will be equally useless: though pure and sober religion will best instruct us in Man's nature, that knowledge -being essential to religion, whose subject is Man, considered in all his relations, and consequently whose object is God. To give this second argument its full force, he illustrates it [from 1. 30 to 43] by the noblest example that ever was in science, the incomparable NEWTON, whom he makes so superior to humanity, as to represent the angelic beings in doubt, when they observed him of late unfold all the law of Nature, whether he was not to be reckoned in their number; just as men, when they see the surprising marks of reason in an ape, are almost tempted to think him of their own species. Yet this wondrous creature, who saw so far into the works of Nature, cond go no farther in human knowledge, than the generality of his kind. For which the Poet assigns this very just and adequate cause: in all other sciences, the understanding is unchecked and uncontrolled by any opposite principle; but in the science of Man, the passions overturn, as fast as reason can build up. Alas, what wonder! Man's superior part This is a brief account of the Poet's fine reasoning in his Introduction. The whole of which his poetical Translator has so miserably mistaken, that, of one of the most strong and best connected arguments, he has rendered it the most obscure and inconsistent, which even the officious Commentator could scarce make worse by his important and candid remarks. Thus beautifully does Mr. Pope describe Man's weakness and blindness, with regard to his own nature: -Plac'd on this isthmus of a middle state, In In doubt, his mind, or body to prefer, And as he hath given this description of Man, for the very contrary purpose to which sceptics are wont to employ such kind of paintings, namely, not to deter men from the search, but to excite them to the discovery of truth; he hath, with great judgment, represented man as doubting and wavering between the right and wrong object; from which state there are great hopes he may be relieved by a careful and circumspect use of reason. On the contrary, had he supposed Man so blind as to be busied in chusing, or doubtful in his choice, between two objects equally wrong, the case had appeared desperate; and all study of Man had been effectually discouraged. But his Translator not seeing into the force and beauty of this conduct, hath run into the very absurdity I have here shewn Mr. Pope hath so artfully avoided. The Poet says, Man hangs between; in doubt to ACT, or REST. Now he tells us 'tis Man's duty to act, not to rest, as the Stoics thought; and to their principle this latter word alludes, he having just before mentioned that sect*, whose virtue, as he says, is -fix'd as in a frost; Contracted all, retiring to the breast: But strength of mind is EXERCISE, not rest. 1. 92, & seq. But the Translator is not for mincing matters. According to him, Man doubts whether he be condemned to a slavish toil and labour, or destined to the luxury of repose; neither of which is the condition whereto Providence designed him. This therefore contradicts the Poet's whole purpose, which is to recommend the study of Man, on a supposition that it will enable him to determine rightly in his doubts between the true and false object. "Tis on this account he says, * With too much weakness for the Stoic's pride. Alike in ignorance, his reason such, i. e. the proper sphere of his reason is so narrow, and the exercise of it so nice, that the too immoderate use of it is attended with the same ignorance that proceeds from the not using it at all. Yet, though in both these cases, he is abused by himself, he has it still in his own power to disabuse himself, in making his passions subservient to the means, and regulating his reason by the end of life. Mr. De Crousaz himself had some glimmering of the absurdity of those two lines of the Translator: and because he shall not say, I allow him to have said nothing reasonable throughout his whole Commentary, I will here transcribe his very words: "Ce qui fait encore, que les antitheses frappent au lieu d'instruire, c'est qu'elles sont outrées. L'homme n'ait-il condamné au "travail? Doit-il se permettre la molesse et le repos? "Quel sujet de decouragement ou de trouble, si l'on "n'avoit de choix qu'entre deux partis si contraires? "Mais nous ne naissons ni destinés à un repos oisif, ni "condamnés à un travail accablant et inhumain." 56 66 Again, Mr. Pope, p. 138. In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast. i. e. He doubts, as appears from the line immediately following this*, whether his soul be mortal or immortal; one of which is the truth, namely, its immortality, as the. Poet himself teaches, when he speaks of the omnipresence of God: Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part. 1 Ep. 1. 267. The Translator, as we say, unconscious of the Poet's purpose, rambles, as before: Tantôt de son esprit admirant l'excellence, Here his head (turned to a sceptical view) was running VOL. XI. on on the different extravagances of Plato in his divinity, and of Des Cartes in his philosophy. Sometimes, says he, Man thinks himself a real god, and sometimes again a mere machine; things quite out of Mr. Pope's thoughts in this place. Again, the Poet, in a beautiful allusion to the sentiments and words of Scripture, breaks out into this just and moral reflection upon Man's condition here, Born but to die, and reasoning but to err. The Translator turns this fine and sober thought into the most outrageous scepticism; Ce n'est que pour mourir, qu'il est né, qu'il respire, Et tout sa raison n'est presque qu'un delire : and so makes his author directly contradict himself, where he says of Man, that he hath —too much knowledge for the sceptic side. Strange that the Translator could not see his Author's meaning was, that, as we are born to die and yet enjoy some small portion of life; so, though we reason to err, yet we comprehend some few truths. Strange ! that he could not see the difference between that weak state of reason, in which error mixes itself with all its true conclusions concerning Man's nature; and an abstract quality, which we vainly call reason, but which, he tells us, is indeed scarce any thing else but madness. One would think he paid little attention to the concluding words of this sublime description, where the Poet tells us, Man was Created half to rise, and half to fall; Indeed he paid so much, as to contrive how he might pervert them to a sense consistent with his Et tout sa raison n'est presque qu'un delire : Which he does in these words: Tantôt feu, tantôt sage, il change A CHAQUE INSTANT. This is indeed making a madman of this sole judge of truth, truth, to all intents and purposes. But Mr. Pope says nothing of his changing every moment from sage to fool; he only says, that folly and wisdom are the inseparate partage of humanity: which is quite another thing. But mistakes, like misfortunes, seldom come single; and the reason is the same, in both cases, because they influence one another. For the Translator, having mistaken both the nature and end of the description of the weakness of human nature, imagined the Poet's second argument for the difficulty of the study of Man, which shews, that the clearest and sublimest science is no assistance to it, nor even religion itself, when grown fanatical and enthusiastic; he imagined, I say, that this fine argument was an illustration only of the foregoing description, in which illustration, instances were given of the several extravagances in false science; whereas the Poet's design was, just the contrary, to shew the prodigious vigour of the human mind, in studies which do not relate to itself; and yet that all its force, together with those effects of it, avail little in this inquiry. But there was another cause of the Translator's error; he had mistaken, as we say, the Poet's first argument for a description of the weakness of the human mind with regard to all truth; whereas it is only such with regard to the knowledge of Man's nature. This led him, as it would seem, to conclude, that, if Mr. Pope were to be understood as speaking here in his second argument, of real and great progress in science, it would contradict what had been said in the description; and therefore, out of tenderness to his author, he turns it all to imaginary hypotheses. Let us take the whole context. I. Go, wondrous creature! mount where science guides, Go measure earth, weigh air, and state the tides; Shew by what laws the wand'ring planets stray, Correct old time, and teach the sun his way. II. Go soar, with Plato, to th' empyreal sphere, |