sold as an 1409 pany. This filling the blank falsely was held a material alteration, and the man was convicted. People v. Graham, 6 Park. C. R. 135; citing R. v. Wilson, 2 C. and K. 527. Where a clerk was given a blank check with authority to fill it for a certain amount, and he wrote in a larger sum. See further as to forgery by fraudulent filling of blanks, R. v. Hart, 7 C. and P. 652; R. v. Vanduzer, 1 Cox, C. C. 186; Wilson v. Park Commissioners, 70 Ill. 46: Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531. Where a bond was altered after execution, and one of the signers was by false representations induced to assent on the express understanding that the representations were true; held, that there was no forgery, as the assent, however fraudulently gained, removed the false character of the instrument. State v. Flanders, 38 N. H. 324. A deed made by the parties purporting to make it was altered by them as to a material date with fraudulent intent. This was held forgery, Kelly, C. B., saying: "Every instrument which fraudulently purports to be what it is not is a forgery, whether the falseness of the instrument consists in the fact that it is made in a false name, or that the pretended date, when that is a material portion of the deed," is false. R. v. Ritson, L. R. and C. C. 199; State v. Kattleman, 35 Mo. 105. On the same paper with a promissory note, and below it, was an agreement referring to it and qualifying it. This was cut off. The act was a forgery, because the alteration was material, and changed a nonnegotiable note into a negotiable one, thus changing the maker's liability. State v. Stratton, 27 Ia. 420. So it was held a material alteration where a note was payable at either of two places, and a paper was pasted over the name of one place, and on the paper a different name written, thus substituting the name of a solvent for that of an insolvent firm. Treble's Case, R. and R. 164. If one from a course of dealing supposes he has authority to sign another's name, it is no forgery; otherwise if one signs thus, thinking he can take up the paper when due. R. v. Beard, 8 C. and P. 143. The defendant brought a bill to a banker's as from T. The bill was not indorsed, but the defendant said he would indorse it. The banker then wrote "per procuration T," beneath which the defendant signed his own name. Held, that this false assumption of authority was not (89) suffer fine, imprisonment, and pillory. And also by a variety of statutes, a more severe punishment is inflicted on the offender in original a copy of a painting with a copy of the artist's name on it. Held, that this was not forgery; that the name copied was no more than an arbitrary mark of identification, and was not properly a writing. So in Smith's Case, Dears. and B. 566, where B had sold a powder in packages with peculiar labels, and S copied the labels almost exactly and put them on packages of spurious powder; held no forgery. But a fraudulent alteration of a book settlement was held forgery in Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; S. C., 45 Am. Dec. 601. There may be forgery of public instruments when no private individual is injured; as of civil process. R. v. Collier, 5 C. and P. 160; or of a returned writ by the officer issuing it. Com. v. Mycall, 2 Mass. 136; or of a letter to a jailer authorizing the discharge of a prisoner. R. v. Harris, 6 C. and P. 129; or, under a statute, of a court record. Brown v. People, 86 Ill. 239. The forged instrument need not have been acted on: the false making with intent to defraud is the gist of the offense. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 15 Mass. 526; United States v. Shellmire, Bald. 370; State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231. The crime consists essentially in trying "to give an appearance of truth to mere deceit and falsity, and either to impose that upon the world as the solemn act of another which he is no way privy to, or at least make a man's act appear to have been done at a time when it was not done, and by force of such falsity to give it an operation which in truth and justice it ought not to have." 1 Hawk. P. C., ch. 73, § 2. subscribing witness to an instrument not requiring one, is not forgery. State v. Gherkin, 7 Ired. 206. In an indictment for forging a promissory note, the false instrument set forth contained no promise to pay money to bearer or order. Held, that this was no forgery, since the instrument, if genuine, would not be a good promissory note in legal effect. R. v. Burke, R. and R. 496. Where a statute re. quired that certain orders should be sealed and directed to a treasurer; held, no forgery to make a false order without seal and directed to a constable. R. v. Rushworth, R. and R. 317. So where an order was drawn without a payee. R. v. Richardson, R. and R. 193. But where a forged bill