poned. This was the solution that he considered best suited to the occasion as regards the Sudan, although he would like to recall that in the year 1923 His Majesty's Government had shown themselves ready to discuss the question of connecting the Egyptian Government in some way with the administration in the Sudan, and if their views were still the same even the Sudan might be disposed of in the agreement he hoped to bring about.

In the case of the preamble, if we were unable to accept his reference to non-interference in the internal affairs of the Egyptian Government while he could not accept our alternative, why not omit the reference altogether and concentrate in the body of the agreement on those guarantees which were really necessary to us for the protection of foreign interests, which, he said, he was prepared to concede, and which, he claimed, he did concede, if I did not misinterpret his intentions.

Sarwat Pasha said, in conclusion, that as matters stood, he believed that a great opportunity had come for the saner elements in Egypt to make their voice heard, and, generally speaking, he gave me the impression that he did not by any means despair of the issue.

I told Sarwat Pasha that I hoped his estimate might be justified in the event. Very much would depend on the decision which Egypt might take in the course of the next few weeks as regards the selection of their leaders, and I thought that if they took a wise decision much would be done to reassure public opinion both at home and abroad. Sarwat Pasha said that he was himself only too much alive to this aspect of the question and would exert all his influence when he got back to Egypt to achieve a result which he urgently desired. W. SELBY.

British Embassy, Paris,

August 31, 1927.

(Translation.)

Enclosure in No. 4.

General Considerations.

THE intention of the declaration of February 1922 was clearly to grant to Egypt, who had been proclaimed independent, the right to dispose freely of her own administration except as regards the reserved points. These points had indeed been defined by the procès-verbal of the 1st March, 1922, but, apart from the fact that this definition was insufficiently exact in itself, it was not binding on the Ministries which succeeded my Administration of 1922. The British Government, moreover, seem to have ceased to consider themselves bound by it.

2. In these circumstances, it has been possible for divergencies of view to arise as to the scope of the reserved points with respect to certain questions on which the British Government consider that

they should be consulted, or on which they should even dictate the course to be followed. Wishing to put an end to these divergencies of view which consistently disturb good feeling between the two countries, I envisaged the possibility of a Treaty of Alliance which, by defining outstanding questions and fixing the rights and obligations of the contracting parties, should prevent the recurrence of incidents such as that of last June.

3. The British drafts in places lack precision, employing certain vague formulas which in practice would not fail to give rise to the same difficulties which we are now endeavouring to dispose of. Where the drafts are precise, they tend to subordinate the action of the Egyptian Government to a preventive control which on more than one point would actually be in conflict with the liberty which that Government have enjoyed in recent years. Egypt, therefore, does not have the consolation of reflecting that by accepting, under a Treaty of Alliance, certain limitations to her sovereignty, she would ensure the disappearance of certain others. The draft does not create for her a more favourable situation than if she had remained under the vague régime resulting from the four reserved points. Interference in the country's affairs could not go further, under the last-named régime, than it would under the régime of the draft.

4.

The essence of a treaty of alliance is that it postulates wide liberty for the two allies, in addition to specific rights and obligations. It is precisely in the exercise of this liberty that their spirit of friendship should manifest itself. If, in every matter they were to be tied down in their action by previous consultations and agreements, their friendship would be rather damaged than consolidated. Friendship, in fact, will only develop in the shadow of reciprocity of interests and a free exercise of judgment on the part of the two allies. There is no true friendship where a state of tutelage exists. There is only forcible control.

5. It can thus be said that the most important provisions of the draft are in conflict with its aims as set out in the preamble. These provisions indeed give the impression that the British Government have no great confidence in Egypt and that they seek by means of a series of measures of precaution and control to bring about the result which, between free countries, would be ensured by confidence and the feeling of reciprocal interest. Even if, by these means, Great Britain were to obtain in practice all the concrete results desired, there could be no development of mutual confidence between the two countries. On the part of Great Britain, the feeling that her interests were only protected by the control set up by the draft would become increasingly strong. On the other hand, this control would weigh heavily on Egypt, who would feel no sense. of merit in meeting British interests since her action would have been defined and determined by the guardian Power.

6. It may perhaps be objected that British interests require that the procedure adopted should be a prudent one, and that a beginning should, therefore, be made with measures of precaution which would be progressively relaxed until they disappeared, leaving

in their place a spirit of proved confidence. I gladly recognised the force of this contention and I had indeed been guided by it in the preparation of the draft which I had the honour to put forward. But I must respectfully maintain that the British draft, with its mechanism of rigid tutelage and continual control, goes too far.

7. If friendship is to develop, and to become unassailable from its foundation upon a reciprocal interplay of interest, and if it is to be accompanied by mutual confidence and esteem, it is necessary that guarantees should be confined to those that are indispensable. I am well aware that in politics it is necessary to reckon with the worst of possible hypotheses, not in order to utilise it as the basis of everyday relations, but in order that it should not be lost sight of. All that is necessary is to provide means of meeting and dealing with the situation, if such a hypothesis is realised. From this point of view, the draft which I presented deprived Great Britain of no tangible advantage which the counter-draft could ensure her. True, the British draft outbids the other in precautions, but these precautions do not afford further guarantees for British interests. They merely result in emphasising a lack of confidence in Egypt and a desire to keep her in a state of tutelage.

