Ver. 145. That is to fay, they país not through void that is altogether free and empty of all bodies: for the heat of the fun paffes through the air, which is full of atoms and other bodies: as winds, exhalations, &c. which refift and retard the course of his rays; and this is what he means by the refifting force from without, ver. 150. Ver. 151. He means that the corpufcles of the light and heat of the fun país not through the whole air in an inftant of time, nor fingly one by one, but conglobed and entangled in one another, which muft, of neceffity, hinder the fwiftnefs of their courfe. Ver. 158. No man will be so foolish as to pretend, that the atoms ftop in the air to confult and deliberate among themfelves which fhall go first, which fecond, &c. This and the two following verfes, fome of the editors of Lucretius have rejected: others retain them, and interpret them as above. Whoever think fit to reject them, may give them what explication they pleafe. Ver. 161. In there feventeen verfes, Lucretius, who is always arguing, though but very weakly against Providence, takes occafion to deride the Stoics, who held matter of itself to be unactive, and incapable to produce any thing: but that it is moved and difpofed to act, not by its own ftrength and power, but by the Divine Mind. Then he audaciously and impiously affirms, that matter, rude as it was, did make this world withour any art or counsel, or defign, and accomplish all thofe works which the ignorant and fuperftitious vulgar afcribe to wifdom and providence. That pleasure is the guide of the life of man; that all things are ruled and governed by her direction, and that God neither made this world, nor any thing elfe for the fake of man. And, laftly, he promises to show in another place, that the frame of the world is fo artlefs, confufed, and ill put together, as to evince itself to be a work altogether unworthy of the Divine Wifdom. In the fifth book we fhall fee how he will keep his word with us: Quid dignum tanto feret hic promiffor hiatu. Meanwhile, how much wiser he, who faid, " Cœli enarrant gloriam Dei, et opera manuum ejus enunciat firmamentum," Pfal. xix. I. When we fee any thing move, fays Cicero, in fixed and regular motions, as the fpheres, the feafons, and many other things, do we doubt those works are made without counsel and reafon? When we con fider with how wonderful a celerity the heavens are whirled around in fo conftant and never-failing a manner, making and maintaining the univerfal viciffitudes, to the prefervation and utmost benefit of all things, can we doubt that they are made and done without reafon, nay, and without an excellent and Divine reason and wisdom too? "de Natura Deor." lib. 2. Ver. 178. He has already affirmed, that all the feeds tend downwards, and that all upward motion is violent. He, now, in thirty-two verfes, urges the fame again, and teaches, that no body, not even fire excepted, naturally afpires, but is driven upwards by the force of other bodies, in like manner as the fap rifes in trees, as blood gushes out of a wound, and as a piece of timber mounts when it is plunged into water. For, who doubts but that the fame fap, the fame blood, and the fame piece of timber would tend downwards in the void, though the fap rifes up in the trees, the blood fpouts out of the veins, and the timber emerges and leaps, at least half of its thickness, out of the water. Laftly, he obferves, that the rays of the fun tend downwards, that stars, fiery meteors, and lightning, fall to the ground; and concludes, that fire is carried upwards, not by its own force, but by the impulfe of protruding bodies. And, upon this he lays the foundation of the double, that is to say, natural and violent motion of his atoms. Plutarch, 1. Plac. Phil. cap. 12. καὶ τὰ πρῶτα μὲν ἄπλα τὲ τὰ ἐξ ἐκείνων συγκρά ματα βάρο; ἔχει· And Simplicius teaches that Epicurus was of opinion, ἅπαν σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, τῷ δὲ τὰ βαρύτερα ἐφιζάνειν, τὰ βάρεα ὑπ' ἐκείνον ἐκθλίβεσθαι ii rò ävw. Ver. 180. Here we may obferve a filent anthypophora: for the poet answers beforehand the objections that his adverfaries might urge against him. But it will be faid that fire moves upward: to which he answers: And plants and trees rife upward likewise, by reason of the driving force from beneath, which breaking out of the earth, compels them to grow by afcent: and yet ali ponderous things naturally, and as much as in them lies, fink downwards. Ver. 199. Though the weight of the flame naturally ftrives to deprefs and bring down the flame; yet the force and strength of the ambient air compels and drives it upwards. Thus it yields to an element heavier and more dense than itself, but