was uttered without the drawee's indorsement, it was held that the instrument was so far a bill as to be the subject of forgery. R. v. Wicks, R. & R. 149. So, an order differing only in some minute particulars from the statutory form, held not so far void that the false making might not be forgery. R. v. Lyon, R. & R. 255. The principle upon which these distinctions rest is laid down thus: An instrument void in law upon its face is not the subject of forgery, because the genuine and counterfeit would be equally useless, imposing no duty, conferring no right. State v. Smith, 8 Yerg. 150. “An instrument should be so far perfect in form and substance as to be valid if genuine. It is not the falsity of the writing alone, but also its supposed fraudulent effect, which makes a forgery criminal. If the forged instrument is so obviously defective in its form as this is, the law will not presume that it can accomplish the fraud which is perhaps intended. The rule seems to be well settled that a writing, void in itself and which cannot be made good by averment, if it were genuine, is not the subject of forgery." People v. Harrison, 8 Barb. 560; Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me. 194. In order to be forgery, the instrument must be of such character that, if genuine, it would be evidence of the fact it recites. The instrument must be such that, when forged, it does or may tend to prejudice the rights of another. State v. Anderson, 30 La. An. 557; Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717. In an indictment for forgery of a note, the instrument set out was an agree ment without any consideration, to be paid in labor, and there was no averment of any extrinsic fact to make the 2. The apparent validity of the forged instrument. The forged instrument should in all essential points have upon the face of it the similitude of a true one, so that it is not radically defective and illegal in the very frame of it. 2 East P. Č. 952. The forgery of a void instrument is not indictable; otherwise, if by a possibility the State or some person might be defrauded. Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503. Where three witnesses were required to a will and a false will had but two, held so plainly invalid as to be no forgery. Wall's Case, 2 East P. C. 953. So where a bill of exchange required a witness and the imitation had none. Moffat's Case, 2 East P. C. 954. See for the same principle, State v. Jones, 1 Bay, 207; State v. Gutridge, 1 Bay, 285. The fraudulent adding of the name of a many particular cases, which are so multiplied of late as almost to become general. I shall mention the principal instances.1 By statute 5 Eliz. c. 14, to forge or make, or knowingly to publish or give in evidence, any forged deed, court-roll or will, with contract operative. As the instrument, on its face, was without legal effect, and it was not shown operative by averment, it was held no forgery, although an ignorant man might be imposed upon by the instrument. People v. Shall, 9 Cow. 778. While one cannot be convicted of forgery if the instrument is apparently void, one may be when the invalidity is shown by proof of some extrinsic fact, because here there is a probability that some one may be defrauded. People v. Galloway, 17 Wend. 540; citing Sterling's Case, 1 Leach, 99, where the defendant was convicted of forging a will while the testator was alive; because, though in fact the will could not be genuine, the instrument purported on its face to be good for the purpose intended. In State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231, it is said: "If the writing is invalid on its face, it cannot be the subject of forgery, for the obvious reason that it has no tendency to effect a fraud. Where, however, the invalidity is to be made out by the proof of some extrinsic fact, the instrument, if good on its face, may be legally capable of effecting a fraud, and the party making the same may be punished." See also Brown v. People, 86 Ill. 239; State v. Shelters, 51 Vt. 102. There may be a forgery of a bill of exchange, though not stamped accord ing to law, notwithstanding this defect appears on the face of the instrument, since the stamp acts are revenue laws and not meant to vary the law of crimes. Hawkeswood's Case, 2 East P. C. 955; Morton's Case, ibid.; Teague's Case, id. 979; R. v. Pike, 2 Moo. 70; Cross v. People, 47 Ill. 152; People v. Frank. 28 Cal. 507; Horton v. State, 32 Tex. 79. 3. Intent. The intent to defraud is the essence of the crime. It is not necessary that one should be actually defrauded. If the jury can infer from the circumstances of the case an intent to utter the instrument, that fact will be enough to imply an intent to defraud. Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503. There must be an intent to defraud some person or corporation, but the intent may be gathered from knowingly forging the instrument. U. S. v. Shellmire, 1 Bald. C. C. 370; Brown v. Com., 2 Leigh, 769. If the jury can fairly infer an intent to utter the forged note, the act of forgery will be sufficient to imply an intent to defraud. But if there could not possibly be any fraud effected by the false making, there could be no fraud intended, and hence no forgery. State v. Redstrake, 39 N. J. 365. Although one may intend to take up a bill when due, if he utters it knowing it to be forged and believing that he could raise money on it, there is a sufficient fraudulent intent to constitute forgery, and this, too, though the forger has actually paid the bill before conviction. R. v. Geach, 9 C. & P. 499. · A man issued in payment of a debt a bill which he knew was fictitious. There was reason to suppose that he meant to take it up at maturity, but he did not communicate this to the creditor, who thought the bill genuine. Held, forgery. R. v. Hill, 2 Moo. 30. To constitute an intent to defraud, it is not necessary to intend to defraud a particular person, if the consequence of his act would necessarily defraud some person, but there must be a possibility of some one being defrauded. R. v. Marcus, 2 C. & K. 356. A man had altered a genuine medical diploma so as to make it appear that the document had been issued to him. On the discovery of the fraud he was indicted for forgery. The jury found that he altered the instrument with intent to induce the belief that it was genuine, but without intent to deceive any particu lar person. Held, no forgery, because it was necessary that, at the time of the alteration, there should have been an intent to defraud some particular person. R. v. Hodgson, Dears. & B. 3. The intent in uttering a forged instrument may be inferred from the uttering of other like instruments. State v. Williams, 2 Rich. 418; S. C., 45 Am. Dec. 741. 1 The 24 and 25 Vic., c. 98, consolidates the various statutes on this subject, and goes with great particularity into an enumeration of the cases which shall be punishable under it. The punishment in some cases may be penal servitude for life. Besides the punishment to which the forger is subject, he becomes at com. mon law infamous, and incapable of giving evidence. Co. Litt. 6 b.; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 373. But to have this effect, there must be both a conviction and a judgment. Rex v. Castell, 8 East, 77; Rex v. Teal, 11 id. 309; People v. Whipple, 9 Cow. 707. The disability will be intent to affect the right of real property, either freehold or copyhold, is punished by a forfeiture to the party grieved of doublo costs and damages; by standing in the pillory, and having both the ears cut off, and the nostrils slit and seared; by forfeiture to the crown of the profits of the offender's lands, and by perpetual imprisonment. For any forgery *relating to a term of [*248] years, or annuity, bond, obligation, acquittance, release, or discharge of any debt or demand of any personal chattels, the same forfeiture is given to the party grieved; and on the offender is inflicted the pillory, loss of one of his ears, and a year's imprisonment; the second offence in both cases being felony without benefit of clergy. Great variety of the crime.-Besides this general act, a multitude of others, since the revolution when paper credit was first established, have inflicted capital punishment on the forging, altering, or uttering as true, when forged, of any bank bills or notes, or other securities; (p) of bills of credit issued from the exchequer; (g) of South Sea bonds, &c.; (r) of lottery tickets or orders; (s) of army or navy debentures; (t) of East India bonds; (u) of writings under the seal of the London or royal exchange assurance; (w) of the hand of the receiver of the pre-fines; (x) or of the accountant-general and certain other officers of the court of chancery; (y) of a letter of attorney or other power to receive or transfer stock or annuities; and on the personating a proprietor thereof, to receive or (p) Stat. 8 and 9 Wm. III, c. 20, § 36. 11 Geo. I, c. 9. 12 Geo. I, c. 82. 15 Geo. II, c. 13. 13 Geo. III, c. 79. (q) See the several acts for issuing them. (r) Stat. 9 Ann. c. 21. 6 Geo. I, cc. 4 and 11. 12 Geo. I, c. 32. (t) Stat. 5 Geo. I, c. 14. 9 Geo. I, c. 5. removed by a reversal of judgment, or by pardon: People v. Pease, 3 Johns. Cas. 333; and it is not competent to attach to the pardon a condition that the disability shall still remain. Ibid. Statutes, in some cases, have changed this common-law rule, either by mak ing the convicted party a competent witness after he has endured the punishment, or by making the infamy of a person an objection, to his credibility only. 1 Declaring that a paper is good is an uttering. U.S. v. Mitchell, 1 Bald. C. C. 366. To utter and publish is to declare or assent, directly or indirectly, by words or actions, that a note is good. Offering it in payment would be an uttering or publishing." Commonwealth v. Searle, 2 Binn. 332. It is an offense to utter a note the forgery of which is an offense at common law. R. v. Sharman, Dears. 