ble. The mind is infantile with the body, says the materialist; but has not the immaterialist quite as much reason on his side, should he feel inclined to assert that the body is infantile with the mind? For observe, we do not contend that the mind has no beginning, but that it shall have no end, and it appears that the body is appointed to be the first stage of its existence. Therefore I should rather affirm that the body is infantile with the mind, than that the mind is infantile with the body, and that a fuller and stronger demonstration of all the powers and faculties of the mind evinces itself in proportion as a more mature developement of the organs of the body enables it passively to receive the impressions, and actively to execute the sovereign volitions of the mind. And in confirmation of this mode of considering the subject, we may observe that children often have a tolerable idea of a thing desired or feared, long before they are able to express the term by which it is described. The mind precedes the tongue; and the effort and wish to speak evinces itself much earlier than the power to do so. The distinguishing and endearing characteristics of mother are sufficiently understood by the infant, long before it can call her by name; and the infantile mind is not without a thousand modes of expressing its feelings, long before the lagging organs of the body are sufficiently developed to accomplish the articulation of them.

"But if mind be material, it must be both extended and divisible, for these are properties inseparable from matter. But the absurdity of

tion.

such a supposition startled even the boldest of skeptics, because he happened also to be the most acute; I shall therefore quote a passage from Mr. Hume, who will be allowed by materialists at least, to be an orthodox authority. "There is one argument," says he, "commonly employed for the immateriality of the soul which seems to be remarkable. Whatever is extended, consists of parts, and whatever consists of parts, is divisible, if not in reality, at least in imaginaBut it is impossible that any thing divisible can be joined to a thought or a perception, which is a being altogether inseparable and indivisible. For supposing such a conjunction, would the indivisible thought exist on the right hand, or on the left of this extended divisible body, on the surface, or in the middle, on the back or foreside of it? If it be conjoined with the extension, it must exist somewhere within its dimensions. If it exist within its dimensions, it must either exist in one particular part, and then that particular part is indivisible, and the perception is conjoined only with it, not with the extension; or if the thoughts exist in every part, it must also be extended, and separable, and divisible, as well as the body; which is utterly absurd and contradictory. For can any one conceive of a passion a yard in length, a foot in breadth, and an inch in thickness? Thought therefore, and extension are qualities wholly incompatible, and can never incorporate together into one subject."

"Again, all mind is conscious of its own existence; but if mind be material, matter must be

conscious of its own existence too; for this consciousness is inseparable from mind, and if mind be composed of matter, that which is inseparable from one, cannot be denied of the other. These are some of the absurdities which the capacious credulity of infidelity, and the bold belief of unbelievers, will find it more easy to swallow than to digest. But if the mind be material, what has death to do with the annihilation of it? for death has no such power over matter. But we are told that "the thinking faculty is nothing more than the result of a more curious and complicated or. ganization." Yet what is this, but an attempt to illustrate what is obscure, by an explanation which is more so? Can we for a moment believe that a mere juxtaposition of parts is able to convey the highest activity and energy to that whose very essence it is, to be, on all occasions, of all created things, the most inactive and inert? If we request the materialist to explain this kind of hocus pocus, I suspect he can only do it by repeating hoc est corpus, the well known etymology of the term. Nature, then, it would seem, no less than art, has her cups and her balls, and a small portion of matter thrown into the inside of a little globe of bone, acquires properties and powers diametrically opposite to all those which, on the out side of it, it has been ascertained invariably to possess.

"Neither does that gulf of insurmountable ignorance, under which we labour, as to the nature of this mysterious union of body to mind, invalidate in the slightest degree, the proofs of its existence; for no one, I presume, will be hardy enough to

deny the existence of life; and yet the union of life with body is quite as inexplicable as the union of mind, superadded to both. Let us then be as candid in the one case as in the other, and apply the same reasoning to mind, that we have all consented to, with regard to life. Let us affirm of both of them, that we know nothing of either, but by their effects, which effects, however, do most fully and firmly establish their existence," See Lacon, Vol. II. pp. 38-58.

The above completely confutes Mr. B.'s position, and establishes the immortality of the soul. It will be in vain for him to attempt to support his doctrine by reason and philosophy, till he meets the arguments advanced in the above quo. tation. Thus we see that reason and revelation both conspire to destroy Mr. B.'s theory, and es tablish ours. We have plainly shown that the sacred penmen have clearly established the doctrine of an intermediate state, and of the immortality of the soul. If there is any doubt upon this subject, I trust it will be removed in the sequel.

84

STATEMENT OF THE

QUESTION IN

DEBATE.

Having shown that Mr. B.'s notion of an unconscious state is repugnant to scripture and reason, the way is now open for the main question, viz. Is all punishment confined to this state, or not? Much dispute has arisen about the statement of this question. We who believe in a future retribution, contend that the question is reciprocal; that both parties have a positive, and both are under obligation to defend it. For either party to say they have no positive, is confessing that their doctrine is only negation, and their faith disbelief; and that they themselves are skeptics, and not Christians. See my Letters, p. 13-17. We are willing to go forward and adduce evidence of a future retribution; and when they refuse to produce any evidence in support of their side of the question, and justify themselves by saying that their views are a negative, they make the confession stated above. Mr. B. probably perceives that his friends expose themselves by taking such ground, hence he varies the question, and thinks he gets rid of the difficulty. "My system," says he, "whether right or wrong, precludes all such discussion," p. 308. But a moment's reflection will show, that he does not avoid the difficulty. His statement of all questions is, What saith the scriptures?" This we admit to