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where such a creature as Man; 2. That the moral evil which He is author of, is productive of the good of the whole. This is his general thesis; from whence he draws this conclusion, That Man should rest submissive and content, and make the hopes of futurity his comfort—but not suffer this to be the occasion of PRIDE, which is the cause of all his impious complaints.

He proceeds to confirm his thesis.-Previously endeavours to abate our wonder at the phænomenon of moral evil-Shews first its use to the perfection of the universe, by analogy, from the use of physical evil in this particular system-Secondly, its use in this system, where it is turned, providentially, from its natural bias, to promote virtue-Then goes on to vindicate Providence from the imputation of certain supposed natural evils, as he had before justified it for the permission of real moral evil, in shewing that though the Atheist's complaint against Providence be on pretence of real moral evil, yet the true cause is his impatience under imaginary natural evil; the issue of a depraved appetite for fantastical advantages, which he shews, if obtained, would be useless, or hurtful to Man--and deforming and destructive to the Universe; as breaking into that order by which it is supported. He describes that order, harmony, and close connection of the parts. And, by shewing the intimate presence of God to his whole creation, gives a reason for an Universe so amazingly beautiful, and perfect. From all this he deduces his general conclusion, that Nature being neither a blind chain of causes and effects, nor yet the fortuitous result of wandering atoms, but the wonderful art and direction of an all-wise, all-good, and free Being; Whatever is, is right, with regard to the disposition of God and its ultimate tendency; which once granted, all complaints against Providence are at an end.

This is a plain and consistent account of the argument of this famous Epistle, which (though here humbled, and stripped of all its ornaments) hath such a force of reasoning as would support rhimes as bad as Donne's, and such a strain of poetry as would immortalize even the wretched sophistry that Mr. DE CROUSAZ has employed against it.

Whose objections it is now high time we should con

4

sider.

sider. For having shewn what Mr. Pope's system really is, we come next to shew what it is not; namely, what that writer hath the injustice, or the folly, to represent it. He begins his examination, with saying, that "Mr. Pope seems to him, quite throughout his system, to embrace "the pre-established harmony of the celebrated Leibnitz,

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which, in his opinion, establishes a fatality destructive "of all religion and morality*."-That the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz terminates in fate, is readily owned; but that Mr. Pope hath espoused that impious whimsy, is an utter chimæra. The pre-established harmony was built upon, and is an outrageous extension of, a conception of Plato's; who combating the atheistical objections about the origin of evil, employs this argument in defence of Providence; "That, amongst an infinite number of "possible worlds in God's idea, this, which he hath "created, and brought into being, and admits of a mix"ture of evil, is the best." But if the best, then evil consequently is partial, comparatively small, and tends to the greater perfection of the whole. This principle is espoused and supported by Mr. Pope with all the power of reason and poetry. But neither was Plato a fatalist, nor is there any fatalism in the argument. As to the truth of the notion, that is another question; and how far it clears up the very difficult controversy about the origin of evil, that is still another. That it is a full solution of all difficulties, I cannot think, for reasons too long to be given in this place. Perhaps we shall never have a full solution here; and it may be no great matter though we have not, as we are demonstrably certain of the moral attributes of the Deity. However, what may justify Mr. Pope in inforcing and illustrating this Platonic notion is, that it has been received by the most celebrated and orthodox divines both of the ancient and modern Church.

This doctrine, we own, then, was taken up by Leibnitz; but it was to ingraft upon it a most pernicious fatalism. Plato said, God chose the best: Leibnitz said, he could not but chuse the best. Plato supposed freedom in God, to chuse one of two things equally good: Leibnitz held the supposition to be absurd; but however, admitting

* Examen de l'Essai de Mr. Pope sur l'Homme.

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the case, he maintained that God could not chuse one of two things equally good. Thus it appears the first went on the system of freedom: and that the latter, notwithstanding the most artful disguises in his Theodicée, was a thorough fatalist. For we cannot well suppose he would give that freedom to Man which he had taken away from God. The truth of the matter seems to have been this: He saw, on the one hand, the monstrous absurdity of supposing, with Spinosa, that blind Fate was the author of a coherent Universe; but yet, on the other, could not conceive, with Plato, that God could foresee and conduct, according to an archetypal idea, a world, of all possible worlds the best, inhabited by free agents. This difficulty, therefore, which made the Socinians take prescience from God, disposed Leibnitz to take free-will from Man: And thus he fashioned his fantastical hypothesis: He supposed that, when God made the body, he impressed on his new-created machine a certain series or suite of motions; and that when he made the fellow soul, the same series of ideas, whose operations, throughout the whole duration of the union, so exactly jumped, that whenever an idea was excited, a correspondent motion was ever ready to satisfy the volition. Thus for instance, when the mind had the will to raise the arm to the head, the body was so pre-contrived as to raise, at that very moment, the part required. This he called the PREAnd with this he promised

ESTABLISHED HARMONY.

to do wonders.

