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William Bates, Oliver Green, Bartholomew Nash, and Henry Long, being called, come; who being elected, tried, and sworn to speak the truth of and concerning the premises, upon their oath say, that the said Peter Hunt Verdict: quilis guilty of the felony and murder aforesaid, on him above charged in the ty of murder. form aforesaid, as by the indictment aforesaid is above supposed against him; and that the said Peter Hunt at the time of committing the said felony and murder, or at any time since to this time, had not nor hath any goods or chattels, lands or tenements, in the said county of Warwick, or elsewhere, to the knowledge of the said jurors. And upon this it is forthwith demanded of the saith Peter Hunt, if he hath or knoweth any thing to say, wherefore the said justices here ought not upon the premises and verdict aforesaid to proceed to judgment and execution against him: who nothing further saith, unless as he before had said. Whereupon all and Judgment of singular the premises being seen and by the said justices here fully under- death, stood, It is considered by the court here, that the said Peter Hunt be taken to the jail of the said lord the king of the said county of Warwick, from whence he came, and from thence to the place of execution on Monday now next ensuing, being the ninth day of this instant August, and there be hanged by the neck until he be dead; and that afterward his body be dis- and dissecsected and anatomized.1
CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER.
upon their oath say, that the said Peter Hunt is not guilty of the Verdict: not murder aforesaid, above charged upon him; but that the said Peter Hunt guilty of murder; guilty of is guilty of the felonious slaying of the aforesaid Samuel Collins; and that manslaughter. he had not nor hath any goods or chattels, lands or tenements, at the time of the felony and manslaughter aforesaid, or ever afterward to this time, to the knowledge of the said jurors. And immediately it is demanded of the said Peter Hunt, if he hath or knoweth any thing to say wherefore the said justices here ought not upon the premises and verdict aforesaid to proceed to judgment and execution against him: Cho saith that he is a clerk, and pray eth the benefit of clergy to be allowed him in this behalf. Clergy prayThereupon all and singular the premises being seen, and by the said justices here fully understood, It is considered by the court here, that the said Judgment to Peter Hunt be burned in his left hand, and delivered. And immediately the hand and he is burned in his left hand, and is delivered according to the form of the delivered. statute.2
be burned in
SECT. 3. ENTRY OF A TRIAL INSTANTER IN THE COURT OF KING'S
Michaelmas Term, in the sixth year of the reign of King George the Third. Kent; The King The prisoner at the bar being brought into this court against in custody of the sheriff of the county of Sussex, by Thomas Rogers. virtue of his majesty's writ of habeas corpus, Et is or- Habeas cor dered that the said writ and the return thereto be filed. And it appearing pus. by a certain record of attainder, which hath been removed into this court Record of atby his majesty's writ of certiorari, that the prisoner at the bar stands at- tainder read; tainted, by the name of Thomas Rogers, of felony for a robbery on the for felony and highway, and the said prisoner at the bar having heard the record of the robbery. said attainder now read to him, is now asked by the court here what he Prisoner askhath to say for himself why the court here should not proceed to awarded what he execution against him upon the said attainder. He for plea saith, that he of execution. is not the same Thomas Rogers in the said record of attainder named, and Plea: not the
say in bar
(1) See the form of sentence now in force, ante, p. 202, n. (25).