is not borne upwards of its own accord. Ver. 203. Here fome may be apt to think, that Epicurus, and Lucretius, who follows his opinion, are mistaken; for the ftars never fall. But by the word ftars in this place, we are to understand a fatty,oleaginous and fulphureous exhalation, which kindles in the air, and falls to the ground in a purple-coloured jelly. Virgil has imitated this paffage of Lucretius, and defcribes the fall of these exhalations, Georg. i. v. 365. Sæpe etiam Stellas, vento impendente videbis The feeming ftars fall headlong from the skies: Ariftotle fays, they are exhalations of the earth, that are apt to take fire; and that being carried by means of their being compreffed by the cold of up into the middle regions of the air, they kindle, the circumfufed air: and he calls this kind of exhalation Επιδρομή, and "Aspa ῥύσις, " difcurfus et be fparkles that fall from the fiery region. Eunafluxus Stellæ." Anaxagoras held these meteors to pius in Ades, calls them, & oppoai rive; ésgw, “ EL Сс fluentiæ quædam Stellarum." And the Arabs Sbibab, which the Commentator upon Ulugh Beigh's Fables, explains, "Stella quæ nocte incedit ficut iguis;" and Stella "Demone's pellens;" for the ancient Arabs and caftern people fancied falling ftars to be fiery darts lanced from heaven, against the devils, or evil spirits of the air; as the learned Golias has likewife obferved in his notes upon Allergan, p. 65. But Fromondus Meteor. lib. 2. cap. 3. defcribes them, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, to be a fiery exhalation forced out of a cloud, and having the resemblance of a true falling ftar. They are thought to come from the fanie caufe and origin as lightning, though they are not attended by thunder, at least not perceivable by us but they bear the fame proportion to lightning, as the fire of a mufquet does to that of a cannon; for, as at a great diftance we may fee the fire of a mufquet, but fcarce here its noife, though the fire of a cannon at the fame diftance is feen, and its noise plainly heard; fo by the reafon of the exility of the exhalation, we hear not the noise when these fallen ftars break from a cloud, as we do that of thunder that follows lightning. Fromondus compares these meteors to our kind of fireworks called rockets (though their motions be different, that of the one being forced upwards, the other downwards); which run in a train and fall in the manner of the stars. And, therefore, Pliny calls them "Scintillas & Difcurfus Stellarem," and Ptolemy, "Trajectiones:" both which are expreffed by Manilius in these verses: Præcipites ftellæ paffimque volare videntur, Quum vaga per nitidum fcintillant lumina mundum; Et tenuis longis jaculantur crinibus ignes, Which Creech renders thus: Lib. i. . 845. And ftill, when wand'ring ftars adorn the night, two: Now feeds in downward motion must decline, He has totally omitted," incerto tempore ferme, Incertifque locis;" which words, nevertheless, have a fignification, and that too of great importance in this place for what Lucretius fays is this, that the atoms, when by their own weight, they are borne downwards through the void in a direct line, do at fome time or other, but "incerto tempore," at no one fixed and determinate time, and in fome parts of the void likewife, but "incertis locis," not in any one certain and determinate place of it, decline a little from the direct line by their own ftrength and power; but fo, neverthelefs, that the direct motion can be faid to be changed the leaft that can be imagined. Infomuch that he infinuates, that his atoms are moved as animals; which appears more evidently, ver. 259, where speaking of the voluntary motion of men, he uses almoft the very fame words. Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo, Nec regione loci certa, fed ubi ipfa tulit Mens. Thus this inveterate enemy of Providence, beftows only not a mind, only not a will on his ftupid and fenfelefs atoms. But, to proceed to the explica tion of this declining motion. The poct has difpured at large of the feeds natural motion downwards, and violent upwards. Now, from whence can that violent motion proceed but from froke? but the feeds being heavy, and therefore defcending through the void in a direct line, and,with equal fwiftnefs, could never meet, never overtake one another, fo that nothing could be generated whatever; and nothing would exift but empty fpace, and invifible principles. Defertum præter Spatium, et Primordia cæca. Lucretius. The opinion of Democritus laboured under this defect: for, as Plutarch fays, "de Placit. Philo foph." lib. i. c. 23. he acknowledged only one fort of motion; xajà wànys, for so it ought to be read, not zal wλaylor, as is