fidering, that they had only natural reason for their guide. Thales, Milefius, Pythagoras, Plato, and others, whom the learned Grotius, in his affertion of the verity of the Chriftian religion, has mentioned altogether, afcribed the creation of the univerfe to God alone; nay, they held that the Almighty was even himself in all things.

-Deum namque ire per omnes [dum: Terrafque, tractufque maris, cœlumque profunHinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum Quemque fibi tenues nafcentum arceffere vitas. Virg. Georg. iv. ver. 221. To the fame purpose too the great apostle himfelf truly and divinely philofophifes to the fuperftitious Athenians, Acts xvii. 28. Nay, even Ariftotle, as much an Atheist as many take him to have been, held the fame belief in his more mature and ferious thoughts, as may be deduced from divers expreffions in his book de Mundo. And, as for any other fortuitous production, fuch as our Epicurus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Parmenides, Leucippus, and Ariftotle too seemed at first to favour, by which all things were constrained to act by certain fatal neceffities; this fingle objection, how thofe curious animals, perfect, and admirable plants, &c. could, by a beginning fo extraordinary, be built, compofed, and excogi. tated in fo exquifite a manner, that the mere confideration, even of a gnat, or the eye of a paltry fly, the leaft particle of the microcofm, man's body, has been able to open the eyes of one of the world's most learned Atheifts without the Divine Providence and fome omnipotent caufe, is undoubtedly not to be imagined, much lefs demonftrated. Well, therefore, might he thus exclaim: Compono hic profecto canticum in creatoris noftri laudem," Galen. de ufu partium, lib. iii. and who that feriously confiders this can abftain from joining in the canticle with him? For then we might with as much reafon believe, that a great volume of excellent fentences, the hiftorical relation of fome intricate and true affair, or an epic poem in just and true numbers, fhould refult from the fortuitous and accidental mifchance of a printer's alphabet, the letters falling out of their boxes confufedly, and without the difpofition either of author or artist.

Ver. 1035 The Stoics were of opinion, that the worlds had been frequently deftroyed, or rather that they decayed, and were diffolved by time, but that fill, phoenix-like, they were continually restored, as it were, from the ashes of the piring world. Now, Epicurus makes this reftoration to proceed from the changes and fortunate encounters of his atoms, which not having, fince the moment of their accidental coition, which begot the univerfe, deviated from their originally defigned, ftated, and equal motions, nor funk any lower to hinder and dilcompofe the reft, are the caufe of the prefervation of the whole frame; for without this infinite fupply of matter, rivers themfelves would have become channals of duft; the fun and ftars have waxed cold, dim, and without influence: and the very

bodies of animals have funk to an utter deftruction both of the fpecies and individuals.

Ver. 1037. In thefe two verfes, he illuftrates the argument he laft propofed, and teaches, that all things would foon be diffolved, unless matter were continually supplied from the infinite plenty of atoms, to make good the damage that bodies daily fuffer, in like manner, as all animals would foon die, if they were not daily supported with food,

Ver. 1039. In these eleven verses, he goes on and fays: But, left any fhould perhaps object, that the atoms, officiously moving up and down, which even Lucretius owns they do, meet, and rudely fhock one another, and that from that conflict it proceeds, that being thus ftopped and hindered in their courfe, they join together, and are compacted into bodies; and, therefore, though they be finite, yet, fince they mutually ftrike one another, the things that are already conjoined, are fo far from lofing any of their parts, that, on the contrary, they are more and more increased by the new atoms, that are always coming to them. He afferts, that finite atoms cannot always, and at every moment of time, mutually ftrike one another; nay, that when they do, they muit fometimes rebound, and thus give time and room to the principles of the compounds, which affect to be in continual motion, to break the chain of their contexture, and to fly away from one another; nay more, that there could be no ftrokes whatever, except the atoms were infinite, as he obferved before, ver. 1019.