against whom judgment was pronounced; and this he is ready to verify Replication, and prove, &c. To which said plea the Honorable Charles Yorke, Esquire, attorney-general of our present sovereign lord the king, who for our said lord the king in this behalf prosecuteth, being now present here in court, and having heard what the said prisoner at the bar hath now alleged, for averring that our said lord the king by way of reply saith, that the said prisoner now here at the bar is the same Thomas Rogers in the said record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was pronounced as aforesaid; and this he prayeth may be inquired into by the country; and the said prisoner at the bar doth the like: Therefore let a jury in this behalf immediately come here into court, by whom the truth of the matter will be the better known, and who have no affinity to the said prisoner, to try upon their oath whether the said prisoner at the bar be the same Thomas Rogers in the said record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was so pronounced as aforesaid, or not; because as well the said Charles Yorke, Esquire, attorney-general of our said lord the king, who for our said lord the king in this behalf prosecutes, as the said prisoner at the bar, have put themselves in this behalf upon the said jury. And immediately thereupon the said jury come here into court; and being elected, tried, and sworn to speak the truth touching and concerning the premises aforesaid, and having heard the said record read to them, do say upon their oath that the said prisoner that he is the at the bar is the same Thomas Rogers in the said record of attainder named,
Issue joined. awarded in
and against whom judgment was so pronounced as aforesaid, in manner and form as the said attorney-general hath by his said replication to the said plea of the said prisoner now here at the bar alleged. And hereupon the said attorney-general, on behalf of our said lord the king, now prayeth that the Award of ex- court here would proceed to award execution against him the said Thomas Rogers upon the said attainder. Whereupon all and singular the premises being now seen and fully understood by the court here, It is ordered by the court here, that execution be done upon the said prisoner at the bar for the said felony in pursuance of the said judgment, according to due form of law: And it is lastly ordered, that the said Thomas Rogers, the prisoner at the bar, be now committed to the custody of the sheriff of the county of Kent (now also present here in court) for the purpose aforesaid; and that the said sheriff of Kent do execution upon the said defendant, the prisoner at the bar, for the said felony, in pursuance of the said judgment, according to due form of law.
On the motion of Mr. Attorney General.
SECT. 4. WARRANT OF EXECUTION ON Judgment of Death, at the
To the sheriffs of the city of London; and to the sheriff of
Whereas at the session of jail delivery of Newgate for the city of Lon-
Giben under my hand and seal this fourth day of November, one
James Eyre, Recorder. [L. S.]
SECT. 5. WRIT OF EXECUTION UPON A JUDGMENT OF MURDER, BEFORE THE KING IN PARLIAMENT.
GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriffs of London and sheriff of Middlesex, greeting. Whereas Lawrence Earl Ferrers, viscount Tamworth, hath been indicted of felony and murder by him done and committed, which said indictment hath been certified before us in our present Parliament; and the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, viscount Tamworth, hath been thereupon arraigned, and upon such arraignment hath pleaded not guilty; and the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, viscount Tamworth, hath before us in our said Parliament been tried, and in due form of law convicted thereof; and whereas judgment hath been given in our said Parliament, that the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, viscount Tamworth, shall be hanged by the neck till he is dead, and that his body be dissected and anatomized, the execution of which judgment yet remaineth to be done: We require, and by these presents strictly command you, that upon Monday, the fifth day of May instant, between the hours of nine in the morning and one in the afternoon of the same day, him the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, viscount Tamworth, without the gate of our Tower of London (to you then and there to be delivered, as by another writ to the lieutenant of our Tower of London, or to his deputy, directed, we have commanded) into your custody you then and there receive; and him, in your custody so being, you forthwith convey to the accustomed place of execution at Tyburn; and that you do cause execution to be done upon the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, viscount Tamworth, in your custody so being, in all things according to the said judgment. And this you are by no means to omit, at your peril. Witness ourself at Westminster the second day of May, in the thirty-third year of our reign.
Yorke and Yorke.
Statement of Offenses now punishable with Death. (A.D. 1844.)
At common law.
9 Geo. IV., c. 31, s. 3.
Burglary, accompanied with an assault with intent to murder, or with stabbing, cutting, wounding, beating, or striking, any person being in the dwelling-house
Maliciously setting fire to a dwelling-house, any person being therein.
1 Vict., c. 85, s. 2.
9 Geo. IV., c. 31, s. 15.
1 Vict., c. 87, s. 2.
Id., c. 88, s. 2.
Id., c. 86, s. 2.
Id., c. 89, s. 2.
Maliciously setting fire to, casting away, or destroying any ship or vessel, with intent to murder any person, or whereby the life of any person shall be endangered
Exhibiting any false light or signal with intent to bring any ship into danger, or maliciously doing any thing tending to the immediate loss or destruction of a ship in distress
Id., s. 5.
Principals in the second degree, and accessories before the fact, to the felonies above mentioned (except the offense of buggery, see 9 Geo. IV., c. 31, s. 31), are alike punishable with death. See 9 Geo. IV., c. 31, s. 3; 1 Vict., c. 85, s. 7; c. 86, s. 6; c. 87, s. 9; c. 88, s. 4; c. 89, s. 11.
Id., s. 4.
