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And Sat. vii. ver. 178.

Balnea fexcentis, et pluris porticus, in quâ
Geftetor Dominus, quoties pluit.

Whence we may gather, that in thefe porticos they were fometimes carried in their coaches, for fo we may call them, for the likeness of the use of them, and fometimes in their chairs on mens fhoulders: Befides, that they fometimes walked on foot in them, either for their health or pleafure, is certain beyond all difpute: and for thefe feveral reasons these places were called geflationis, Viridaria, deambulationes, and porticus. In thefe walks they used fometimes to walk, or be carried a certain number of paces, as Plutarch reports of Cicero in his life. And this cuftom appears from the following ancient infeription which we find in Pignorius, de Servis, p 141. and by which they knew when they had been carried, or had walked a mile.

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Thefe large places of recreation, these covered walks, were but fuitable to their other magnifi. cence: For their houfes were for largenefs like cities, as Seneca witneffes, Epift. 90. and 114. fo that, according to the several seasons of the year, they fometimes ufed one part of their houfe, fometimes another. In thefe were their "Cœna. tiones, Vestibula, Atria, Periftylia, Bibliothecæ, Pinacothecæ, Bafilicæ," and fuch structures, according to the state of public works. But to return to Lucretius, who in these four verfes brings Example VIII. of fuch a porticus, as is above described; and fays, that if we look into fuch a building at one end, especially standing at some diftance from it, it will feem fo to contract itself by degrees from the roof, the pavement, and on either fide, that the profpect will ead in a fharp point or cone. Of which the mathematicians give this reafon: because those parts of parallel lines that are fartheft removed from the fight, feem almoft to meet at the end: which they demonftrate in this manner: In the first place, parallel lines muft of neceffity take up the fame fpace and extent of ground. Let us fuppofe two parallel lines of a hundred feet long, to be ten feet diftant from one another: Let ten traverse hines be made from one parallel to the other: These ten lines will be all alike, and each of them ten feet long: Let the eye be placed exactly on a level with that part of the gronnd or plain, where the first traverfe line is drawn; the fecond Jine (I do not reckon that first which is next the eye) will feem longer than the third, the third than the fourth, the fourth than the fifth, the fifth than the fixth, the fixth than the feventh, the

feventh than the eighth, and the eighth than the ninth: fo that the tenth or laft will feem fhorter than the others, because it is the most remote from the eye: The reason of which is; because the farther any magnitude is from us, the lefs it makes the angle that falls under the fight. And, on the contrary, the nearer any magnitude is to us, the bigger it makes that angle. Hence it comes to país, that the most remote and topmost part of the portico may feem to end in a very little cone, and even to touch the ground or furface of the earth, and that the farthest parts of the two fide walls feem to touch one another.

Ver. 443. For when the roof feems to defcend, the floor to rife up, and the fides to meet together the profpect must neceffarily end in a sharp angle or point.

Ver. 444 In these four verses, he brings Example IX. and fays, that to men at fea the fun feems to rife out of the water, and at his fetting, to be plunged again into the waves. But this is a deception likewife of the mind, which, because the eyes fee nothing that intervenes between the fun and the fea, erroneously supposes that nothing does intervene between them. Virgil defcribes finely the fun rifing out of the fea;

Poftera vix fummos fpargebat lumine montes
Orta dies, cum primùm alto fe gurgite tollunt
Solis equi, lucemque elatis narribus efflant.

Æn. 12. ver. 113.

Thus as finely rendered by our English Maro, The morn, enfuing from the mountain's height, Th' ethereal courfers, bounding from the fea, Had fcarcely spread the skies with rofy light; From out their flaming noftrils breath'd the day.

Dryd.

Ver. 448. These eight verfes contain Example X. of oars, which in the fea appear bent and broken for that part of the oar, which in rowing is dipt in the water seems crooked or broken; but the part above the water is flraight. Now, this too is an error of the mind, who does not obferve, that the part of the oar, which is beneath the water, is feen by refracted rays, and does not appear to the eyes in the place and fite, in which it indeed is, but beyond the furface of the water, from whence the rays tend directly into the eyes. Of which the mathematicians give us this reafon : In feeing every thing, either the visual rays from the eyes ftrike upon the object feen, or are reflected back upon the eyes, or else they are broken: They ftrike or fall upon the object seen, when we fee, for example, a horse, or any other body; or when we fee colour in a body not dense, but fmooth: They are reflected when we fee, for example, a mirror, or any other body both dense and smooth: But they are broken when we fee any thing through pellucid bodies; for example, through air and water, or through air and glass: Now the oars in a veffel feem broken because they are seen in this laft manner, that is to fay, through two transparent bodies; i. e.