8. Egypt's ambition would be to convince Great Britain of her friendship and to ensure that a feeling of confidence predominated in the relations of the two countries. Even so, she has not forgotten to offer all guarantees necessary to meet every danger and even to prevent the occurrence of mere difficulties. But she feels in honour bound to preserve her liberty to prove to Great Britain that this liberty is in perfect accord with the protection of British interests. It could not be otherwise. In short without accusing Egypt of the worst folly, can it be supposed that having obtained an alliance which both gives satisfaction to her legitimate aspirations and ensures the assistance of a most powerful ally in the defence of her territory, she could give Great Britain any cause for anxiety? In the light of these general considerations, I turn to a detailed examination of the draft.

Preamble: Paragraph 4.

"Anxious to eliminate the possibility of any interference in the internal administration of Egypt.

9. This paragraph at first glance seems to authorise, or rather not to exclude, the possibility of interference in the external administration of Egypt, since for the one word "administration" it has been thought necessary to substitute the words "internal administration." Further, it seems not to exclude interference even in the internal administration in cases where this would not be incompatible with the constitutional régime of Egypt.

10. As to the first point, there is no doubt that the engagements by Egypt proposed in article 7 of my draft (article 10 of the British draft) should suffice amply to reassure Great Britain upon Egypt's attitude in respect of foreign policy. In Egypt's eyes, the interference which this provision foreshadows amounts to nothing

less than tutelage. I would refer to what I have said above in this connexion.

11. As to the second point, it is to be observed that the Egyptian Constitution takes into account those international conventions which infringe the sovereignty of the country. By article 154 it is laid down that the dispositions of the Constitution shall not have the result of affecting Egypt's obligations towards foreign States. Assuming that a convention was concluded between Egypt and Great Britain on the basis of the British draft, this would, properly speaking, constitute an international convention, and would thus itself have the effect of limiting the scope of the Egyptian Constitution. Hence it results that the formula "interference in the internal administration which would not be incompatible with the constitutional régime in Egypt" would impose no limit on interference in the internal administration, since the Egyptian Constitution does not determine its own sphere of action in respect of foreign Powers. The effect of the formula which I propose is quite different, since it tends precisely to limit the scope of article 154. It definitely excludes from the bearing of the article in question the vague and general right of interference which the British Government seem to wish to reserve to themselves by this paragraph in their own draft. It amounts, in fact, to an interpretation of article 154 to the effect that in the relations between Egypt and Great Britain only precise rights and obligations exist.

Paragraph 5.

"Will provide for effective co-operation in the joint task of ensuring the defence and independence of Egypt.".

12. This formula puts Egypt and Great Britain on a footing of · absolute equality in the matter of ensuring the defence and independence of Egypt, and assumes that this duty already falls to Great Britain. But this would not be the case except under a Protectorate, and the phraseology would be unsuitable as between two equally free countries. If to assure her own defence and independence is a natural and fundamental task for Egypt, it is only the task of Great Britain fortuitously and in her capacity of ally. To ensure the defence and independence of Egypt would only be a duty common to the two countries in consequence of the alliance, and not so independently, and ab origine. If it is desired to retain this paragraph, it should be so drafted as to bring out the difference in the position of the two contracting parties in this respect.

"and the maintenance of friendly relations between the high contracting parties and other foreign States."

13. It is not clear to what order of ideas this phrase belongs. If it means that the best way to ensure these relations would be the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance . . . "and the maintenance of friendly relations . ." that would be a tautologous affirmation and should not be included in the dispositions of the treaty. It would

be rather an indication or recommendation than a specific provision. If, on the other hand, it is intended to say that the Treaty of Alliance will facilitate an efficacious co-operation . . . . and the maintenance of friendly relations, &c. . it can be asked what direct connexion can exist between the Treaty of Alliance and the maintenance of friendly relations. Certainly one of the consequences of the treaty would be that the situation of Egypt would be based, from the international point of view, on more solid foundations and would thus be more worthy of the esteem and friendship of foreign States. On the other hand, British interests being safeguarded by the treaty, foreign States would be less tempted to violate them and more disposed to consider them with respect and sympathy. But these are two distinct consequences which affect each contracting party separately. Apart from this, I do not see in what respect the Treaty of Alliance would be a factor of friendly relations between Great Britain and Egypt, considered as a single party, and foreign States. This formula would even run the risk of being misinterpreted. It would be regarded as a vestige of a Protectorate, a régime which entails, in the matter of foreign relations, the fusion or submergence of the protected State in the protecting State. Moreover, this order of ideas has absolutely no connexion with that embodied in the treaty, and could, without any inconvenience, be suppressed.

Article 2.

14. In the last analysis this disposition merely repeats article 10 (which reproduces article 7 of my draft), since it has as its essential object to ensure that, in following her foreign policy, Egypt should not damage British interests, which is equally the purpose of article 10.

At the same time, the two dispositions are mutually exclusive. In fact, the engagement foreseen in article 10 naturally presupposes a State free in its action in this sense, that it is not bound to a consultation or a preliminary agreement before undertaking some given action. The only limit placed on its liberty is a limit of finality or purpose and not a limit of procedure, and the sanction applicable to any violation of this engagement would be the rupture of the alliance. On the other hand, article 2 excludes all liberty, and constitutes a veritable tutelage. It represents the situation of a ward who must. duly to perform a legal act, obtain the authorisation of his guardian. It is evident that recommendations would only be made to a person who is in a position to manage his own affairs. They can well be dispensed with in the case of a person who is under control.

15. I have dwelt at sufficient length in my general remarks on this question of guardianship which characterises the British project. I do not need to repeat here the reasons for which Egypt would willingly accept a rule of conduct, such as that foreseen in article 10, which fully guarantees British interests, and