Questions proposed by the House of Lords to the Judges in relation to the Law respecting alleged Crimes committed by Persons afflicted with insane Delusion, and the Opinions of the Judges thereon. (Ordered to be printed, 19th June, 1843.)
"1st. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons
afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular
"2d. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury when a person alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons is charged with the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defense? "3d. In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the
prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed? "4th. If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts commits
an offense in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused? "5th. Can a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial, and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act that he was acting contrary to law, or whether he was laboring under any and what delusion at the time?"
MR. JUSTICE MAULE. "I feel great difficulty in answering the questions put by your lordships on this occasion: First, because they do not appear to arise out of, and are not put with reference to, a particular case, or for a particular purpose, which might explain or limit the generality of their terms, so that full answers to them ought to be applicable to every possible state of facts not inconsistent with those assumed in the questions; this difficulty is the greater, from the practical experience both of the bar and the court being confined to questions arising out of the facts of particular cases; secondly, because I have heard no argument at your lordships' bar or elsewhere on the subject of these questions, the want of which I feel the more, the greater is the number and extent of questions which might be raised in argument; and, thirdly, from a fear, of which I can not divest myself, that as these questions relate to matters of criminal law of great importance and frequent occurrence, the answers to them by the judges may embarrass the administration of justice when they are cited in criminal trials. For these reasons, I should have been glad if my learned
brethren would have joined me in praying your lordships to excuse us from answering these questions, but as I do not think they ought to induce me to ask that indulgence for myself individually, I shall proceed to give such answers as I can, after the very short time which I have had to consider the questions, and under the difficulties I have mentioned, fearing that my answers may be as little satisfactory to others as they are to myself.
“The first question, as I understand it, is. in effect: What is the law respecting alleged crime, when, at the time of the commission of it, the accused knew he was acting contrary to the law, but did the act with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some supposed public benefit? If I were to understand this question according to the strict meaning of its terms, it would require, in order to answer it, a solution of all questions of law which could arise on the circumstances stated in the question, either by explicitly stating and answering such questions, or by stating some principles or rules which would suffice for the solution. I am quite unable to do so, and, indeed, doubt whether it be possible to be done, and therefore request to be permitted to answer the question only so far as it comprehends the question whether a person, circumstanced as stated in the question, is for that reason only to be found not guilty of a crime respecting which the question of his guilt has been duly raised in a criminal proceeding; and I am of opinion that he is not. There is no law, that I am aware of, that makes persons in the state described in the question not responsible for their criminal acts. To render a person irresponsible for crime on account of unsoundness of mind, the unsoundness should, according to the law as it has long been understood and held, be such as to render him incapable of knowing right from wrong. The terms used in the question can not be said (with reference only to the usage of language) to be equivalent to a description of this kind and degree of unsoundness of mind. If the state described in the question be one which involves or is necessarily connected with such an unsoundness, that is not a matter of law, but of physiology, and not of that obvious and familiar kind as to be inferred without proof.
"Second. The questions necessarily to be submitted to the jury are those questions of fact which are raised on the record. In a criminal trial the question commonly is, whether the accused be guilty or not guilty; but in order to assist the jury in coming to a right conclusion on this necessary and ultimate question, it is usual and proper to submit such subordinate or intermediate questions as the course which the trial has taken may have made it convenient to direct their attention to. What those question are, and the manner of submitting them, is a matter of discretion for the judge —a discretion to be guided by a consideration of all the circumstances attending the inquiry. In performing this duty, it is sometimes necessary or convenient to inform the jury as to the law; and if on a trial such as is suggested in the question he should have occasion to state what kind and degree of insanity would amount to a defense, it should be stated conformably to what I have mentioned in my answer to the first question as being, in my opinion, the law on this subject.
“Third. There are no terms which the judge is by law required to use. They should not be inconsistent with the law as above stated, but should be such as, in the discretion of the judge, are proper to assist the jury in coming to a right conclusion as to the guilt of the accused.
Fourth. The answer which I have given to the first question is applicable to this.
"Fifth. Whether a question can be asked depends, not merely on the questions of fact raised on the record, but on the course of the cause at the time it is proposed to ask it; and the state of an inquiry as to the guilt of a person charged with a crime, and defended on the ground of insanity, may be such that such a question as either of those suggested is proper to be