which flowed out of it; that it had been frequently held that the statute of limitations operated only upon the remedy, and not upon the right, and that it did not destroy the right, but merely withheld the remedy; that consequently the redress must be sought within the time fixed by the lex fori, and not within that fixed by the lex contractus, and that the limitation period might be altered by the legislature; that the mode of redress was governed by the law of the place where redress was sought, even if such law permitted the arrest of the debtor's body, which was not allowed by the law of the place where the obligation was created; that the remedy must be according to the law of the forum to which application was made, and in conformity to the rules there prescribed; that remedy was a subject of legislative discretion; that a summary and more expeditious remedy might be given by statute upon obligations theretofore created, as had been held by the Court of Appeals with Judge Boyle upon the bench, which court had also held that a statute might constitutionally subject lands to execution for debts before contracted; that the force which, in a state of nature, a party might use to exact performance of an obligation, had been surrendered to society, whose aggregate force was substituted therefor, and that the individual had no right to deny to society the right to modify the mode of exercising its aggregate; and that as has been held by the Supreme Court, in an opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, the distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, existed in the nature of things, and without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy might certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation should direct. These were some of the arguments advanced in support of the proposition that alterations in executive laws, process, and courts do not impair the obligation of contracts."

"At the legislative session in the fall of 1823, pending the petition for rehearing, the question was taken up. Resolutions were introduced in the legislature, and printed, in which, after twenty-six pages of most inflammatory preamble, the legislature most solemnly protested against the doctrines promulgated in the decision as ruinous in their practical effects, to the good people of this Commonwealth, and subversive of their dearest and most invaluable political rights,' and resolved 'that if the decision should not by the court be reviewed or reversed, but should be attempted to be enforced upon the good people of this Commonwealth, the legislature cannot, ought not, and will not furnish any facilities for its enforcement.' Also 'that any effort which the legislature may feel it a duty to make for the contravention of the erroneous doctrine of that decision, ought not to interfere with, or obstruct the administration of justice according to the existing laws, which,

whether they were, or were not, expedient, are believed to be constitutional and valid; and which should, when it shall be thought expedient to do so, be repealed by the legislature, and not by the Appellate Court." "

On December 4, 1823, the petition for rehearing was overruled. The same day, George Robertson, the speaker, attacked the resolutions in an address covering some twenty-four closely printed pages of "flawless logic, superb and stately rhetoric, and biting allusions."

On December 19 the House adopted the resolutions.

The constitution of 1799, provided that the judicial powers of the Commonwealth should be vested in a Supreme Court, styled the Court of Appeals, and in such inferior courts as the General Assembly might authorize from time to time. It provided that the judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, should hold their office during good behavior, but for any reasonable cause, though not sufficient ground for impeachment, the governor should remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of each House of the General Assembly; and further provided that the cause of the removal should be stated at length in such address, and on the Journal of each House. The constitution did not prohibit the Igislature from reducing judicial salaries. The Court of Appeals was a constitutional court, therefore, and could not be constitutionally abolished. Its judges could only be removed by impeachment or by address. "Nor was it possible, without violating the spirit of the constitution, to starve them out of office, for the constitution provided that they should, at stated times, receive for their services, an adequate compensation to be fixed by law."

No ground for impeachment existed. The campaign of 1824 for governor, and for the General Assembly, was really for the removal of the judges by address. General Joseph Desha, "a man of great energy and partisanship," was, by an overwhelming vote, chosen governor by the relief party, which also by a large majority controlled both houses of the General Assembly. The judges were summoned before the bar of the legislature, to show cause against their removal, and stated at length the ground of their decisions. Barry, Bibb and Rowan replied elaborately. Resolutions for their removal by address passed the House by sixty-one to thirty-nine, every member voting. Though large, the majority fell short of the constitutional two-thirds. Meanwhile, the senate had passed an Act to repeal the law organizing the Court of Appeals, and to reorganize a Court of Appeals, by which all acts establishing that court, and every act, or part of any act, or acts, concerning it, "or for giving or allowing any salary or compensation to the Chief Justice of Kentucky, or any Judge or Justice of the Court of Appeals," were repealed, "and another Court of Ap

peals was attempted to be established, and the governor authorized to appoint four judges thereof. The bill was debated in the House over three days and nights. The excitement was intense. The speech of Mr. Wickliffe was a marvel of withering invective. Robertson delivered an elaborate address. The Governor and Lieutenant Governor were present on the floor of the House, urging the adoption of the bill."

The argument against the bill was its unconstitutionality, as an attempt under the guise of reorganization, to abolish a constitutional court, and by indirection to accomplish by a bare majority what the constitution required should be done by a twothirds vote, on impeachment or by address.

A principal argument in support of the bill was made by comparing the proposed action with that of Congress, in adopting the Judiciary Act, by which the law establishing Circuit Courts, enacted near the close of Adams' administration, was repealed. That argument was fallacious, as in the debate upon that bill, it was unanimously conceded that the Supreme Court, created by the Constitution, could not be abolished by Congress.

The discussion grew exceedingly vehement, and the ordinary courtesies of parliamentary debate were disregarded.