manifeft from Cicero, who, in his Book of Fate, fays, "Quandam vim motus habebant, impulfionis, quam Plagam ille appellat, à te Epicure, gravitatus et ponderis." Formerly, they [the atoms] had a motion of impulfe, which he (Democritus) calls ftroke: but you, Epicurus, gave them a motion of heaviness and weight. Epicurus, therefore, held two forts of natural motion: one perpendicular, the other declining : δύο είδη τῆς κινήσεως, τὸ κατὰ στάθμην, το rò xarà wagiyeksie. “Plutarch. de Placit. Philof. lib. I. cap. 23. Now, this motion of declination was thought neceffary, because, otherwife the atoms could never have met together; and, confequently, there could have been no generation of any thing whatever. Cicero, in 1. lib. de Fin. Cenfet [Epicurus]" illa folida ac individua Cor pora Materiæ ferri fuo deorfum pondere ad lineam: hunc naturalem effe omnium Corporum Motum. Deinde ibidem homo acutus cum illud occurreret,fi omnium deorfum è regione ferrentur, et ut dixi, ad lineam, nunquam fore ut Atomus altera alteram poffet attingere: itaque attulit rem commentitiam: declinare dixit Atomum perpaulum, quo nihil poffet fieri minus. Ita effici Copulationis, et Complexiones et Adhæfiones Atomorum inter fe, ex quo efficeretur mundus, omnefque partes mundi, quæque in eo funt." Epicurus was of opinion, that thole indiviñible and folid bodies are carried downwards in a direct line by their own weight; | Sed nihil omnio recta regione viai And yet they contain a part of the argument, as the reader may obferve by the explication I have given of them. Ver. 236. It is modeft in the poet to afk of us to believe only this; and yet he might with equal reafon have infifted on the moft oblique motion that can be imagined. If he apprehends the judgment of the fenfes, away with thefe importunate judges, and for once let them fuffer themselves to be impofed upon. This requeft would be no leis reafonable than the other. Befides, even this declination is invented at pleasure: for as Cicero tells us in the firft book de Finib. "Ait declinare Atomos fine caufa, quo nihil turpius eft Phyfico: Et illum motum naturalem omnium ponderum é regione inferiorem locum petentium fine caufa eripuit Atomis. Nec tamen id cujus caufa hæc fecerat affecutus eft: Nam, five omnes Atomi declinabunt, five aliæ declinabunt, aliæ fuo motu recte ferentur primum erit hoc quafi provincias Atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur: deinde eadem illa Atomorum, in qua etiam Democritus hæret, turbulenta Concurfio hunc Mundi ornatum efficere non poterit." Epicurus fays, the atoms decline without caufe, than which nothing is more unbecoming, more unworthy of a natural philofopher; and has, without any reafon likewife, taken from them that motion which is natural to all Ver. 216. Lucretius adheres fo obftinately to this zoon xalà wagiyee, motion by declination, that he will by no means fuffer it to be extorted from him; and, therefore, he sharply inveighs against those who believe that the heavier feeds, as they defcend through the void, can overtake and frike the lighter; infomuch that there is no need of his pretended declination in their defcent; he afferts, that all feeds are alike swift, and that they are hurried through the void with an equal velo-heavy bodies, that descend in a straight line from city: and, therefore, those that follow, can never overtake thofe that are before them. But he grants that the medium through which they país, may contribute to the haftening or retarding of their motion; and that bodies of the fame matter, but different in weight, when they fall from above downwards through water, or through the air, are not alike fwift, which is falfe; but he will have the motion to be the fwifter, the more free and empty the place is, through which the bodies move; fo that where the space is most void and empty, there the motion must confequently be moft fwift; and be there ever so many motions, or things moving in that space, they are all of a like [wiftnefs. Ver. 234. Having confuted the opinion he last propofed, he concludes in these fix verfes, that the atoms decline in their motion; but to little, that nothing can be lefs: nay, not so much as that they can be faid to be moved obliquely for the fenfes themselves teach us, that heavy things when they tend downwards, make not their defcent in an oblique motion; but the fanie fenfes cannot perfuade, that heavy things do not decline in the kaft; fince the declination is fo fmall that it cannot be perceived. And, therefore, fince the fenfes are not repugnant to it, and that the generating of things, which could never be done at all without that motion, indifpenfibly requires it, we muft, of Deceflity, admit a declination