The deplorable effects of the lack of preparation and training in those who enact the laws is common subject of comment. This unfortunate class is indeed in very bad case. On the one hand the members are imbued with an ineradicable conviction that every citizen is fully qualified to lay down common sense rules for the guidance of the conduct of men in their ordinary affairs; on the other, those who elect them are equally as strongly convinced too often after the fact, that their representatives had not only a faint understanding of what their duty was, or if they

did, their ability to execute it was still less. Legislators as a rule are chased by the spectre that they must do something, when as a matter of fact the less they do the better. The enactment of laws requires the widest possible knowledge of law and the nicest sense of discrimination combined with the subtlest power of adjustment to present conditions and far reaching discernment. A body of rules applicable to every case already exists by which the courts will be guided and which will provide a rule or standard by which even the enactments of

the Legislature will be tested; which are seldom apparent to the casual observer, are always difficult to apply, and so adjusted to each other that the slightest disturbance may cause the most far reaching consequences. In fact, it is impossible to enact any legislation without running the danger of disturbing this adjustment, and often the consequences, when the statute is sifted through the courts, are far different from those intended or foreseen. That such a function should be entrusted to unskilled, untrained, and ignorant hands is the height of absurdity. That the preservation of liberty under the constitution should be left to the untrammeled manipulation and the unrestrained control of immature judgment and restless empiricism is an invitation to lack of confidence in the stability and justice of law and to disaster. It is said that at Rome the very boys were obliged to learn the Twelve Tables by heart. And Tully said:

"It is necessary for a senator to be thoroughly acquainted with the constitution; and this is a knowledge of the most extensive nature; a matter of science, of diligence, of reflection; without which no senator can possibly be fit for his office."

What a contrast is this to the prevailing idea that for any of these important positions, there is needed only a few weeks of private reading of one or two books; a committing to memory of the undigested and ephemeral statutes; the acquirement of an acquaintance with the verbiage of a common conveyance and a declaration in debt. Such a supposition sets at naught the wisdom and experience of mankind, and presents so low a standard as to indicate that those who hold to such a proposition either have no appreciation or are utterly regardless of the benefits of civilization. Hand in hand with this theory go two utterly false premises; first, that he that is preparing to enter the profession need only have such knowledge as will enable him to pass successfully through the ordeal of an elementary examination at the hands of his personal friends or his friends' personal friends; and second, that initiation into the practice and into the mechanical parts of the Law qualifies for performance. These are both founded upon the same low-level standard and fundamentally fallacious premise; they both stick in the bark; both leave out of consideration that the Law is reason and a highly developed system; both take their origin in quackery and the "Get-rich-quick" scheme. Lawyers cannot be made by any of these means, and none of them offers a foundation for the practice, for the woolsack, for the legislature, or any other public calling to which one trained in the Law may legitimately look forward.

-Lyman Chalkley.

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There is no earlier recorded case, we venture to say, in the United States of a suit for

breach of promise of marriage than that which came before the Court of Burgomaster and Schepens in New Amsterdam, or what is now New York city, in February, 1653.

Curiously enough it was the man who was plaintiff petitioning the courts to force his fiancée to comply with the formal marriage contract.

Now when Pieter Koch summoned the fair Annetie Cornelissen Van Vorst to answer to him "in case of marriage" it puzzled the worthy court just what to do with the suit. The court was made up of good, substantial Dutch burghers, and not trained lawyers, and this sort of thing was a little beyond their experience. They allowed the case to drift along in hope that a settlement out of court between the parties might be arranged. They turned deaf ears to petitions for dispatch until wisely they judged it the part of discretion to forward the papers to the Director General and Council of the Colony of New Netherlands, then sitting at Fort Orange, to obtain their decision thereon.

Almost three months elapsed before the papers came back, and in the words of the record, "The Honorable Director General and Council were accordingly pleased to apostil as follows: 'Suit having been entered, judgment must follow, and if either party. after the decision, feel aggrieved by the judgment of the Burgomaster and Schepens, such person may apply by appeal to the Supreme Council.' Therefore the Burgomaster and Schepens commissioned two of their number to hear the evidence and report in writing to the Board."

Even as long ago as these good old days justice was slow in New York, and another month passed before the commissioners were ready to report. They found there had been a promise of marriage between Pieter Koch, "a bachelor, a burgher and inhabitant of said city," and Anna Van Vorst, "spinster," and that certain gifts and presents in confirmation had been made by the plaintiff to the aforesaid defendant. But sad to relate, "it appeared by the documents exhibited by parties" that the said Pieter had misbehaved himself. In consequence whereof the defendant "is in no wise disposed to marry said Pieter."