285; overruling R. v. Boult, 2 C. & K. 604, where it was held no offense to utter an instrument unless the fraud succeeded. Uttering to an accomplice is not enough to make an offense. R. v. Heywood, 2 C. & K. 352. There may be an uttering through the hands of an innocent agent. Com. v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136. Simply handing a bill with a forged indorsement to a clerk for payment is a sufficient uttering. R. v. Arscott, 6 C. & P. 408. A man gave a forged bill to a banker and asked him to take it as security for a debt, and the banker said that it would depend on his inquiries. Held, this conditional uttering was enough. R. v. Cook, 8 C. & P. 582. A debtor exhibited to a creditor a forged receipt for the debt, claiming credit for it, but kept it in his own hands. Held, a sufficient uttering, for, unlike a promissory note, it need not be tendered to be taken. R. v. Radford, 1 C. & K. 707; but the mere exhibition of a false note with fraudulent intent, is not an uttering. R. v. Shukard, R. & R. 200. Handing another a counterfeit note as a specimen of engraving, not to put it in circulation, is not an uttering. R. v. Harris, 7 C. & P. 428; neither is it to give knowingly a counterfeit in charity. R. v. Page, 8 C. & P. 122. transfer such annuities, stock or dividends; (2) also on the personating, or procuring to be personated, any seaman or other person, entitled to wages or other naval emoluments, or any of his personal representatives; and the taking or procuring to be taken, any false oath in order to obtain a probate, or letters of administration in order to receive such payments; and the forging or procuring to be forged and likewise the uttering, or publishing, as true, of any counterfeited seaman's *will or power: (a) to which may be [*249] added, though not strictly reducible to this head, the counterfeiting of Mediterranean passes, under the hands of the lords of the admiralty, to protect one from the piratical states of Barbary; (b) the forging or imitating of any stamps to defraud the public revenue (c) and the forging of any marriage register or license; (d) all which are by distinct acts of parliament made felonies without benefit of clergy. By statute 13 Geo. III, cc. 52 and 59, forging or counterfeiting any stamp or mark to denote the standard of gold and silver plate, and certain other offences of the like tendency, are punished with transportation for fourteen years. By statute 12 Geo. III, c. 48, certain frauds on the stamp duties, therein described, principally by using the same stamps more than once, are made single felony, and liable to transportation for seven years. the same punishment is inflicted by statute 13 Geo. III, c. 38, on such as counterfeit the common seal of the corporation for manufacturing plate glass (thereby erected) or knowingly demand money of the company by virtue of any writing under such counterfeit seal. There are also certain other general laws with regard to forgery of which the first is 2 Geo. II, c. 25, whereby the first offence in forging or procuring to be forged, acting or assisting therein, or uttering or publishing as true any forged deed, will, bond, writing obligatory, bill of exchange, promissory note, indorsement, or assignment thereof, or any acquittance or receipt for money or goods, with intention to defraud any person (or corporation), (e) is made felony without benefit of clergy. And by statute 7 Geo. II, c. 22, and 18 Geo. III, c. 18, it is equally penal to forge or cause to be forged, or utter as true, a counterfeit acceptance of a bill of exchange, or the number or principal sum of any accountable receipt for any note, bill, or any other security for money; or any warrant or order for the payment of money, or delivery of [*250] goods. So that I believe, through the number of these general and special provisions, there is now hardly a case possible to be conceived wherein forgery, that tends to defraud, whether in the name of a real or fictitious person, (f) is not made a capital crime.1 (z) Stat. 8 Geo. I, c. 22. 9 Geo. I, c. 12. 31 Geo. II, c. 22, § 77. (b) Stat. 4 Geo. II, c. 18. 1 If one indorses a note or bill in an assumed name, with intent to defraud, it is forgery. R. v. Marshall, R. & R. 75. So, even if by the use of the fictitious name no credit is added. R. v. Whiley, R. & R. 90; R. v. Francis, R. & R. 209. So, a false making in an assumed name. Thompson v. State, 49 Ala. 16. S accepted a bill which was afterwards dishonored. When the drawer next saw him he was called B. On the evidence the court held that it did not suf |