"Shylocks and Silver-heels, on one side, and Judge-breakers on the other, were among the milder forms of epithets," used; indeed, the governor and his party seem to have adopted as a slogan the title of Judge-breaker, which had been first used as a term of reproach.

"At midnight, on December 23, 1824, amid great tumult, the House concurred in the bill. The old court party appealed to the people."

A brief but fervent protest was issued by the minority of the General Assembly.

The new court was organized, Barry, Chief Justice, with Trimble, Haggin and Davidge associates. The clerk of that court, Francis P. Blair, obtained possession of the records by force, and the court proceeded to decide cases, the first opinion being delivered April 19, 1825.

Boyle and his associates denied the constitutionality of the Act creating the new court, and continued to hear such cases as were brought before them. The records having been forcibly seized by the clerk of the new court, no decision appears to have been rendered by the old court at the Spring term of 1825, although in 3 Monroe, one opinion appears under the heading "Spring Term 1825," but it was delivered October 15, preceding.

"Curiously enough Judge Bibb was the counsel who filed a petition for rehearing in the case which was overruled." The

new court, in possession of the records, delivered fifty-two opinions of the Spring term.

With great unanimity the bar adhered to the old court, and the great majority of the circuit judges obeyed its mandates. Some circuit judges recognized the new court, and a few recognized both tribunals.

"Meanwhile the campaign of 1825 was waged with great activity, and unexampled bitterness. The parties had been rechristened, and when not referred to in terms of opprobrium, were now known as the Old, and the New Court parties. The result was an overwhelming victory for the Old Court party, a result which is a little surprising under the circumstances, with the passions of the people excited as they were, until we consider the great though quiet influence which must have been exerted by the practical unanimity of the circuit court bench and bar. One contributing factor which cannot be overlooked in reading the popular addresses and writings of the times, was the personal character of Boyle, and in a less degree, because less known, of his associates. As a result of the popular vote, there were but twenty opinions delivered by the new court at the Fall Term.”

"Although the old court controlled the House by a large majority, but one-third of the senators were chosen at that election— and the senate was equally divided, with the casting vote of the Lieutenant Governor, on the side of the new court. A Bill to repeal the reorganizing Act, sent up by the House, was rejected by the senate. Various compromises were proposed by the New Court party, some providing for the continuance of the old judges in office, with Boyle as Chief Justice, but as all involved by implication, a recognition of the constitutionality of the reorganization. act, Boyle and his party steadfastly refused them.

"After the legislature convened, the new court ceased to do business, but refused to surrender the records, or to permit parties or counsel to have access to them. Their clerk's office was guarded by armed men, and as the House adopted a resolution that it was the duty of the old court, through its sergeant-at-arms, to regain possession of its records, a hostile encounter was avoided with difficulty. The legislature adjourned, and an appeal to the people was again necessary. Each party had its newspaper organ, which was filled with abuse of its opponents. The tide of public opinion had turned permanently against the New Court party. At the session of 1826, the senate, like the house, was in favor of the Old Court, and on December 30, 1826, an Act passed both houses, the governor's objections notwithstanding, 'to remove the unconstitutional obstructions which have been thrown in the way of the Court of Appeals.' The salaries of the old judges for the time they had served without salary were voted to them, and the old

court proceeded in the discharge 'of its duties, and since that time, the decisions of the new court, which are printed in 2d Monroe, have never been recognized as valid."

Note-Judge Boyle lived on a fertile tract of some hundred acres, with a large family, including grandchildren, and with slaves sufficiently numerous to cultivate his fields.

Within the holiday season of 1823-4, his own and other girls were playing before an open hearth, when a doll's dress caught fire. A girl seizing it, ran out upon the lawn. Waving the toy in a frantic effort to extinguish the flame, it escaped her grasp, and lodging on the roof, the whole was soon burning. The woodwork of the solid brick mansion was totally consumed, except such parts as could be hastily detached. The next season it was rebuilt, the family finding shelter meanwhile in the old log house which had not yet been removed.

This extraordinary draft upon his resources, coming at such a period of financial stringency, and being soon followed by the suspension of his salary, the family straits became severe. My father described their condition. Sugar and coffee were luxuries indeed, and many conveniences obtainable only by purchase, were conspicuously absent. The farm supplied the indispensable food of the large family of whites and blacks. Flax and hemp were grown-the mother led her daughters and the young negro women in the art of carding, spinning, weaving and dyeing—of cutting and sewing, and thus the clothing of the children and servants was provided during that long period of privation. But it was a serious question how to supply the head of the family with the means necessary to maintain the dignity of his official station.

"The whole controversy was excessively distasteful to Boyle, who possessed quiet tastes. Only a high sense of duty, which in him was religious, induced him to retain his seat upon the bench during that trying period."

"Chief Justice Robertson said of him: 'He never sought office, he never shrank from duty.' It had been for some time his intention to retire as soon as the controversy should be finally settled, and it was virtually settled by the election of the old court senate."

Chief Justice Boyle had determined to resign as soon as he could do so, without being unfaithful to the constitution, and without sacrificing his own honor. When the August election of 1826, indicated the triumph of constitutional law, at the earliest moment, November 8, 1826, he resigned. Chief Justice Robertson reports that he said to his countrymen :

"Persecuted and abused for honestly maintaining the best interests of yourselves and your children, and for helping to save