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this monster, it will be necessary to transcribe the whole chapter: "Pythagoras and Plato held the soul to be "immortal; for that lanching out into the soul of the universe, it returns to its parent and original. The "Stoics say, that on its leaving the body, the inore infirm (that is, the soul of the ignorant) suffers the lot of the body: But the more vigorous (that is, the soul of the wise) endures to the conflagration. Democritus and Epicurus say the soul is mortal, and perishes with the body: Pythagoras and Plato, that the reasonable soul "is uncorrupt (for it is to be observed, the soul is not "God, but the workmanship of the Eternal God) and “ the irrational: mortal. Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν ἐξιδσαν γὰρ εἰς τὸ τῇ παντὸς ψυχήν. ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές. Οι Στωικοί, ἐξιᾶσαν τῶν σωμάτων ὑποφέρεσθαι, τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεσέραν ἅμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι γενέσθαι. (ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων) τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροτέραν, οἵα ἐςὶ περὶ τὲς σοφὸς, καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως. Δημόκριτος, Επίκερα, φθαρτην, τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην. Πυθαγόρας και Πλάτων, τὸ μὲν λογικὸν, ἄφθαρτον (ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ τὴν ψυχήν, ἐ θεὸν, ἀλλ ̓ ἔργον τα αιδία θεῖ ὑπάρχειν) τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, φθαρτόν. Περὶ τῶν Apeo. Tois pin. Beλ. . K. C. Here we see, the soul first Αρεσ. τοῖς φιλ. Βιβλ. δ'. Κ. mentioned, and said to be immortal, and to lanch out into the soul of the universe, was the same which the Stoics held to endure, when it had been in their wise man, till the conflagration; was the same which Democritus and Epicurus held to be mortal. And was this the VEGETATIVE soul? How hard has the world dealt with Democritus and Epicurus for twenty round ages, only for holding that the vegetative soul was mortal! A very reasonable opinion, had there been any vegetative soul at all. But what then must we say to the contradiction, which I have promised to remove, and which seems now quite fixed, since we have evaporated this spirit of vegetative immortality, from the passage? The plain solution of the difficulty is this: When Plutarch had mentioned the impious notion of the soul's mortality, first started by Democritus and Epicurus, he opposes it by that of Pythagoras and Plato.* He had told us before, that these held the soul to be immortal: But now, using their authority to con fute the other two, he, like a judicious writer, explains it with more exactness. He tells us, that Pythagoras VOL. XI.

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Plato held the reasonable soul to be immortal, the onal mortal. When, in the beginning of the chapter, he had said, they held the soul to be immortal, he added their reason, for that lanching out, &c. TAP is TO TH anos, &c. Now here, in the conclusion, mentioning again the same dogma, he adds his own, For it is, to be observed the soul is not God, &c. KAI TAP Tux, &c. ΚΑΙ την ψυχήν, For Plutarch had, with the rest of the philosophers of the Christian times, refined his notions on this matter: They said, the soul was immortal, because it was related to the soul of the universe: He said, it was immortal, because it was the work of God. Henry Stephens, who, it seems probable, saw this was Plutarch's, and not Pythagoras's or Plato's philosophy, makes the words καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐ θεὸν ἀλλὰ τὰ αἰδία θεξ υπάρχειν) a pa renthesis, as he does ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων and as he should have done ofa isiwegi Tas ropes; both which are the explanatory remarks of Plutarch. And now it is to be hoped our Advocate sees why this last part was not at all taken notice of by Mr. Warburton though in the very same paragraph with the first which he quoted. But what does he now sce of his contradiction?

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We have said what it was that induced Plutarch3to interfere with his own opinion in this matter. The very same concern for the orthodoxy of old Pagan philosophy (then to be opposed to Christianity) that now seems to . distress our Advocate. The very same that made Plotinus ery out, as above, The soul necessarily loves God, yet is a different existence from him. And this will account for :: Plutarch's labouring so much as he does, in the place quoted by our Advocate, at his 75th page, to free Pluto from the charge of making the soul cternal and uncreated. For a charge, it seems, it was, and a heavy one too, upon him. Now where Plutarch performs the faithful office of an historian, in delivering us "the placits of the old philosophers, there, we see, he owns both Pythagoras and Plato held this opinion; but here, where he acts the Advocate, I mean of old Pagan philosophy, he -entleavours to distinguish away the accusation. This at eedlength we see the contradiction lies at Plutarch's door;

which will require more than a vegetative inmortality to remove: Legulcio dignus vindice nodus. inlet abou

These

These three passages, from Stobaus, M. Antoninus, and Plutarch, are the only three of the great number Í brought to prove the Greek philosophers held the soul to be part of God, which our Advocate has ventured to undertake. These he thought he could manage: And envy must own he has acquitted himself to admiration.