Ver. 1050. Laftly, Left his Memmius fhould have embraced a different opinion, and believe that the universe has a centre, to which all things tend by their natural heavinefs, and therefore that there is no need of an infinite multitude of atoms, that, continually meeting together, may, by external blows, keep this compacted frame of the world in good repair; he confules, and, at the fame time, derides all belief of a centre; for he fuppofes, with the Stoics, who were very zealous afferters of a centre, that there was heretofore a confused multitude of particles fcattered up and down through the whole immenfe space, and that. all thofe particles made their way to one point, that is to fay, to the middle of the universe. That this is the reason that the earth is round, and fufpended in the midst of the world, and that all, even the oppofite parts of this globe, are inhabited by animals, which fall not down into thofe parts of the heavens that are beneath them, because their heavinefs makes them tend to the middle; that, for the fame reafon too, the sky is vaulted and rolled round; and the fun, who with neverceafing motion runs through the arch of the heavens, alternately gives day to the oppofite parts of the earth; and that it is not to be feared that the higheft and loweft parts of the frame will ever be disjoined from one another, fince they all ftrive to one and the fame centre. He has comprifed this in fixteen verfes, and will now endea vour to prove this opinion to be weak and foolish, and that there is no middle place whatever in the

univerfe. Befides, he fuppofes it an abfurdity to believe that any ponderous thing can ftop and fupport itself, or make its way upwards into the adverfe parts of the earth; for the Epicureans adhered to that vulgar notion; and, indeed, many of the ancients, and even of the firft Chriftians, did not believe the Antipodes, particularly Lac tantius and St. Auguftin were very difficult of bélief upon that matter. Virgilius, a German bishop, as it is related by Aventinus, in Hift. Boiorum, was like to have fuffered a very fevere punishment for favouring a little of this mistaken herely. Plutarch, de Placitis Philofoph. lib. i. tells us, that Oecetes affirmed there were two earths, between which, Philolaus, a difciple of his, interferted another continent of fire, which opinion Sandivogius, and other hermetic philofophers, have alfo illuftrated; but a founder philofophy, and certain experience and knowledge, have long fince evinced the error of all thofe opinions.

Ver. 1060. For if we look on the fhadows of animals in the water, their feet feem directly upwards towards our sky.

Ver. 1062. For one of the trifling objections which fome of the ancients made against the An. tipodes was, that if there were any fuch place, all weights and heavy bodies nuft there tend up wards towards the centre, to which they tend downwards with us; nor could they comprehend how the creatures there did no more fall downwards to their fkies, than our bodies here mount upwards, and knock their heads against the oppofite hemifphere. And this foolish conceit, perhaps, was what made Lucius, as Plutarch, de Mac. in Orbe Lun. reports, deride thofe in his time who fancied that men crawl there with their backs downwards, as cats, mice, and fpiders do upon the walls and ceilings of our houses. We read likewife of the feoff which Demonactes put upon a man who was difcourfing with him concerning the inhabitants of the regions ἀντιχρόνων, when leading him to the mouth of a wel, Numquid," fays he, tales effe Antipodas afferis?"

Ver. 1064 Phabus.] Of whom, see ver. 816. Ver 1c66 Having laid down and explained the opinion of those who held a centre in the univerfe, he attacks it in these fixteen verles, and teaches, in the first place, that there can be no middle, becaufe the void is infinite. Plutarch too, in like manner: The univerfe is infinite; but what is infinite has neither beginning nor end, and therefore it cannot have a middle. for the middle itself is a fort of extreme, and infiniteness is a privation of extremes; and he argues Chryfippus to be guilty of a manifeft contradiction, in giving a middle place to infinity De Stoic. Repugn. And Plato himself, in his fimæus, feems to question any furfum or deorfum at all in nature; for, fays he, the whole heaven is round, and therefore it would be abfurd to call any place higher or lower, as in relation to the middle. Befides, fays Lucretius, grant there be a centre, yet no reason can be given why heavy things fhould ftop and rest in that middle part of

the void, rather than in any other part of it; because it is the nature of the whole void to give way to ponderous things; nor can any part of the void fupport any thing that has but the leag weight, because the void is of all things the least firm and folid.