through air and water; one of which is more transparent than the other; that is to fay, the air than the water; but water is more denfe than air and this is the reason that the rays, project. ed from the eyes upon the oars, that are plunged in water, are broken; for when we fee that part of the oar that is dipt in the water, we fee it not directly, but obliquely; nor do we indeed fee it in the water, which is a denfer body than the air, but only its fhadow or image; becaufe the line from the thing feen is not reflected in a ftraight line to the eye, but is broken on the furface of the water. Hence it is, that the eye fees not the thing in the due place, but in another: nay, fees not the thing itfelf, which is ftraight; but the fhadow of it, which is bent and crooked. Ver. 449. "Clauda navigia," fays Lucretius : where the epithet clanda feems fo properly applied, that I wifh our interpreter had retained it in its natural fignification. For let us fuppofe the oars to be the feet and legs of the veffels, by the help of which they walk through the water; and when thefe oars are broken, the veffels may well be faid to be lame and crippled. The two firft verfes of this paffage in Lucretius run thus: At maris ignaris in portu clauda videntur Navigia, apluftris fractis, obnitier undis.

In which Creech, in his Latin edition, has made an excellent emendation. For in portu, he reads in ponto; and indeed how can a fhip in harbour be faid to struggle with the waves? Had he been aware of this when he translated this passage, he would not have placed his ignorants upon the fhores, because they could hardly difcern, from fuch a diftance, whether the oars of a veffel at fea feem broken or not: and he might have fpared the next verfe fave one, And they are loth, &c. for which he has no authority from his author; who, by maris ignaris, means men unaccustomed to the fea, raw seamen.

:

Ver. 456. In these four verfes is contained Example XI. of the ftars, which by night feem to fly by the clouds, and to be hurried in a contrary motion in which not the eye but the mind itfelf is deceived: For while the eye beholds the clouds, and perceives them in different places, the mind itself believes them unmoved from their place; and while the fight remains fixed upon them, the mind fuppofes, that it is not they that move along the fky, but the stars that fly over, and pass by them.

Ver. 460. Thefe fix verses contain Example XII. concerning things that appear double, by reafon of the pupil of the eyes being ever fo little diftorted; fo that, for inftance, we feem to fee two candles for one, two faces of one man, for one face, &c. In which the mind itfelf is deceived, not confidering that the eyes, in that distorted fite, do not regard the objects feen with their ufual and conjoined, but with unwonted and feparated rays and for that reason we perceive the object feen to be double. As if, for example, in like manner, we touch one round ball with the middle and forefinger transposed, we shall

feem to feel two balls. Ariftotle, Problem, fe&t. 3. giving the reason of this example, fays, That the fame thing happens, as does to men drunk, who fee two for one: For the principle of fight is moved in fuch a manner, that both eyes fee not alike: There is this only difference, that the motion in men who are drunk, is made inwardly: but another reafon may be given of it: When one of the eyes is preffed by the hand, the fight is bent and crooked, and the nerves are moved up and down, and diftorted this way and that and hence it is that the objects are doubled. Bat Cicero in Lucullus, fays: Timagoras Epicureus negat fibi unquam, cum oculos torfiffet, duas ex lucernâ famulus effe vifas: Opinionis enim eft mendacium, non oculorum." 1 imagoras the Epicurean, denics, that when he distorted his eyes, he ever faw two flames from one candle; for it is a lic of the opinion, not of the eyes.

Ver. 463. I am forry it is neceffary to acquaint the reader, that Creech has put this poor thought in the mouth of his author.

Ver. 465. "Et duplicis hominum facies," fays Lucretius. Geryon was a king of Spain, and faid to have three bodies; therefore the word almost was requifite. See the note, Book V. ver. 30.

Ver. 466. In these ten verses, the poet brings his thirteenth and laft example, concerning thofe things that we feem to fee in our dreams, as if we were awake. For fometimes when we are found afleep, we feem to fee the fun, the light, the fky, the fea, rivers, mountains, fields, &c. And all these things appear fometimes to move and change their places. Nay, we feem to hear founds, and to fpeak, when all is in the deepest filence. This happens because the mind rafhly and erroneously interpofes her judgment concerning these things, and fupposes they are indeed as they really appear to be. The like hap pens alfo in deliriums, in folly, and in madnels. Thus Pentheus feemed to fee two funs, two Thebes, and the furies too, as well as Oreftes. Virgil. An iv. ver. 469.