XI. But that Plato was orthodox in this point, he will now shew from Plato himself.-And that this was Plato's opinion (says he) concerning the human rational soul, I shall further proce-from himself.-In one place he says, We have spoke most truly in asserting the soul was made before the body, and the body in the second place, and after the soul, forasmuch as the governing part "ought in point of time to be created before that which "is is governed." pp. 71, 72. Where says he this? Where think you but in the old place, his Book of Laws? It is an odd fancy this, in our Advocate, to go so continually to a Book of Laws for Plato's religious sentiments. Law and Gospel, let me tell him, agreed no better formerly than they do now. But he must needs go as his index led him. Which in this road always points exoterically. Let us follow him then into his warehouse of Laws. Here, to our great surprise, we find, that Plato is not speaking of the origin of the human rational soul, but of a very different thing. This tenth Book of Laws, from whence he takes his quotation, is employed to prove the Being of a God against Atheism. One of his arguments, for an eternal mind, is, That that is the first efficient Cause which moves itself and all other things. But MIND moves itself and all other things: Therefore MIND is the first efficient. Hence, in the words of the quotation, it is inferred, That the soul was before the body, Yuxu μov προτέραν γερονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν. And farther, that there is one, general Soul or Mind, that governs the universe, Ψυχὴν δὲ διοικᾶσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάλη κινεμένοις ἡμῶν ἐ καὶ τὸν ἐρανὸν αν άγκη διοικεῖν φάναι ; Now, who sees not that it sil was Plato's business here, to shew only in the abstract, that mind was prior to body; and altogether beside his purpose to speak of the origin of the human soul ? Yet Our Advocate, misled by the Latin translator, and unaided by any discernment of his own, makes Plato's words relate to the creation of the soul. That the soul O2

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ADE before the body; animum ante carpus FACTU But Plato in his Epinomis, referring to this very explains the meaning in these words: That every soul is elder than every body, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον εἴη ψυχή σώματος ἅπασα παντός. Yet was this passage so far from helping our Advocate to the true sense of his quotation, that he even refers to it for the confirmation of his mistake. All therefore that Plato's argument required was to prove, that mind was before body. But had he thought proper to digress about the origin of the soul, he must needs have made it ungenerated, from a principle he lays down in this very place, namely, That the soul was a self-moving substance; Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν τῆς λίγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐσίαν, ἅπερ τ' ἔνομα ὃ δὴ πάνες ψυχὴν προσαγόρεούμεν for a self-moving and an eternal-moving substance were the same thing amongst the Ancients. So Plutarch tells us, that Thales was the first who taught the soul to be an eternal-moring OR self-moving nature, Oaxñ #ývalo πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν αεικίνητον Ἢ αυτοκίνητον *

Our Advocate goes on with his Plato: In another place (says he) God, after having made the ANGELS, is introduced as delivering them materials to form man and other animals, and as speaking to them in this manner: Go to then, turn yourself to the formation of animals, according to the lures of nature, and imitate "that efficacious power which I myself used in your production; and since they will be created as it were "fellow-citizens with yourselves, they shall be esteemed of divine extract, and shall have dominion over all, "other creatures." p. 72.

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1. God, after having made the ANGELS (say he). Would the reader know what sort of angels he has here to do with ?. Our Advocate is silent. But honest Plato tells us their names: Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, Juno, and the rest of the Pagan Gods and Demons. Heps de var ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν Γῆς τε καὶ Οὐρανα παῖδες Ωκεανός τε κ Τηθὺς ἐγενέσθην ἐκ τάτων δὲ, Φόρκυς τε καὶ Κρίνῳ καὶ Ῥέα, &c. But if philosophers are to pass for apostles, why may not. Heathen Gods stand for angels? Of these holy angels, Pláto says it would be impiety not to believe what the ancient Mythologists taught concerning them, IEIETEON

Plat. Phil. 1. 4. C. 2.

δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἔμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν ἔσιν ὡς ἔφασαν, σαφῶς δέ σε τὲς αὐτῶν προγόνες εἰδόσιν· ἀδύνατον ἔν θεῶν παισὶν a. Being now in the humour, he tells us, that when God created souls, he disposed them amongst the stars: ξυρήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλε ψυχὰς ισαρίθμες τοῖς ἄκροις, ἔνειμεθ' ἑκάσην πρὸς ἕκασον-That they suffered transmigration into brutesἔνθα καὶ εἰς θηρίε βίαν ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ ἀφικνεῖται με πανόμενῷ δὲ ἐν πέτοις ἔτι κακίας, τρόπον ὃν κακόνοιο κατά τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς σὲ τρόπο γενέσεως, εἴς τινα τοιαύτην ἀεὶ μεταβάλλει θηρία φύσι. And is not this a likely place to find Plato's real sentiments concerning the soul?

2. But what do we talk of his real sentiments? The book, from whence our Advocate brings this passage, contains not Plato's sentiments at all, but another Man's, one Timaus Locrus, of whose book, de Anima Mundi, this work of Plato's is a Comment. The passage in question, particularly, being a paraphrase on these words of Timaeus, ΜΕΤΑ δὲ τὴν τῶ πόσμω σύςασιν, &c.*

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But our Advocate, now grievously bemired, yet flounders on. And again PLATO MUCH TO THE SAME PUR POSE SAYS, "that after God had formed the world, he allotted the human soul to be disposed of by Nature, as “his vicegerent," &c. p. 73. Can the reader now guess whither we are sent to look for these words?-To 3 Plat. 99 D. which fairly brings us a mile beyond Plato, to a treatise of Timæus Locrus, intitled, De Anima Mundi. The swallowing Sigonius for Cicero was a trifle to this exploit. Here he saw writ in fair Latin characters, ovèr the page, Timai Locri de Anima Mundi. If one did not know him, one should take hun to be of the humour of that critic, who had a great mind that every thing that was good should be his favourite author's. But he was puzzled with the two titles. One was, the Timaus of Plato; the other, the Anima Mundi of Timæus. This was the deep problem of the Horse-mill, and Mill-horse: but the best of the story is, he here again (as in the former case of the Evok of Laws and Epinomis) brings these words of Timaus to confirm his sense of the foregoing quotation from the Timæus of Plato; and says, as well he might, 'tis much to the same purpose. This I remark to the honour of his penetration. For though *Plato Serr. Vol. III. p: 99.

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