of the feeds in their defcent. Here, too, our tranilator has omitted these two verfes of his author, a higher to a lower place: but neither has he gained the point for the fake of which he invented all this. For either all the atoms will decline, and none will ever cleave and flick together, or fome only will decline, while the others defcend perpendicularly, as they naturally ought to do. And this is, in the first place, to prescribe to atoms their feveral duties and cffices; which of them fall defcend in a straight line, which obliquely : and in the next place, fuch a turbulent and confufed concourfe of atoms, the fhelf on which Democritus likewife run aground, could never make this beautiful and regular frame of the world. Ver. 240. In the following 41 verfes, Lucretius contends yet farther for the declining motion of his atoms. All men feel within thenfelves, that fome of their motions are voluntary. Every one perceives a liberty in himself, and does not, without good reafon, conjecture the like freedom to be in other animals; for he fees that they do not perform their motions at a certain time, nor in a certain order; but vary them as they lift, and live as they please themselves. Nay, when the barriers of the lifts are thrown open on a fudden, we only not fee the will of the courfer starting to the race, and running even before his limbs are in motion. Upon hearing the first shout he pricks up his ears, and the inward motion of his mind is hurried forward, while the fpirits that are to be conveyed through the nerves into the feveral joints and members of his body affemble more flowly; and with greater difficulty obey the eager mo tary motions of men, or of irrational animals, to the exterior motion of atoms, fince they proceed from the very nature of the free mind. It is well, however, that Lucretius owns that all our actions are not the effects of neceffity or fate; but he was in the wrong to impute this freedom to the declining motion of his atoms. tions of his mind. Befides, when we are compel- | fore, Lucretius has no reason to afcribe the volun led to act by any exterior or foreign force, fomething, I know not what, lies hid within us, that refifts and opposes that compulsion. And we plainly perceive a difference within ourselves, and feem to do another thing when we act of our own accord, than when we are compelled and moved to action by any exterior and foreign force. But from whence proceeds this liberty? Search the feeds themselves; nothing like it is concealed in them. The chain of neceffity and fate is faft linked together by the ftraight and direct motion of the principles, from their striking one another, if they can strike, unless they decline, the fame neceffity follows. The declination therefore of the atoms only remains to which our liberty can be due. But fince the Epicureans acknowledge the liberty of the will, we may take it as a fuppofition already granted, and without any farther proof, make use of it in our difputes against them: but, because it is of great confequence, and is the foundation of Seneca's and Plutarch's difcourfes, "Car Bonis malè, et Malis bene," why good men are afflicted and why villains profper, it deferves fome confirmation. The liberty of the will is a power to choose, or refufe any thing after that the understanding hath confidered it, and proposed it as good or bad. This is that rò ipv of Epictetus; and, as he calls it, ἐλεύθερον, εκώλυτον, ἀπερεμπόδισον free, not fubject to hindrance or impediment. And Adrian delivers it as his doctrine, τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐδ ̓ ὁ Ζεὺς años dúvalar Our will not Jupiter himself can fetter. Epicurus calls it rò wap Яpās and that such a power belongs to every man, is evident from the general confent of mankind; for every man finds fuch a power in himself, and thence proceeds this agreement; it is the foundation of all laws, of all rewards and punishments. For it would be very ridiculous for a prince to command a stone not to fall, or break it for doing fo. Origen declares, ἀρετῆς ἐὰν μὲν ἀνέλης τὸ ἑκέσιον, ἀνέλης αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν érízy and Lucian ingeniously makes Sofastrus baffle Minos, after he had granted that all men act ac cording to the determination of fate, Я ixásy Plutarch, in the Treatife de At. Solert. teaches us, that this doctrine of the declining motion of atoms was first broached by Epicurus, res es τὴν ζωὴν ἢ τύχη παρεισέλθη, καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὴ ἀποl. And that the reason why he fet up this opinion, was, because he feared that if no other motion were allowed to atoms but that which they naturally, and of neceffity have, by their own