Eumenidum veluti demens videt agmina Pentheus Et fulem geminum, et duplices fe oftendere The

bas:

Aut Agamemnonius scenis agitatus Oreftes, Armatum facibus matrem, et ferpentibus atris Cum fugit, ultricifque fedent in limine Dira. But we shall have occasion to speak more at large of dreams towards the end of this book.

Ver. 476. It is certain we are deceived in things, in which the fenfes are employed, but how does that argue the fenfes themselves to be fallible? The poet, in thefe four verfes, fhows the unreasonableness of this pretence; the fenies receive the images of things, juft as they are prefented to them: they know not the nature of them, nor do they judge or determine in the least concerning them: therefore there is no error on their part; but all mistakes proceed from the judgment of the mind. The fenfes reprefent and make their report; according to which ther reason judges, but often rafhly, and inconfiderate

ly. Epicurus himself writes to the fame purpose to Herodotus : Καὶ πᾶσα μὲν φαντασία είτε διάνοια, είτε αἴσθησει κατλαμβανομένη ἢ μὲν τοι διαλαμβανο μένη, ἐσὶν ἀληθὴς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος. καὶ τὸ δὲ διήμαρτημένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ αἰεὶ ἐσιν κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην μέν τινι φαντασικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δὲ ἔχεισαν, καθ ̓ ἂν τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται, &c. Besides, we may gather the opinion of Epicurus concerning the certainty of the fenfes, from feveral of the ancients : Cicero in Lu. cullus fays: “ Eo rem dimittit Epicurus, η unus è fenfibus femel in vitâ mentitus fit, nulli unquam effe credendum :" Epicurus went fo far as to fay, That if any one of the fenfes had but once mistaken, no credit ought ever to be given to any of them. And in the first book, de Fi. nibus: "Judicia rerum in fenfibus ponis [Epicurus] quibus fi femel aliquid falfi pro vero probatum eft; fublatum effe omne judicium veri et falfi putat." Empiricus explains this opinion of Epicurus to this purpose. They are mistaken, who fay, that fome of the images are true, fome falfe; inasmuch as they cannot diftinguish that opinion from certainty: For, as to what relates to Oreftes, when he seemed to himself to fee the furies, the fenfe itself, that was moved by the images, was true for the images were really prefent: But the mind was deceived in believing them to be real furies. Thus Tertullian, lib. de Animâ, cap. 17. fays, "Epicurei conftantius parem omnibus atque perpetuam defendunt veritatem, fed aliâ via: non enim fenfum mentire, fed opinatum; fenfum enim pati, non opinari." Thus Gregor. Nyffenus, lib. iv. de Phil. c. 3. fpeaking of the fight, after he has mentioned thole examples of the oars that feem broken in the water, and of a fquare tower that appears round, adds: “ne. que eft hic error vifus fed mentis: nam ille videt et renunciat quidem: verum mens ad ea quæ exhibentur non attendit:" Nor is this an error of the fight, but of the mind; for the fight indeed fees, and makes its report, but the mind does not give due attention to the things that are reprefented to her. You may confult farther Empr. adv. Logic. but above all Macrob. Saturn. lib. vii. c. 14. where he argues admirably well of all thefe matters. Our tranflator has omitted the two last verses of this paffage, which run thus in the original:

Nam nihil egregius, quam res fecernere apertas A dubiis, animus quas ab fe protinus abdit. The meaning of which feems to be this: For nothing is more excellent, than to diftinguish things that are clear and plain from fuch as are doubtful, which the mind immediately hides from herself, that is, from her own knowledge. However, feveral of the interpreters, as Lambinus, Faber, and fome others, abfolutely reject them, as foolish and unworthy of Lucretius. But Creech, in his Latin edition, blames their feverity, and fays, that fome copies, and that truly too, read "Nam nihil ægrius eft," &c. and that, if instead of abdit, we read addit, the fenfe will be plain and saly, He goes on, that the poet has taught, ver.

467,"non addere opinatus animi," not to add the judgment of the mind: For we are deceived in all thofe examples which he but now enumerated; and that too, even though we were forewarned of it: For it is indeed difficult not to add the opinion and affent of the mind to things imparted to us by the fenfes.

Ver. 478. "Opinatus animi," the opinion of the mind, of which Epicurus, writing to Herodotus, gives this definition, κίνησις ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένη εμέν τινι φαντασικῇ ἐπιβολῇ διάληψιν δὲ xa.