Ver. 1080. In most of the former editions of this tranflation, these two, and most of the following verses of this book are transposed, and the fenfe of Lucretius wretchedly embroiled and confufed, if not totally mistaken. No doubt our tranflator followed fome of the old editions of Lucretius, and finding them incorrect in this paf. fage, endeavoured to mend them in his interpretation, but has fucceeded fo ill, that we may well apply to his verfion. what Lambinus faid of the original text, before he had corrected and brought it into fome tolerable order: Totus hic locus, qui deinceps fequitur, miferabilem in modum per. turbatus et confufus erat ex qua ordinis pertur 'batione ita obfcurus erat, ut nulla ex ea probabilis fententia ellici poffet I have attempted to ict it to rights in this edition; and in the few altera. tions and additions I have made, where the true meaning of Lucretius was evidently mistaken, or imperfectly rendered, as well as in the difpofition and placing of the verfes, I have followed the interpretation and order which Creech himself has given and obferved in his Latin edition of Lucretius, and hope I have done juftice both to our tranflator and his author.

Ver. 1982. His fecond argument against those that hold a centre, is contained in these twentytwo verfes, which are chiefly taken up in reciting their opinion; and he that recites an abfurdity, confutes it. Now they teach, fays he, that the particles of earth and water only tend to the centre, but that those of fire and of air strive upwards. That of the fires which arife from the centre the planets and stars are made, and their flames preferved and kept alive. But Lucretius aníwers, If fome earthy particles did not rife upwards likewife, how could animals be nourished? how could trees, and all manner of plants grow, become green, and flourish, but by help of the needful food with which the earth fupplies them? In the next place, fays he, they pretend, that cer tain solid heavens, which stop and enclose these light particles that arife from the centre, are rolled around all things: for if thefe particles were not ftopped and reftrained in their motion, they would immediately fly away through the immenfe void; the heavens would fall to pieces, the earth slip away from our feet, and the contexture of the whole frame would be diffolved; for whenever any part of the world begins to fail, the diffolution of the whole will follow.

Ver 1086. Of this opinion, fee the note on ver. 277.

Ver. 1094. The whole circuit or circumference of the heaven, with which the world is enclofed and furrounded, as with walls, Lucretius calls it Mania Mundi; and Ennius, Virgil, Manilius, and others, use the fame expreffion.

Ver. 1106. Through this whole book he has

Been making grievous complaints of the obscurity and intricatenefs of his fubject, and of the difficulty of his undertaking; and, left this fhould have deterred his Memmius from giving ear to his argumentations, he now, in these eight verfes, encourages him to take heart, promifing that his future difputation will be plain and easy.

ANIMADVERSION

BY WAY OF RECAPITULATION, ON THE FIRST BOOK OF LUCRETIUS.

Taus I have finished my notes on the first book: may the reader enjoy the benefit of my labours, and pardon my mistakes. But how can I bespeak the candour and favour of my judges, who am going to pass a sharp, and perhaps too severe a cenfure on Lucretius himself. For. I will examine what he has advanced amifs, and what with good reafon. And as I will not reject all he has faid, fo neither will I approve all his affertions. He who denied the praife of wit to Lucretius, granted him art; and who will refufe him that honour which the most spiteful envy allowed him. I affirm, therefore, that his work is difpofed in an excellent method. Order thines throughout the whole; and the arguments fupport and strengthen one an other in fuch a manner, that if, in the opinion of Epicurus, there had not been a certain deformity, which no beautifying art could varnish over and conceal, a certain weakness and deficiency which no strength of wit, nor force of reatoning could sustain and make good, the poet would have reprefented to us a moft beautiful, and at the fame time, a moft ftrong and found philofopher.