Oh wicked Pieter, what been your misdeeds? The book says nothing. We may be sure that with contrite heart he had hastened to the side of the fair Anne and had confessed all, declaring himself undeserving of that gentle lady and with promises and protestations had released her from her unworthy bargain. But the wild regrets of the fervid lover soon had given place to pangs of despair when the hasty bachelor found himself taken at his word and the practical Anne had insisted on her release. By two witnesses "with affidavits" she proved the release "with promise to give her a written acquittal to that effect."

The book particularly says that the Burgomasters and Schepens attentively examined and perused all the documents and the evidence and the report of the commissioners and still did they puzzle and ponder.

They tried to reason with and persuade the said defendant.

"Then be not coy, but use your time

And while ye may, go marry;
For having lost but once your prime
You may for ever tarry."

She stood her ground and would none of him. The Burgomasters and Schepens consulted together, debating the pros and cons, and their quandary only increased. Deliberately, solemnly, finally they announced their decree:

"That the promise of marriage having been made and given before the eyes of God, shall remain in force, so that neither plaintiff nor defendant shall be at liberty without the knowledge and approbation of the worsh, magistrates and the other one of the interested parties to enter into matrimony with any other person, whether single man or woman. Also that all the presents made in confirmation of the promise of marriage shall remain in the possession of defendant parties with pleasure, good will, contentment and inclination of both, shall marry together, or with the knowledge of the Magistracy shall release and set each other free. Furthermore, both plaintiff and defendant are condemned equally in the costs of this suit."

-Lee M. Friedman.

The Corporation of Yale University at a recent meeting adopted the following provision relating to the admission of students to the Yale Law School, and made the same applicable at the beginning of the academic year 1909-1910:

"Candidates for admission to the Yale Law School must present either a diploma from some approved College or Scientific School, or evidence that they have performed with credit the equivalent of at least two full years of work, of collegiate grade, of fifteen hours per week.

Such evidence can be furnished by a certificate from an institution of good standing. Candidates who have not attended institutions able to give this certificate, but who have otherwise fitted themselves for the study of the law by work of corresponding grade, are admitted to examination on payment of a fee of ten dollars."

The announcement issued by the Yale Law School in this connection states it is important for law students as a class to have the maturity, culture, and ethical ideals for which an American college education stands. All those who are able to complete a college course before entering the Yale Law School are advised to do so; and if a college makes provision for the effective teaching of subjects contained in the Yale Law School course itself, credit will be given to students who come here for work which they have previously done in those subjects. The Faculty does not require a college degree, because such a requirement, in view of the difference of standing and merit of different

colleges in the United States, becomes to some extent an arbitrary one, and is also one which may bear unfairly upon men who possess much ability but little time or money, who can reach the same grade of preparation by a different road.

George Tucker Bispham, lawyer, author, clubman and one of the foremost figures of the Philadelphia Bar, died suddenly on July 28, 1906, at his summer villa at Newport, R. I., after a short illness.

Mr. Bispham was born in Philadelphia in 1838, and graduated from the University of Pennsylvania's Law Department in 1862. He had been admitted to the bar a year previous to his graduation, and from that time practiced in Philadelphia. He has been a figure of national prominence in the practice of law, and was many times heard arguing cases of the highest importance before the United States Supreme Court.

As a corporation lawyer Mr. Bispham ranked with the greatest in the country. He was principal solicitor for the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, the Girard Trust Company, the Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company and the Westmoreland Coal Company.

Mr. Bispham's prominence was entirely in the line of his profession, as he never coveted public office. His aversion to holding office resulted in a political complication of great interest in 1903, when he declined to accept a Judgeship at Governor Pennypacker's hands. The Governor appointed Mr. Bispham to fill the vacancy in Common Pleas Court No. 3 caused by the death of Judge McCarthy. Mr. Bispham was in Europe when the appointment was made, and his cabled declination of the honor caused a stir in political circles.

Early in his career he attained eminence as a writer on legal subjects, and his works are recognized standards. Mr. Bispham's American editions of Kerr's works obtained for him the reputation of an industrious and learned writer upon legal subjects. In his treatise on equity, published some years ago under the title, "Principles of Equity," he boldly advanced from the circumscribed path of the editorship of the works of others to the broad road of original investigation.

In addition to writing the "Principles of Equity," he edited "Hill on Trustees," "Adams on Equity" and "Kerr on Receivers."

In 1883 Mr. Bispham was elected to a chair in the department of Law of the University of Pennsylvania, and for many years he taught the subject of Equity in that school.

While Mr. Bispham's principal life work was the active practice of his profession, his services to legal education and to the University of Pennsylvania were many and sig