Ver. 480. In thefe ten verfes, the poet takes occafion to fall upon the modern academics, of whom Arcefilas was author, and introduced, says Lactantius, an incoherent kind of philofophy; for fomething must of neceffity be known, otherwise it could not be known that nothing can be known: For if you know nothing at all, then how can you know that nothing can be known? But if it be known that nothing can be known, then it is false to say that nothing can be known. "Arcefilas introduxit genus philofophiæ árúsator, quod Latinè inftabile five inconftans poffumus dicere. Ut enim nihil fciendum fit, aliquid fcire neceffe eft. Nam fi omnino nihil fcias, idipfum nihil fciri poffe tolletur. Itaque qui velut fententiæ loco pronunciat, nihil fciri, tanquam perceptum profitetur et cognitum: ergo aliquid fciri poteft." Lactantius, lib. iii. de falfâ fapientiâ, cap. 6. And for this reafon Metrodorus of Chios, in the Lucullus of Cicero, fays, "Nego fcire nos fciamus ne aliquid an nihil fciamus; ne id ipfum q idem nefcire, aut fcire nos nec omnino fitne aliquid, an nihil fit" I deny that we know whether we know any thing, or know nothing; nay, that we either know, or not know even this, whether any thing be, or nothing be. But fuch men cannot be difputed with who know not what is true, what falfe, what certain, what doubtful, nor what it is to know, er not to know; and who glory in their ignorance. But Lucretius overthrows this fophifm at first attack; for, fays he, if you know for certain that nothing can be known, you know at least that you know nothing. crates, whom the ancient academics followed, was more wary, and faid only: This one thing I know, that I know nothing.

So

Ver. 482. This may perhaps in fome measure exprefs the implied meaning of Lucretius, though the words of the text be very different : Hunc igitur contra mittam contendere caufam, Qui capite ipfe fuo inftituit veiligia retro. All the copies acknowledge these two verses: But Lambinus fufpects them not to be genuine, and at length reads,

Hunc igitur contra quidnam contendere curem? Faber, however, is of another opinion, and fays, this paffage is very plain and elegant. They who walk on their hands, with their head prone to the earth, as moft mountebank's boys do, can go no other. wife than backwards; which you may easily ap ply to explain the meaning of Lucretius, Faber. Let us then apply it to that purpose, and

Thus

let his meaning be this. There is no difputing with a man who perverts all things, as it is certain the new academics did.

Ver. 490. In thefe twenty-five verfes, he attacks the ancient academics, and establishes the fenfes as the fole arbitrators and judges of truth. For, fays he, whatever can correct and confute what is falfe, muft of neceffity be the criterion of truth: And this is done by the fenfes only. But what can correct and confute the fenfes? Can reafon? Reafon itself entirely depends upon the fenfes Shall one fenfe convince and confute another? This can never be; for each fenfe has its proper objects: nor does it care, or know what the other fenfes do: Shall the fame sense then

correct itself: Impoffible: For we must alway give equal, or no credit at all to the fenfes. Therefore we ought to believe the fenfes infallible, and to truft only to what they represent and lay before

us.

Now the ancient academics held the mind to be the fole arbiter and judge of all things; but that the fenfes are dull and heavy, and cannot thoroughly perceive the things that are subject to them; for fome are so small, as not to be visible to the eye, others fo fwift, as never to feem the fame, nor like what they were before. But Epicurus taught, Kerýgix àλndéias eivai tà; alodńces, είδ ̓ εἶναι δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι· That the fenfes are the criterions of truth, and that it is not pofGble to confute them.

But he that would eftablifh a criterion, is certain to have the fceptic for his enemy; and, what is more uncomfortable, to be unable to confute him. He is an animal incapable of conviction; his folly may be exposed, but to endeavour to bring him to fenfe and reafon is as wild a deigu,

--ut fiquis afellum

In campum doceat parentem curere frænis.
As would be his who went to train an afs
T' obey the bridle, and to run a race.

matift, affirms it is as imágxor, but rò iaurü φαινόμενον καὶ πάθος ἀπαγγέλλει τὸ ἑυντῇ ἀδοξάτων. The law of their country is the rule of just and right, and the custom of the nation determines their religion.

