tion of the law as a liberal and ingenuous occupation, and its exercise (too common) as a mercenary craft.-Sir George Mackenzie retired at the Revolution from all public employment; and died, a short time after, at London, 1691, in the fifty-fifth year of his age.

APPENDIX.-No. II.

LETTER from Mr HENRY HOME to the Reverend Dr SAMUEL

REVEREND SIR,

CLARKE.

Edinburgh, August 1723.

THE same inclination for the benefit and instruction of mankind, that engaged you first to publish to the world your excellent Sermons upon the Being and Attributes of the Deity, will, I am hopeful, prevail upon you frankly to give your assistance to a young philosopher, though a stranger, whose misfortune it is to have yet some remaining difficulties, after the strictest perusal of your book: Nor do I want precedents in this boldness; and the obliging as well as satisfactory returns you have given to your former correspondents, makes me not despair of success.

Not to waste your time with apologies, I shall begin with the demonstrations of your second proposition, neither of which, (pardon my weakness), can. I prevail upon myself to think accurate; and

both

both for the same reasons; for you connect two ideas which in this proof are necessarily distinct, viz. self-existence and necessity; for, upon the present supposition, though it is granted that not a link of the chain is self-evident, yet it certainly follows, that each is necessary; from this plain reason, that the whole is reckoned so. It is unreasonable, therefore, to take for granted, that none of the series is necessary, when the direct contrary is the most immediate consequence that possibly can be drawn from the supposition, which stands at length thus: There has been an infinite succession of beings produced one from another, in an endless progression, none of which are self-existent, because each owes the cause of its being to the preceding; but the whole, and consequently every one, is necessary, upon this account, that there is something in the nature of every individual that works necessarily in the production of that immediately following.

Dear Sir, I am heartily convinced, even without a demonstration, of the wildness of this position; but I would gladly not rest here, not doubting but there are data sufficient to determine your proposition to the conviction of the most obstinate atheist. If this be done already, and your demonstrations conclusive, I am confident you will not grudge the trouble of giving me satisfaction. I must look upon it as a most valuable favour, and mark myself down very much debtor your upon that account. But to proceed :

In Prop. 7. in your demonstrations of the Unity, you seem not accurately enough to distinguish the hypothetical necessity, from the absolute necessity à priori; and though I grant your proof conclusive with respect to the first, yet by no means with respect to the other. There is nothing plainer, than that but one Deity can be hypothetically necessary, that is to that is to say, one being sufficiently answers for that necessity, by which I am obliged to allow some one being at least to

be

be eternal, and this precisely is your argument. But though I see no necessity for more than one Deity, does it from thence follow, that there possibly can be no more: here lies my difficulty, which I am vexed your arguments have not as yet brought me over.

Page 107. edit. 4. you endeavour to reconcile Liberty and Prescience: I confess I never could get over this point, and I have long ago drawn up some arguments on this head, before I had it in my thoughts of giving you the trouble of this epistle, and they are as follows:

In page 123. the proof that God is true, seems not clear enough. You say the only possible reason of falsifying is either rashness or forgetfulness, inconstancy, &c. Now, this looks a little like begging the question; for unless it be antecedently wrong to tell a lie, it will not be granted you, that rashness, forgetfulness, &c. are the only possible reasons of falsifying, because your antagonist would say, there being no antecedent preference of truth to falsehood in the nature of things, in every case you are left at liberty to choose which of them is fittest for your present purpose.

In page 127. you say, God cannot but do always what is best and wisest on the whole: if you design only that best and wisest should stand in opposition to error, evil and unfitness, I willingly close with you; but if but if you mean by best and wisest, strictly, that of all possible infinite varieties of actions, God cannot but choose that which, taking in all considerations, is the best and most for the advantage of the whole; herein I must profess myself your antagonist. It is undeniably certain, that there is a series of possible events going on to infinity, each of which is more fitted than the preceding for the good of mankind. To refuse this, is to set limits to God's power of doing good. The case being so, to say that in any one instance God has done the best upon the whole, is to maintain this absurdity,

that

that infinity is exhausted, at the same time that it is inexhaustible. But enough of this; I am convinced that the first meaning is only yours; and, upon reflection, I perceive your demonstration goes no further.

In the evidences of natural and revealed religion, you lay it down as the first rule, that we keep up constantly in our minds, the highest possible honour, esteem and veneration for the Deity. It is true, that most writers upon the laws of nature do the same; but it is certainly too loose a way of writing. I believe it will be granted, that our actions are the only proper objects of law. Now, having veneration, honour, esteem for the Deity, is not acting. Veneration, honour, esteem, are passions, and, therefore, not subject to laws. 2dly, You order us to consider him as the only Supreme Author, Preserver and Governor of all things. Now, it is absurd that any law should subject our thoughts, or oblige us to look upon a thing to be so or so. It may indeed oblige us to act, by applying our faculties to the consideration of the attributes of the Deity; and this truly is our duty, because thereby we learn God's will, which is the rule of all our actions: for as the end is necessary, so is the means; and it must be confessed also, that if we thus apply our minds to consider God's attributes, it can hardly miss to influence our passions; but this is far from making it our duty to have these passions.

In the rule you laid down to regulate our actions with respect to our neighbours, (page 67. of the second Treatise), you name two branches, one of Equity, another of Love; but the second, viz. That we deal so with every man, as, in the like circumstances, we could reasonably expect he should deal with us, is either no rule at all, or a very undetermined one; for if you mean by it only this, that any relation I bear to you, changing places, you must bear to me; in this sense, it is no rule of action, but an abstract truth: and if you

design any thing more, it must lie in the words, "we could reasonably expect." This indeed makes it a rule, but much too general for practice; for the question still remains, What can we reasonably expect? Indeed, we have the answer ready which we can draw from the latter branch of this rule; for, as you say afterwards, explaining this second branch in page 72., we may expect all the good that is -in our neighbour's power; and after all, I cannot possibly find the reason why you should not distinguish these two branches, and call the one Equity, and the other Love; for the second seems purposely calculated to determine the too general conception of the first. What you mean by Love I do not so well comprehend; for, as you lay down in page 72., if every rational creature ought in its sphere and station, to do all the good it can do to all its fellow-creatures, the fellow-creature must have the reciprocal right of exacting; consequently, it will be unjust to withhold any part of this good, or to disappoint the just and reasonable expectations of the fellow-creature. Besides, I wish you had explained this last rule, That every one is obliged to do all the good he can, so as to have left no dubiety; for I cannot certainly determine, whether your sense be, that he ought to do all he can, providing that he do himself no harm; or if the rule be absolute, that he is under a positive obligation in every action to do what is best in the whole, without considering himself in any other view but as a single particle of this whole. I am the more importunate upon this head, because it is of great consequence, no less than the foundation of all morality, that part at least which -regards our neighbours; and it is strange that this matter has not, as far as I could learn, as yet been taken out of the state of dubiety, and fixed to some certain point by an accurate demonstration. There are three different schemes which I have frequently revolved in VOL. I. my

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