Now we see, that, from the principle of Plato, as well as from that of Leibnitz, this grand consequence follows, THAT WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT; because every thing in this world, even evil itself, tends to the greater perfection of the whole. The Mr. Pope employs as a principle, throughout a Poem (the most sublime that ever was written) to humble the pride of Man, who would impiously make God accountable for his creation. What then does common sense teach us to understand by whatever is, is right? Did the Poet mean right with regard to Man, or right with regard to God? Right with regard to itself, or right with regard to its ultimate tendency? Surely with regard to God: For he tells us, his design is To vindicate the ways of God to Man. 1. 16.

Surely

Surely with regard to its ultimate tendency: For he tells us again,

All partial ill is universal good. 1. 283.

Yet Mr. De Crousaz preposterously takes it the other way; and so perversely interpreted, it is no wonder that he, and his wise friends, should find the Poem full of contradictions*.

But, before we come to an examination of particulars, it will be necessary to remind the reader once again, that the subject of this Epistle is a justification of Providence, against the impious objections of atheistic Men. It is to vindicate the ways of God to Man.-Thus the Poet addresses them at the beginning:

Presumptuous Man! the reason would'st thou find Why form'd so weak, so little, and so blind? 1.35. Then say not Man's imperfect, Heav'n in fault. 1. 69. As he proceeds, he still applies his reasoning to the same Men:

Go T and in thy scale of sense

Weigh thy opinion against Providence ; Call imperfection what thou fancy'st such; Say, here he gives too little, there too much; Destroy all creatures for thy sport or gust: Yet cry, if Man's unhappy, God's unjust. 1. 109, & seq. And concludes with this reproof to them:

Cease then, nor Order Imperfection name.

1. 273

Having premised thus much, we now proceed to Mr. De Crousaz.

Mr. Pope had said,

The lamb thy riot doom: to bleed to-day,

Had he thy reason, would he skip and play?

* J'ai lû l'essai de Mr. Pope (repond un ami de la companie) et jamais je n'eus plus besoin de patience. J'ai fait des grands efforts, pour y trouver quelque sens raisonable, et je les ai faits inutilement. Tantot j'y suis tombé sur des precisions sophistiques, tantôt sur des decisions egalement hardies et sans preuves, tantôt enfin sur des longues periodes d'un pompeux galimatias, &c. Examen de l'Essai.Thus his friend runs on in this abusive way, and grows more particular in his scurrility, while Mr. De Crousaz, good man, is unable to make him hold his peace.

Pleas'd

"

Pleas'd to the last, he crops the flow'ry food,
And licks the hand just rais'd to shed his blood.
O blindness to the future! kindly giv'n,

That each may fill the circle mark'd by Heav'n.
1. 77, & seq.

On which his Commentator:-"We do not, indeed, perceive any thing in beasts, that shews they have an "idea or apprehension of death. But, surely, with "regard to Man, to reflect on death, and to contemplate "the certainty of it, are of great use to a prudent life " and a happy death. Reason and religion agree in this, "and a man must want both one and the other, to cry out,

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"O blindness to the future! kindly giv'n,

"That each may fill the circle mark'd by Heav'n.

"This supposes, that if men had a foreknowledge of "their destiny, they would do all they could to avoid it, "and that they would succeed: Because, without this ignorance, Heaven, it seems, could never bring all its beings to fill that circle marked out by it. Yet this, "notwithstanding, is a consequence that can have no place, if it be impossible for men to act with freedom. "But the doctrine of FATE necessarily draws us into "contradictions*." Mr. Crousaz introduces his Commentary, by solemnly acquainting his reader, That he had, from his very infancy, a strong bias towards LOGIC: that he has given a considerable time to that study, and does not repent his pains; that he has profited by maxims which he has found in books not written with a design to give them; that he has run through every book that has fallen into his hands under that title, or any thing approaching to it; that he has not even neglected the most out-of-fashioned works of this kind: But, as the greatest treasure is worthless, unless well used, he is resolved to employ some of it upon Mr. Popef. And here you have the fruits of his labours. Here he has shewn, to some purpose, his skill in extracting doctrines from books not designed to give them. And for this passage I will

* Commentaire sur la Traduction en vers de Mr. l'Abbé du Resnel de l'Essai de Mr. Pope sur l'Homme, p. 63, 64.

+ P. 27, 28.

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