This is the face of a sceptic, as it is drawn by his own hand; and fince we find him condemned to diffidence, there are some reasons fure of this unfettle dnefs, this rex and fome propole ten, others fifteen, and others increase the number; but one will comprehend them all, and that is enough to ruin every fcience in the world. It is taken from the variety of opinions about the fame thing; for there can be no appeal for a decifion, because he that would judge acts by the same faculties that thofe do, that are at ftrife, and so he that lofes the caufe will be ftill diffatisfied: And to invert Seneca, "Citius inter horologia quam philofophos convenit," clocks will agree fooner than philofophers. This difference rifes from the various tempers of mens bodies, the difpofitions of their organs, and fituation of the object: Thus melancholy and fanguine take different notices from the fame impreffion, young and old, fick and healthy, drunk and fober, do not agree; nor is it enough to anfwer, that fome of these are indif posed, whilt the others are in order; for, fince that change is nothing but an alteration of the humours, they demand a reafon why fuch and fuch a difpofition fhould be more capable of receiving impreffes from objects that are agreeable to the nature of the things than another: Befides, they obferve, that the complexions of animals are various, and the texture of their organs different; fo that there cannot be the fame refractions in their eyes, the fame windings in their ears, and therefore not the fame notices from the fame objects: And, indeed, did the fceptics proceed vo farther than fenfible qualities, we must acknowledge them to be very happy in the difcovery; for it i certain, that those are phantafms alone; and they that think honey fweet, and they that think it bitter, have equally true reprefentations of the object, because the little parts of honey act upon both their organs, according to their figure.

Hence they proceed to deny all first principles, and fo are put beyond all poffibility of conviction; for ftill demanding proof after proof, they mult reel on to eternity without fatsfaction: But this is too long a journey, and too fruitless a trouble to purfue, and fo we must take our leaves of these contradicting animals, who have no other reafon to deny the clear light of fcience, but becaufe fome mens eyes are too weak to look fleady upon it.

Pyrrho would venture on a precipice in fpite of his fenfes; and though the more fober are careful of their lives, yet they are as proof againft convictions; a perverfe fort of creatures, born to contradict, and inftructed in all the fludied methods of foolery. Scepticism, according to their own definition, is, δύναμις ἀνιθητική φαινομένων καὶ yopivav its effect is freedom from affent, and its end ferenity. The principle of the fect is, a λόγῳ λόγον ἴσον ἀντικεισθαι, yet this is not propofed as a dogma, for that is an affent, riga τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἐπιςήμας ζητεμένων nor is it laid down as fo in itself, and a real truth, but only in appearance and therefore Empiricus prefaces his difcourle with there words: προέτων ὅτι περὶ ἐδενὸς τῶν λεχθησομένων διαβεβαίεται ὡς ὕτως ἔχοντος πάντως. Καθάπερ λίγω. And yet they follow their Ver. 499. Epicurus in Laertius fays, Odrá natural appetite for their prefervation, seek the ὁμοιογενής αίσθησις ὁμοιογενῆ διελέγξαι δύναται διὰ good and profitable, and fly the bad and hurtful τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνομοιογενὴς τὴν ἀνομοιογενή, according to appearance: for they do not deny jàg Tâv aútāv xiixaí. For it is not poflible but that they may be warm and cool, and are ca- that a fenfe of the fame kind fhould confute a pable of pain and pleasure; yet none, like a dog-fenfe of the like kind with itself, because of the

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Ver. 495. Thus too Epicurus in Laertius, näs γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ήρτηται, πᾶσα δὲ αίσθησις ἄλογος ἐςὶν· For all reafon depends upon the fenfes, but every fenfe is void of reafon.

equality of their ftrength and power: Neither can one of an unlike kind confute another of an unlike kind B cause the senses of a different kind have not the power nor means to judge of them. Ver. 515. But fince we are often deceived by the fenfes; for example, a fquare tower, seen at a great distance, seems round, what are we to do? Lucretius anfwers, in these twelve verses, that it is better to have nothing to do with those problems, nor concern ourselves about them: Or to allign any cause of them, rather than distrust the certainty of the fenfes, on which our fafety, our all, our life depends: For without the fenfes we could not choose nor difcern good things from bad, nor healthful from hurtful: Nay, nor avoid precipices, flames, or other things of the like nature. But here the poet chiefly lafhes the fceptics, of whofe founder, Pyrrho, Diogenes Laertius fays, Μηδὲν ἐκβατόμενος, μηδέν φυλατζόμενος ἦν, ἅπαντα ὑφισάμενος, ἁμάξας, ει τύχοι, καὶ κρημνὸς, καὶ κύ τας, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, μειδὲν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπιτρέπων.