weight, we fhould not be free agents in any thing, fince our mind would be moved in fuch a manner as it would be compelled to move in by the motion of the atoms. But Cicero in his Treatife of Fate, blames Epicurus for this foolish opinion, in thefe words: " Epicurus ab Atomis petit præfidium, eafque de via deducit, et uno tempore fufcipit duas res inenodabiles: unum, ut fine caufa | fiat aliquid, ex quo existet ut de nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipfi, nec cuiquam Phyfico placet: alterum, ut cum duo individua per inanitatem feruntur, alterum, è regione moveatur, alterum de-iiragi ygundin), rà wearia, which ordains every clinet." Epicurus fled for refuge to the atoms, man's actions as foon as he is born; and the comand leads them out of their way: and by fo doing, paffionate philofopher, who would have all offen. fubjects himself to two difficulties that can never ces forgiven, produceth this argument: yixbe folved. One, that any thing can be done with- ένα ἁμαρτάνειν ἀλλά τινι πάρει κα ηναγκασμένον, του out a caufe: from whence it follows, that every none fin willingly, but are forced. But more, this thing may proceed from nothing; which neither may receive a particular confirmation from every himself, nor any natural philofopher will allow : man's experience; for let him defcend into himself, the other, that when two indivifible bodies are he will find as great evidence for the liberty of his moved through the void, one of them fhould will, as for his being, as Cartes delivers; though move in a direct line; the other by declination. he is extremely mistaken, when he tells us in a And the fame author farther evinces the vainnefs metaphyfical ecftafy, "A quocunque fimus, et of his opinion, by fhowing it to be wholly need- quamtumvis ille fit potens, quantumvis fallax, lefs; and that the freedom of will in animals hanc nihilominus in nobis libertatem effe experi proceeds from another caufe. "Ad Animorum mur, ut femper ab iis credendis quæ non plane motus voluntarios non eft requirenda caufa exter- certa funt et explorata, poffimus abftinere, atque na; Motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in feita cavere, ne unquam erremus:" From whom continet, ut fit in noftra poteftate, nobifque pareat: nec id fine caufa: ejus enim caufa ipfa eft Natura." We need not leek an external caufe for the voluntary motions of the mind. for voluntary motion contains within itself such a nature, that it is in our power, and is obedient to us; and this too not without a caufe, for nature herfelf is the cause of it. Lib. de Fato. Thus, even in Cicero's opinion, any antecedent external cause takes away liberty. But freedom of will does not require an antecedent external caufe to make it move; fince has the caufe of its motion within itself. There foever we have our being, and how potent or deceitful foever he be, yet we find within ourselves this liberty, that we can abftain from believing thofe things that are not evidently certain, and ex perimentally tried and proved to be fo: and be fo aware of ourselves as never to be mistaken for what does he in this but determine the extent of that power, of whofe bounds he is altogether ignorant? and place this cogitation beyond his reach, whofe power to deceive is infinite, and his will equal to his ability. But let us all confider our ufual actions, and we fall find every one a demonstration. For let a thousand men think on any thing, and propofe it to my choice, I will embrace or reject it according to their defire, which neceffarily proves my liberty; unless these thoufand, or perhaps the whole world, were determined to think on the fame thing I was to act. For my part, if any one would take the bit and bridle of fate, I fhall not envy him the honour, nor be very willing to blind myself, to have the convenience of a guide. Let Velleius think it a commendation for Cato to be good, "quia aliter effe non potuit," because he could not be otherwife; and Lucan agree with him in his fentence: I should rather be freely fo. Ver. 249. Here the poet takes occafion to explain the voluntary motion of animals. First, the mind is willing, then it collects the spirits which are always obedient to its will, and conveys them through the nerves into the members, cherishes the languid and weak spirits, and supplies new and vigorous. Thus the animal is moved, and its motion continued. Ver. 260. In these twelve verfes the poet illuftrates the voluntary motion of animals, which he has explained, and makes a comparison between that and a violent or constrained motion. For when we are moved by a violent motion, we feel an exterior force: but when we move of our own accord, we perceive no fuch thing. Befides, our