ANALYSIS. BOOK IV. OF PUBLIC WRONGS. CHAPTER I. ON THE NATURE OF CRIMES, AND THEIR PUNISHMENT. 1. In treating of public wrongs may be considered, I. The general nature of crimes and punishments. II. The persons capable of committing crimes. III. Their several degrees of guilt. IV. The several species of crimes, and their respective punishments. V. The means of prevention. VI. The method of punishment Page 1 2. A crime, or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it 4 3. Crimes are distinguished from civil injuries, in that they are a breach and violation of the public rights, due to the whole community, considered as a community 5 4. Punishments may be considered with regard to, I. The power, II. The end, III. The measure, of their infliction 7 5. The power, or right, of inflicting human punishments, for natural crimes, or such as are mala in se, was by the law of nature vested in every individual; but, by the fundamental contract of society, is now transferred to the sovereign power; in which also is vested, by the same contract, the right of punishing positive offenses, or such as are mala prohibita 7 6. The end of human punishments is to prevent future offenses: I. By amending the offender himself. II. By deterring others through his example. III. By depriving him of the power to do future mischief 11 7. The measure of human punishments must be determined by the wisdom of the sovereign power, and not by any uniform universal rule; though that wisdom may be regulated and assisted by certain general, equitable principles CHAPTER II. OF THE PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES. 12 1. All persons are capable of committing crimes, unless there be in them a defect of will; for to constitute a legal crime, there must be both a vicious will and a vi cious act. 20 2. The will does not concur with the act, I. Where there is a defect of understanding. II. Where no will is exerted. III. Where the act is constrained by force and violence. 21 3. A vicious will may therefore be wanting in the cases of, I. Infancy. II. Idiocy, or lunacy. III. Drunkenness; which doth not, however, excuse. IV. Misfortune. V. Ignorance, or mistake of fact. VI. Compulsion, or necessity; which is, 1st, that of civil subjection; 2dly, that of duress per minas; 3dly, that of choosing the least pernicious of two evils, where one is unavoidable; 4thly, that of want or hunger; which is no legitimate excuse 22-32 4. The king, from his excellence and dignity, is also incapable of doing wrong 33 CHAPTER III. OF PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES. 1. The different degrees of guilt in criminals are, I. As principals. II. As acces sories 34 2. A principal in a crime is, I. He who commits the fact. II. He who is present at, aiding, and abetting the commission 34 3. An accessory is he who doth not commit the fact, nor is present at the commission, but is in some sort concerned therein, either before or after 35 |