Ver. 528. In these eight verfes, he concludes this long difputation concerning fight. We examine all things, fays he, by the truth of the fenfes, and therefore if they are erroneous, farewell to all certainty and knowledge. Nor should we err less than a carpenter, who works by a falfe rule, line, and level.

Ver. 536. Hitherto he has been arguing of fight and of images Now, to ver. 621. he treats of found, and of hearing, which certainly, next to fight, deferves the preference before any of the other senses; since the ear, the inftrument of hearing, is the entrance or inlet of voice and found, and confequently of knowledge and discipline. First, therefore, in these eleven verses, he teaches what hearing is. Now we hear, fays he, when any found reaches the ears, and, by means of its body, moves and affects that fenfe, which is appointed to perceive it. But now it is manifeft, that even voice is a body, because it fcrapes and rakes the jaws, makes them rough, and hurts them: Therefore it muft of neceffity touch them: And whatever touches, or is touched, is a body. This is his first argument. Epicurus, writing to Herodotus, fays, 'Aλλà μìv nai τὸ ἀκύειν γίνεται ρευματός τινος φερομένω ἀπὸ τὰ φωκάλος, ἢ ἠχῶνος, ή ψοφωνίας, ή όπως δήποτε ἀκωτικὸν πάθος παρασκευάζονος. And in Plutarch de Placitis Philofoph. lib. iv. cap. 19. he teaches to the fame purpofe, that voice or found is a flux emitted from things either speaking, founding, or making a noife by any means, or in any manner whatsoever; and that that flux confifts of minute fragments figured alike; or, as he teaches in Laertius, this effluxion is like little drops of water, and that, therefore, it is no wonder that the fame voice or found ftrikes the ears of several perfons at once, because the sounds or voices they receive are exactly like little drops of water that refemble one another.

But not Epicurus only held the voice to be a body, for the Stoics too were of the fame opinion, and held every thing to be a body that either acts or fuffers: Now the voice both acts and fuffers:

It acts when it ftrikes the ears, and the air that is in the head, and imprints hearing, as the seal marks the wax: It fuffers, when falling upon fmooth and folid places, it is reflected and repelled. But Pythagoras and Plato held voice and found to be incorporeal: For, fay they, every ftroke of the air is not a voice; for the wagging of a finger strikes the air, and yet makes neither voice nor found. Therefore they took voice and found abstractedly, as they call it, for the figure only in the furface of the air, which is evidently incorporeal, because it is void of all profundity. Plato in A. Gellius, lib. v. cap. 15. defines found and voice, an air and strong percuffion of the air. Ariftotle too seems to incline to the fame opinion; for he defines found to be a local motion of fome bodies, and the medium which is applied to the organ of hearing. This definition fome of his followers have endeavoured to interpret otherwife than the words will bear, and imagine found to be different from local motion. And these are the chief opinions of the ancients concerning found, which is the undoubted object of hearing, and generally believed to confift in, and to be caused by a tremulous motion of the air, vibrated and forced on by a motion produced in other bodies; which motion of the air must neceffarily be made in an undulatory manner, that being the fole motion the air is capable of receiving: For, fince all places are replete and filled with air, no particle of air can receive any motion, without immediately imparting that motion to its adjoining particle, and that again to the next, and fo on fucceffively: And this motion must be granted, unless we could fuppofe that the particles of air were able to penetrate into one another, which is the greatest absordity imaginable: Now that this undulation of the particles of air is caused by the motion of bodies, is evident, because of themselves they tend to rést.

Moreover, found may be taken in two different acceptations: I. For the fenfation we have when fonorous bodies make their impreffion on our organs. II. We may confider it as a power pecu liar to fonorous bodies, of producing in us this fenfation. If we understand it in the first fignification, experience will be our best instructor, and explain it beft to us: But we may obferve, that all are not alike moved and affected with the fame founds; and that one hears perfectly what another cannot, or at least does but faintly perceive. If we confider found in the fecond mean. ing, that is to fay, as a power peculiar for example, to a bell, a cannon, or the like, of exciting in us the fenfation of hearing, we fhall find it comprehended under the description given above. Befides, that all found is produced by motion, reafon and experience both evince: For found confifts in that, the exiftence of which being granted, found exifts, and without whofe existence found can have no being: Now, grant a motion of the air, found exists, but without that motion there can be no found: For daily experience teaches, that motion alone is capable of caufing found, and by the fame experience we are as cer

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