will refifts and opposes an outward force, and fometimes even overcomes it: whence it appears, that there is some inward principle of motion entirely free, and not bound or compelled by any neceflity. Ver. 262. So far are we from giving confent to this violent exterior force, that on the contrary, the mind refifts it, and yields with reluctancy. Ariftotle in the third of his Ethics gives this definition of a violent and compulsive motion: "Eft Motus violentus, cujus Principium extrinfecus eft, nihil ad juvante eo, quod agit." That is a violent motion, whofe principle and caufe proceed from without, the movent, or thing moved contributing nothing to it. Ver. 267. Something.] He means the will that is feated in the heart. Ver. 270. At the command of the will a fubtle matter, that is to fay, the spirits fly, &c. This is opposed by those who imagine the foul material, and therefore all her actions neceffary; because matter once moved will ftill keep the fame motion, and the same determination which it received, which muft needs deftroy all liberty, and evidently proves the Epicurean hypothefis to be inconfiftent with it. Others urge prefcience, and think themselves fecure of victory, whilst the Deity is on their fide. The weakness of the former opinion will, hereafter, be discovered; and Cartes has faid enough to filence the latter objection. | "His difficultatibus nos expediemus, fi recordemur mentem noftram effe finitam, Dei autem potentiam, per quam non tantum emnia, quæ funt, aut effe poffunt, ab æterno præfcivit, fed etiam, voluit, ac præordinavit, effe infinitam, ideoque hanc quidem à nobis fatis attingi, ut clarè et diftin&tè percipiamus ipfam in Deo effe, non autem fatis comprehendi, ut videamus quo pacto liberas hominum actiones indeterminatas relinquat. Libertatis autem, & indifferentiæ quæ in nobis eft, nos ita confcios effe ut nihil fit quod evidentiùs & perfectiùs comprehendamus. Abfurdum enim effet, propterea quòd non comprehendimus unam rem, quam fcimus ex natura fua nobis debere effe incomprehenfibilem, de alia dubitare quam intimè comprehendimus, atque apud nofmet ipfos experimur." We may extricate ourselves from thefe difficulties, if we reflect that our mind is finite; but that the power of God, by which he not only foreknew from all eternity all things that are, or that can be, but likewife willed and preordained them, is infinite; and therefore, that it is enough for us plainly and diftinctly to perceive and know that fuch a power is in God: and though we cannot fo fully comprehend the extent of it, as to fee Low and by what means he leaves the free actions of men undetermined, yet we are so confcious of the liberty and indifference that is within us, that we comprehend nothing more perfectly, nor with greater evidence. For it would be abfurd, because we do not comprehend one thing," which we know ought in its nature to be inconprehenfible to us, to doubt concerning another, which we entirely comprehend, and experience within ourselves. Ver. 244. For as Cicero, de Fato, fays, fate is only ειρμος, οι συμπλέκη αἰτίων τεταγμένη, and they who introduce a fixed and eternal fucceffion of caufes, deprive the mind of man of all its freedom and liberty, and fubject it to the inevitable neceflity of fate. Ver. 272. In thefe nine verfes he at length concludes for the motion by declination from the freedom of will, which cannot proceed from ftroke; for motion by ftroke is an outward force, which is wholly contrary to all liberty, and even deftructive of it. Weight, though it be an inward principle of motion, yet fince it always tends downward, and in the fame manner, is no lefs an enemy to liberty, than ftroke itself. Therefore declination only remains, which being made neither at any certain time, nor any certain place, avoids that neceffity of which both weight and ftroke are the cause, and unlinks the chain of deftiny. Ver. 274. Whence proceeds the freedom of will; i. e. the declining motion of the atoms is the cause of it. Cicero, in the first book of the Nature of the Gods: " Epicurus cum videret, fi "atomi in inferiorem locum ferrentur fuopte pon"dere, nihil fore in noftro poteftate, quod illarum motus effet certus et neceffarius, invenit declinationem, ut hanc neceffitatem effugerit." When Epicurus faw, that if the atoms were moved downward by their own weight only, and had no other motion whatever, nothing would be in our power; because their motion would then be certain and neceffary, he invented declination to a❤ void this neceflity Ver. 277 I take this paffage, of which by the way, the interpreters say nothing to be very difficult, and this to be the meaning; nothing is made of nothing; therefore freedom of will proceeds |