Epicurus was of opinion, that not the leaft part of happiness confifts in living exempt from fear; and that this happiness can be attained only by the knowledge of nature:

-Terrores Animi, tenebrafque neceffe 'ft, Non Radii Solis, non lucida tela diei Difcutiant; fed Naturæ Species, Ratioque. Lucret. lib i. v. 147.

And

Thefe bugbears of the mind, this inward hell, No rays of outward funshine can dispel; But nature and right reafon must display Their beams abroad, and bring the darksome foul to day. Dryden. Epicurus writes thus to Pythocles: Μὴ ἄλλο τὸ τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετέωρων γνώσεως είτε καλὰ συναφην λεγομέτων, είτε αὐτοτελῶς, νομίζειν δεῖ εἶναι, ἤπερ ἀταραξίαν, καὶ πίςιν βέβανον, καθάπερ τὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Cicero fays, that by the knowledge of the nature of all things, we are eased of superstition, we are delivered from the fear of death, we are not dif quieted by the ignorance of things, which alone is often the caufe of our most horrid and amazing "Omnium natura cognit. levamur fuperftitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturba mur ignoratione rerum, è qua ipfa exiftunt horribiles fæpe formidines," lib. I. de Fin.

terrors.

Epicurus afferts, that all the fears that disturb the minds of men, proceed from the belief of Providence, and of punishments after death, which laft is a neceffary confequence of the former. For who is the man, that believing that God takes care of him, does not day and night dread the Divine Majefty? See Cicero in Lucullus. This was the opinion of that mistaken man, who was wife and knowing in a mad and foolish philofophy against whom, whoever undertakes to dispute, will engage himself in a moft ridiculous attempt: for whofoever favours fo abfurd an opinion, plainly wants common fenfe, and is fit company only for lunatics. The care and protection of a gracious prince, or of a kind parent, deliver us from fear and forrow, nor do we dread the good will of courte us and charitable men. Whence then this horror, to think that we are taken care of by a most beneficent and Almighty Deity?

Lucretius proposes this abfurd opinion in this first book; and after having prepared his reader by an artful introduction, he illuftrates and adorns the fubject, of which he had unhappily made choice. Ver. 181 He endeavours to prove by ten arguments, that nothing is made of nothing, and that nothing returns into nothing. I confefs he is ingenious in the invention, and copious in the explication of them, but he does by no means come up to the matter: For, let us grant, I. That every thing cannot proceed from every thing. II. That things are produced at fixed and certain feafons. III That they require time to grow: And, IV. Matter to make them grow. V. That bounds are fet to ftrength and life. VI. That the earth be comes more fertile by culture and by the industry of men. VII. That nothing dies unlefs it be diffolved by fome force. VIII. That animals cannot be born daily, unless they be renewed by certain feeds. IX. That one and the fame ftrength is not able to diffolve all things: And, X. laftly, That nature does not produce any thing, unless she be affifted by the death of another. Let us, I fay, grant all this, and what will it avail Lucretius? Will he conclude that the feeds themselves were not made of nothing? Or, that nothing is ordered by the will and providence of the Deity? He can rationally conclude neither; and thus bis ten arguments come to nothing: not indeed for auy want of wit or artfulness on his part, but through the weakness of the cause itself, which he undertook to fupport.

Ver. 316. He admirably well defends his fubtle and minute feeds againf fuch as believe their fenfes only: and ver. 381, he evinces that there is a void, by four arguments, than which no man yet ever brought more convincing. I have never feen any thing that could be replied to the first and fourth of them; but indeed, the fecond and third are not of the fame validity.

Ver. 472. He confirms by two arguments, that nothing is befides body and void: and whatever elfe others allow to be things, he confines to the clafs of accidents which fubfift, and are diftinguifhed from body and void by the imagination